

POL 27

BIAFRA-NIGERIA

7/1/69

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to

☒ Declassify with exemption of

EO 12958, 25X

FPC/HDR by MS Date: 3/19/96

Withdrawal No: _____

0002

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MMNARA Date 10/5/05

46



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Tananarive 570
7-29-69

CONFIDENTIAL 003

PAGE 01 TANANA 00570 300829Z

18
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 001/071 W

112235

R 291415Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2175

CONFIDENTIAL TANANARIVE 570

LIMDIS:

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
REF: STATE 123842 — *POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA*
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, MALAGASY OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED ON SUBJECT NIGERIAN WAR. BIAFRA'S SECESSION IS OPPOSED AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY NIGERIA BACKED.
2. MALAGASY CONCERNED OVER NIGERIAN-BIAFRAN SUFFERING AND AT ONE TIME PRESIDENT TSIRANANA TOLD INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT GOM READY OFFER FOOD. SUBSEQUENT ICRC FOLLOW-UP HAS BOGRDD DOWN SOMEWHERE.
3. FRENCH MEDIA HAVE OCCASIONALLY PUBLISHED PICTURES OF BIAFRAN SUFFERING. WE ASSUME FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO ENLIST MALAGASY SYMPATHY FOR BEAFRA. NEVERTHELESS, MALAGASY FEEL QUESTION NATIONAL UNITY IS PARAMOUNT BOTH IN MADAGASCAR AND ON AFRICAN CONTINENT.
4. RELATIVE LACK OF PUBLIC INTEREST ON NIGERIA WAS DUE TO MALAGASY ATTITUDE THAT AFRICAN MAINLAND DIFFERENT FROM ISLAND OF MADAGASCAR BOTH RACIALLY AND CULTURALLY. KING

①

CONFIDENTIAL

0003

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

Screened

POST Tanapave

SERIAL 570

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 30 AM 7 26

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 956

Secretariat

S/S-S 4
S/S-O 4
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
 MilRep
 Digest
Task Force

Principals and "S" Area

ES
S
U
J
D
C
 USC

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/PM
S/R
U/CF
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Geographic

AF 5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU
E 2
H
INR 6
IO 4
L 2
O 3
 OPR
 OC
 SY
 WLG
P
SCA
 VO
 SCS
SCI

Other

WH 10
VP
DOD
CIA
USIA 4
PC

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
 AA/AFR 2
 AA/VN 2
 AA/EA 3
 AA/NESA 2

TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE

AGR 3

LAB

HEW

INT

TRANS

CAB

AEC 3

NASA

JUS

FBI

NIC

NSA

File

Burned

2/10/69

0004

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
re POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 288

PAGE 01 OSLO 03020 290940Z

16
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

104256

R 290705Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2706
USIA

CONFIDENTIAL OSLO 3020

LIMDIS:

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

1. NORWEGIAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT NIGERIAN WAR HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL DURING PAST YEAR. SUBSTANTIAL NEWS COVERAGE HAS KEPT ISSUE BEFORE PUBLIC. SOME OF THIS COVERAGE WAS PREPARED IN NIGERIA BY NORWEGIAN CORRESPONDENTS MAKING FOR SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO NORWEGIANS. THIS CONTINUAL FLOW OF NEWS ABOUT DAILY EVENTS OF WAR, WITH EMPHASIS ON BIAFRAN SUFFERINGS, HAS PROBABLY BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPMENT WITHIN GENERAL NORWEGIAN OPINION OF AN EMOTIONAL TINGE WHICH FACTS DO NOT NECESSARILY CALL FOR.

(2) 2.A. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT POLITICAL ISSUES OF WAR. EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY ON HUMAN SIDE. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION AS TO FUTURE FORM OF NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AFTER WAR. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC DEBATE ON RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA BUT PRESSURES DO EXIST CENTERED IN YOUTH GROUPS OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND IN BIAFRA ACTION COMMITTEE.

2B. WITHIN TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK OF NORWEGIAN GENEROSITY TOWARD HUMAN SUFFERING ABROAD, THERE WAS, INITIALLY, GOOD SUPPORT IN RELIEF CAMPAIGNS TO AID VICTIMS OF WAR. BOTH SIDES HAVE RECEIVED NORWEGIAN LARGESSE BUT POPULAR SYMPATHIES HAVE BEEN WITH BIAFRANS PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL
3

OSLO 3020
7-29-69

0005

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 03020 290940Z

BEEN DEPICTED BY LOCAL MEDIA AS SUFFERING MORE. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL CAMPAIGNS (JOINT CHURCH AID, RED CROSS, AD HOC COLLECTIONS) DURING PAST YEAR ALL OF WHICH WERE WELL-SUPPORTED. SPRING CAMPAIGN, HOWEVER, WAS LESS SUCCESSFUL PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WAS CONDUCTED ON EVE OF ANNUAL VACATION PERIOD WHEN THRIFTY NORWEGIANS ARE SAVING FOR HOLIDAY TRIPS AND TO SOME EXTENT BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER RELIEF WAS GETTING THROUGH TO INTENDED RECIPIENTS.

3. AS REFLECTED BY MEDIA COVERAGE AND GENERAL PUBLIC DISCUSSION, DEGREE OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN NOGERTIAN WAR HAS LESSENED DURING CURRENT VACATION PERIOD. PRESUMABLY IT WILL INCREASE IN FALL. IN ADDITION, QUESTION OF RELIEF ACTIVITIES APPEARS SO CONFUSED BY DEBATE OVER ROUTES, ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES, ETC., THAT FOR MOMENT MANY ALSO ARE TOO DISCOURAGED BY PROSPECTS FOR ANY SOLUTION TO BE AS ACTIVELY ENGAGED AS BEFORE. GP-3.
CROWE

CONFIDENTIAL

0006

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

Screeners

POST

SERIAL

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 29 AM 7 45

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT

Secretariat

Geographic

Other

S/S-S
S/S-O
S/S-Screener
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Digest
Task Force

AF 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE

Principals and
"S" Area

CU
E 2
H
INR 6
IO 4
L 2
O 3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG

AGR 3

ES
S
U
J
D
C
USC

P
SCA
VO
SCS
SCI

LAB

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/PM
S/R
U/CF
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Other

HEW
INT

WH 10
VP
DOD
CIA
USIA 4
PC

TRANS
CAB

AEC 3
NASA

JUS
FBI
NIC
NSA
File
Burned

2/10/69

0007

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA	
ORIGIN/ACTING				AIRGRAM			
AF - 5				Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.		FILE DESIGNATION	
RM/R	REP	AF	ARA	CONFIDENTIAL		CA-4225	
5	FE	NEA	CU	HANDLING INDICATOR		NO.	
5	E	P	IO	<p>TO : LAGOS</p> <p>INFO : ADDIS ABABA GENEVA LONDON PARIS USUN</p> <p>FROM : STATE</p> <p>DATE: JUL 28 4 59 PM '69</p> <p>SUBJECT : Visit of Nigerian Commissioners Ayida and Ebong</p> <p>REF :</p> <p>Commissioners Ayida and Ebong, with Ambassador Iyalla, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Robert Moore on July 17. Mr. Ayida did most of the talking for the Nigerians.</p> <p>Ambassador Moore stressed that the FMG should not underestimate the gravity of the situation that would be created in the US should there be a recurrence of last summer's tragic starvation in the Biafran enclave. He expressed keen US disappointment over the failure of the FMG to proceed with the Cross River proposal, which if implemented could largely meet the relief problem without putting the FMG at a military disadvantage. He urged that the FMG consider international opinion and make public its basic intentions on relief, negotiations and security guarantees for Ibos.</p> <p>The Nigerians in response placed the blame for the relief stoppage on General Ojukwu and defended the FMG conditions. Mr. Ayida asserted that kwashiokor is endemic in Nigeria, that Biafra is exploiting the issue, that starvation is greatly exaggerated, and even alleged that the international relief effort may have provided more protein for needy Biafrans than is available to the needy in the rest of the country. He commented on the brutal nature of the conflict, asserted that the public is aware of combat casualties, and claimed these reduced public sympathy for any Biafran suffering. He is of the opinion that it is impossible to separate humanitarian from political objectives in the war. Ambassador Iyalla, in contrast to the previous</p>			
5	FBO	AID	28/7				
AGR	COM	FRB	INT	<p>1969 JUL 28 PM 7 15</p> <p>COPY 10-PRR</p>			
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB				
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD				
USIA	NSA	CIA					
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION							
POST ROUTING							
TO:	Action	Info.	Initials				
AMB/PO							
DCM							
POL							
ECON							
CONS							
ADM							
AID							
USIS							
FILE							
Action Taken:							
Date:							
Initials:							
Drafted by:							
AF/W:Rwach:nb							
Clearances:							
AF - Amb. Moore							
FORM 10-64 DS-323				CONFIDENTIAL			
For Department Use Only				In <input type="checkbox"/> Out <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
Drafting Date:		Phone No.:		Contents and Classification Approved by:		AF/W:DSSpigler	
7/25/69		2946		[Signature]		[Signature]	

0000

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

2

then said that the FMG concern for suffering civilians is shown by its "allowing" night flights even now to reach Uli. Twenty flights from Sao Tome were permitted to land at Uli "last Friday," he claimed, and pointed out the risk that some were arms carriers.

Ambassador Moore stressed the United States Government's hope for an early peaceful settlement and asked the Nigerians to continue efforts to resume talks with the secessionists. Mr. Ayida responded that he is convinced, after participating in all previous FMG negotiations with the Biafrans, that there is no hope of negotiations. However, the FMG is prepared to negotiate if Biafra should signal honest intentions. He pointed out that a series of Biafran military defeats and loss of territory have not made Biafra willing to compromise on their political objectives (which Ayida thought should logically be tailored to their military ability to achieve them). He expects a solution only after the arms supply from abroad is cut off by the FMG actually taking all airfield sites in Biafra.

Mr. Ayida claimed that at Monrovia in April five of the six African heads of state of the OAU Consultative Committee were willing to announce that there are no longer two sides in the Nigerian conflict, in view of the contracting small size of the Biafran enclave. Mr. Ayida thought that negotiations on a "give and take basis" are no longer reasonable to ask of the FMG.

The discussion was frank and uninhibited, but the Nigerians seemed resigned both to a military solution and to what they deemed the FMG inability to satisfy foreign humanitarian concern. At the same time, none would predict the time for an end to the conflict or comment clearly on the state of the fighting.

RICHARDSON, ACTING

CONFIDENTIAL

0009

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW NARA Date 10/3/03

(1)



Department of State

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 004

PAGE 01 KHARTO 00825 300829Z

18

ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

112244

R 281225Z JUL 69

FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3610

INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

CONFIDENTIAL KHARTOUM 825

LIMDIS:

REF: STATE 123842

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

X2 POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

SUDANESE RECENT PUBLIC OPINION NOT GREATLY CONCERNED NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. LITTLE INTEREST THAT EXISTS IN PRO FNG.

2. NO REAL ATTITUDES APPARENT ON EITHER POLITICAL ISSUES OR RELIEF ISSUES. GOS HAS OWN SECESSIONIST PROBLEMS AND THEREFORE GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC NIGERIANS.

3. VERY LITTLE INTEREST SHOWN BY LOCAL MEDIA AND PRINCIPAL CONTACTS. HOWEVER, FNG CHARGE RECENTLY PLACED ADD IN ARAB PAPERS GIVING FNG STORY. MOORE

Khartoum 825
7-28-69

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

4

0010

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 950503
By MN/ARA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

TOP SECRET

Screeners

POST

SERIAL

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 30 AM 7 31

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 959

Secretariat

S/S-S
S/S-O
S/S-Screener (3)
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Digest
Task Force

Principals and
"S" Area

ES
S
U
J
D
C
USC

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/PM
S/R
U/CF
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Geographic

AF 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU
E 2
H
INR 6
IO 4
L 2
O 3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P
SCA
VO
SCS
SCI

Other

WH 10
VP
DOD
CIA
USIA 4
PC

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE

AGR 3

LAB

HEW

INT

TRANS

CAB

AEC 3

NASA

JUS

FBI

NIC

NSA

File

Burned

2/10/69

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARA Date

46



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 714

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01311 281123Z

16
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

097114

R 280940Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4193

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1311

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842 —

1. OVER PAST YEAR GOA HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED FEDERAL NIGERIAN POSITION ON CIVIL WAR AND RELIEF. ALGERIAN MEDIA, WHICH MORE OFTEN REFLECT GOA OPINION RATHER THAN THAT OF PUBLIC, HAVE FOLLOWED SIMILAR PATTERN AND HAVE ALLEGED "IMPERIALIST" MACHINATIONS IN BIAFRA. AS WITH OTHER THINGS AFRICAN, THERE IS NOT A GREAT INTEREST IN WHAT MAY OCCUR IN NIGERIA EXCEPT AS GOA MAY WISH TO AROUSE INTEREST FOR ITS PURPOSES. MODERATE PUBLICITY IS GIVEN TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY GOA TO GON.

2. FOREIGN OBSERVERS ARE INTRIGUED BY CALL OVER WEEK-END OF ICRC PRESIDENT NAVILLE ON BOUMEDIENE. IT IS ASSUMED THAT NAVILLE SPOKE OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RELIEF WITH VIEW TO HAVING BOUMEDIENE USE HIS INFLUENCE ON NIGERIANS, WITH WHOM GOA MAINTAINS FRIENDLY RELATIONS. WE HAVE AS YET NO SOLID INFORMATION ON THIS MEETING, BUT WOULD BE SURPRISED IF GOA WERE PREPARED TO PRESS GON TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BEYOND ITS NORMAL INCLINATIONS. GP-3 HOFFACKER

Algeria 1311
7-28-69

(P)

CONFIDENTIAL

22

0012

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

Screener W

POST

Algiers

SERIAL

1311

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 28 AM 10 02

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 892

Secretariat

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Digest
Task Force

Principals and "S" Area

ES 1
S
U
J
D
C
USC

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/PM
S/R
U/CF
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Geographic

AF 5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU
E 2
H
INR 6 6
IO 4 4
L 2
O 3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P 1
SCA
VO
SCS
SCI

Other

WH 10 16
VP
DOD
CIA
USIA 4 4
PC

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2
TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE
AGR 3
LAB
HEW
INT
TRANS
CAB
AEC 3
NASA
JUS
FBI
NIC
NSA
File
Burned 2/10/69

0013

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MM Date 10/3/05

66



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

*Amembassy
7-28-69 4097*

CONFIDENTIAL 865

PAGE 01 KINSHA 04097 290254Z

83
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01/071 W

102329

R 281730Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1569
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI

CONFIDENTIAL KINSHASA 4097

SUBJ: KINSHASA PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

LIMDIS:

1. INTEREST NOT HIGH IN CONGO (K) CONCERNING NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. GDRG POSITION CLEARLY SUPPORTS NIGERIAN FMG, REMEMBERING ITS OWN SECESSION TROUBLES.
2. KINSHASA PRESS, RADIO, AND TV PRESENT BOTH SIDES OF CONFLICT, PARTLY IN EFFORT TO BE OBJECTIVITY, SSBUT ALSO PARTLY BECAUSE INCLINED TO USE ANY WELL-PREPARED FRENCH COPY WITHOUT REVIEWING CONTENTS. THIS HABIT OFTEN GIVES BIAFRA THE EDGE BECAUSE OF FRENCH NEWS SOURCES.
3. GENERAL PUBLIC OPINION BASED ON SOUNDING OF EMBASSY CONTACTS SHOWS MILD SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRA. VANCE

①

CONFIDENTIAL

47

0014

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 950503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

Screener

POST

Kinsloss

SERIAL

4097

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 29 AM 12 31

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 978

Secretariat

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 8
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Digest
Task Force

Principals and "S" Area

ES ✓
S
U
J
D
C
USC

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P ✓ 1
S/PM
S/R
U/CF ✓ 1
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Geographic

AF 5 ✓ 6
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU
E 2
H
INR 6 ✓ 6
IO 4 ✓ 4
L 2
O 3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P ✓ 1
SCA
VO
SCS
SCI

Other

WH 10 ✓ 10
VP
DOD ✓ 1
CIA 1 ✓ 1
USIA 4
PC

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2
TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE
AGR 3
LAB
HEW
INT
TRANS
CAB
AEC 3
NASA
JUS
FBI
NIC
NSA
File
Burned

2/10/69

0015

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 370

PAGE 01 PRETOR 02136 281953Z

83
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01, CIAE: 00, /071 W

100239

R: 281521Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3353

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 2136

LYMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN WAR

REF: STATE 123842

JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

1. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR IN ALL SOUTH AFRICAN NEWS MEDIA. COVERAGE CENTERS ON ITS INHUMANITY.

2. ANSWERS TO PARA. 2 OF REFTELI QUESTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. GENERAL ATTITUDE AMONG INFORMED PEOPLE IN SA TOWARD NIGERIAN WAR IS THAT IT "QTE: ANOTHER EXAMPLE BLACK AFRICA'S UNSTABLE POLITICAL LIFE". (END QTE) SUPPORT FOR BIAFRAN SEPARATION PREDOMINATES.

AMONG INFREQUENT SAG COMMENTS ON SITUATION IS SUGGESTION THAT PRINCIPLE SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO NIGERIA AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS OF WORLD. SAG SPOKESMEN CLAIM THAT ENFORCED INTEGRATION PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT TRIBAL BACKGROUNDS INEVITABLY LEADS TO FRICTION AND BLOODSHED, WITH NIGERIAN PROVIDING ONLY MOST RECENT EXAMPLE. IN CONTRAST TO THIS, SPOKESMEN HAVE POINTED OUT "WISDOM" OF POLICY OF "SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT", WHEREBY AFRICAN PEOPLE OF REPUBLIC ARE SEGREGATED INTO SEPARATE "HOMELANDS" FOR EACH ETHNIC BACKGROUND. BY THIS POLICY, SAG CLAIMS FRICTION AND TRIBAL CLASHES ARE AVOIDED.

B. WITH REGARD RELIEF ISSUES, SAG HAS SENT, TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE, TWO SHIPMENTS MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO BIAFRA. THERE HAVE BEEN NO

CONFIDENTIAL

*Pretoria 2136
7/28/69*

*Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
XR Pol 27-9 B-N*

(a)

0016

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 02136 281953Z

PUBLIC RELIEF CAMPAIGNS, HOWEVER.

3. SA NEWS MEDIA CONTINUE SHOW ACTIVE INTEREST IN NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS. RECENT VISIT PROFESSOR CHRIS BARNARD TO GABON, WHERE HE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED WITH EMACIATED BIAFRAN CHILDREN IN REFUGEE CAMPS, WAS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PLAY IN SA PRESS WHICH FOCUSED ON BARNARD'S CONDEMNATION OF A SITUATION WHICH SO AFFECTS CHILDREN. MEDIA INTEREST IN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE FOCUS ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECT. PRINCIPAL CONTACTS GENERALLY DO NOT DISCUSS NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR WHEN THEY DO, HOWEVER, IT OFTEN IN CONTEXT THEIR VIEW INEVITABILITY SUCH SITUATIONS WHEN THEY ALLEGE BLACK MAN GIVEN POWER BEFORE HE READY TO HANDLE IT AND WHERE POPULATION IS NOT ETHNICALLY HOMOGENEOUS. ROUNTREE

CONFIDENTIAL

0017

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA/NARA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

TOP SECRET

Screened *gr*

POST

PRETORIA

SERIAL

2136

(Time Received)

1969 JUL 28 PM 5 49

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 904

Secretariat

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Digest
Task Force

Principals and
"S" Area

ES
S
U
J
D
C
USC

S/CPR
S/FW
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/PM
S/R
U/CF
U/PW
J/PM
J/WP

Geographic

AF 5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU
E 2
H
INR 6
IO 4
L 2
O 3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P
SCA
VO
SCS
SCI

Other

WH 10 10
VP
DOD
CIA
USIA 4
PC

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

TRSY 6
FRB
EXIM
BOB
CEA
COM 2
STR
TAR
WHRE

AGR 3

LAB

HEW

INT

TRANS

CAB

AEC 3

NASA

JUS

FBI

NIC

NSA

File

Burned

2/10/69

0018

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MMNARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 239

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06772 281745Z

52
ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EURI 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, SCA 01, SCS 04, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

JPM 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, 158 W

099537

R 281620Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8020
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMCONSUL IBADAN POUCH
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USUN 1079
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 6772

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE UNGA CONSIDERATION OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

1. IN COURSE OF JULY 28 CALL ON UDOH, HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, MINEXTAFF, WE RAISED THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE UN CONSIDERATION OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR BY NOTING STATEMENT OF INFORMATION COMMISSIONER ENAHORO TO PRESS IN PARIS JULY 25 THAT UN "INTERFERENCE" COULD BE "DANGEROUS" IN A DOMESTIC SITUATION. UDOH RESPONDED BY SAYING HE DID NOT THINK UNGA WOULD TAKE UP THE ISSUE, NOTING THAT OAU, A REGIONAL UN ORGANIZATION, ALREADY HAD MATTER UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

2. WHEN EMBAOFF RECALLED PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY IVORY COAST, INCLUDING THEIR UN DEL LINKING THEIR POSITION ON RHODESIA TO NIGERIAN WAR, UDOH BECAME VISIBLY DISTURBED AND VERY SERIOUS. SAID QUESTION A "DIFFICULT ONE" FOR FMG, BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

23

0019

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06772 281745Z

REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT LARGE MAJORITY UN MEMBERS WOULD
ACCEPT "AFRICAN VIEW" THAT OAU PROPERLY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER AND THAT ANY EFFORTS RAISE THE ISSUE PARTICULARLY
BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BIAFRA SHOULD BE
REGARDED AS "PARTISANSHIP".

3. COMMENT: UDOH IS REASONABLY WELL INFORMED AND COMPETENT
UPPER-MIDDLE LEVEL CIVIL SERVANT WHO PROBABLY REFLECTS
FMG AVERSION TO PROSPECT OF UN CONSIDERATION NIGERIAN CRISIS.
IT DOUBTFUL FMG AT THIS STAGE HAVE TAKEN ANY ACTIONS
TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE IVORIAN MOVE IN THE UN, OTHER THAN
LOBBYING WITH OAU CONCOMI MEMBERS FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR
KEEPING ISSUE SOLELY WITHIN OAU CONTEXT.

GP-3

OLSON

CONFIDENTIAL

23

0020

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 95/503
By	MN NARA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

US Mission GENEVA

Origin

ACTION:

Info:

Info:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy LAGOS
AmEmbassy ~~GENEVA~~ ADDIS. ABABA
AmEmbassy PARIS
AmEmbassy ROME
AmEmbassy ABIDJAN

(THIS IS A SIX (6) page MESSAGE)

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Biafran Positions on Nigerian Civil War

On invitation Professor Roger Fisher, Under Secretary attended private dinner Dr. Pius Okigbo July 21.

Okigbo spoke ^{with} his usual clarity and eloquence about Biafra's cause, setting forth with apparent authority and assurance current Biafran positions. He made several new points which were confirmed and developed in breakfast meeting between Okigbo and Fisher next morning.

1. Cross River. Okigbo advanced customary Biafran argument for third party guarantees, viz., any surface corridors, even river route, involved serious dangers to Biafran security. (Okigbo also claimed Biafran authorities had understood from original Ferguson presentation that Cross River operation would be managed by U.S. and conducted from mother ships standing offshore.) However, Okigbo responded favorably to Roger Fisher's

Drafted by:

U: CWRuser

Tel. Ext.

4515

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF - Ambassador Newsom

Clearances:

U/CF - Mr. Schott

D/S - DGleysteen

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0021

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Page 2 to Amembassy LONDON, Amembassy GENEVA

Classification

Origin

ACTION:

Info:

formula for breaking impasse on guarantees, i.e., Biafra would accept

Cross River proposal on explicit understanding that FMG forces not exploit river corridor militarily while relief operations in progress.

As to follow-up, Okigbo agrees that next move is his. He and Fisher next morning agreed that he would send letter to Ferguson, subject to review by his authorities in light of developments since his departure from enclave, as follows: QUOTE

Let me confirm in writing what you have been told already. Biafran Government agrees Cross River proposal and guarantees safe conduct to relief supplies and personnel concerned. We do so on explicit understanding that so long as this relief operation continues neither side will conduct any military operations in the area in which the shipments are being loaded or unloaded. Specifically, we understand that Ikot OkPoro, from which some our defenses will be withdrawn, will not be subject to military operations by Nigeria. (In context of discussion, Okigbo appeared to be referring to west bank of Cross River rather than east bank where town of ~~M~~ Ikot OkPoro is located.)

We also understand this relief arrangement can be terminated either side upon 60 days notice. END QUOTE.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ex.

Telegraphic transmission and

Cleances:

Arms Embargo Okigbo and Biafran authorities would accept complete

cessation arms flights into their territory if UK alone of FMG's various suppliers would agree stop all arms

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0022

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

Page 3 of telegram to AmEmbassy LONDON, AmEmbassy ~~ADPFC~~ ~~ABABA~~ GENEVA

SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

shipments into Nigeria. In this connection, Okigbo claimed major portion of Biafran military supplies captured from FMG. Despite smaller dollar value, UK more important arms supplier to FMG than Soviet Union, UK being principal supplier for FMG ground forces. Okigbo also claimed Biafra agreeable international inspection Uli ^{air strips} and any other ~~strip~~ on its territory, to verify cessation of arms flights. (Conversation noted such surveillance might also be accomplished by radar and appropriate identification procedures relief aircraft.) Said such embargo would be major step toward deescalation of the fighting. R

In breakfast conversation, Okigbo reaffirmed his statements. Noted, however, that Biafran agreement conditional upon present pattern of arms supply and ineffectiveness Nigerian air force in support Federal ground operations. ~~Minimum~~ Biafra would have to withdraw ^{its} ~~from~~ agreement if USSR (or other suppliers) would shift from aircraft to supply of ground equipment, effectively assuming UK's supplier role, or if new Soviet ground controls would make Nigerian air force more effective in support war on ground.

3. Mediation. Under Secretary in general terms described his concept of mediation, i.e., outsiders trusted by respective parties to engage FMG and Biafran authorities in dialogues about ~~minimum~~ minimum objectives and elements of settlement, transmittal this information to a mediator, who would compare two positions for

0023

Page 4 of telegram to AmEmbassy LONDON, AmEmbassy ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ GENEVA

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

common elements offering basis for fruitful talks. Okigbo endorsed this procedure. Also accepted suggestion Houphouet-Boigny ^{satisfactory} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ to Biafrans as conversation channel, suggested some OAU member for FMG.

Okigbo also readily agreed Emperor could play role of mediator provided he would agree to do so in personal capacity rather than as Chairman OAU Consultative Committee. (Fisher thinks, in light next morning's conversation, some formal confirmation of this necessary.) In this context, Okigbo also emphasized:

a) mediator would have to approach talks without preconceptions about settlement, e.g., Emperor would have to free himself from acceptance of OAU terms of reference re "united Nigeria;"

b) mediator should take active role in soliciting and shaping responses of ^{belligerents} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, offering suggestions while keeping open mind on terms of settlement;

c) Emperor would need competent support and advice, to energize mediation effort.

In footnote, Okigbo stressed that supporters of Emperor's mediation effort should, similarly, be uncommitted on outcome of settlement. This applied to U.S. if it were to support actively Emperor's attempt.

Okigbo said his authorities were prepared to engage in such

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

0024

Page 5 of telegram to AmEmbassy LONDON, AmEmbassy ~~ADDIS ABABA~~ GENEVA

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~
Classification

talks without insisting on ceasefire--although ceasefire would be helpful in advancing talks. He conceded possibility basis for talks might be interpreted differently by two parties, with FMG maintaining that talks were being held in context of "one Nigeria" while Biafran authorities would interpret terms of reference to hold open possibility of sovereign Biafran state.

Other parts of conversation went over familiar territory. In particular, Okigbo claimed the Biafran authorities were now agree-
(He did not mention
able to daylight flights/~~xxxxxx~~ qualifying conditions). Under Secretary described proposal under which cargoes would be loaded in third countries, under supervision, and would be kept under seal during touchdown in Lagos or other Federal points. Okigbo did not specifically respond this proposal, and Fisher apparently received no ~~further~~ encouragement from Okigbo on this point. in his breakfast meeting.

COMMENT: We appreciate that many aspects of positions set forth by Okigbo may seem unrealistic. Although he spoke ~~xxx~~ with authority we do not know extent to which his statements have official Biafran endorsement.

FOR LONDON: Request you inform FonOff of gist of Okigbo's comments and invite their reactions. ~~without~~ Without indicating any special US interest, ~~we~~ we hope in particular you can elicit their reaction to

SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0025

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/3/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

Page 6 to telegram to Amembassy LONDON, Amembassy GENEVA
ACTION:

Origin

Info:

arms embargo concept.

FOR GENEVA: We will comment in separate message on Fisher
formula for Cross River route guarantees.

RICHARDSON

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0026

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954543
By MWA Date 10/5/05

Monthly Count 200

O U T G O I N G

SECRETARIAT	Distribution by <i>S/S-O G. Helene</i>	Ex Secy
S/S	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	Post Geneva/London	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	Serial No. 124661	
S/S-O	Date 7/27/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	✓ 4	AF	✓✓ 14, 15, 24
U	✓✓ 5, 6, 10	ARA	
J	✓ 8, 7	EA	
D		EUR	✓✓ 16, 17
C	✓ 10	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓✓ 2, 3	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF ✓ 12		Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA ✓ 18	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓ 13		AID/VN	
IO — 25 Per Mr. Brown		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P (Returned by USC) 155-26-73-9-1-1		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/23/69

0027

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

10

POK 27 Biafra - Nigeria

124662

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

XR POK 27-9 Biafra Mission

XR SOC 3 Red Cross

Origin

ACTION: US Mission GENEVA

Info:

INFO: ~~Amem~~ Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy LAGOS
Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
Amembassy PARIS
USUN, New York

27 JUL 69 01 07Z
FOUR FOUR
(THIS IS A ~~TELETYPE~~ MESSAGE
TELEGRAM)

STATE

EXDIS

1. As indicated State 124661 Okigbo appeared receptive to Fisher formulation to break impasse on third country guarantees for Cross River route. Formulation ^{appears} ~~appears~~ so simple that it seems difficult to believe it will be endorsed by Biafran authorities. However, virtue of simplicity reflected in our own formulation contained in Ferguson letter of June 30 to Otue (see para. 2 below) is one we should strive to maintain.

2. Following is text of statement on guarantee contained in letter to Otue. QUOTE With regard to your reference to guarantees of this route by the USG I must first state that the Cross River route is an ICRC operation, and by insistence of the ICRC it must be conducted under the usual guarantees of the parties given to the ICRC as international protector of the arrangement. The ~~USG~~

8

Drafted by: U AF - CRM ^{and}	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - Amb. Newsom
U/CF - Mr. Schot		

~~AF - CRM~~

U - Mr. Ruser ^{p.w.R.}

S/S ^D Gleystean

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0028

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

Page 2 to USMission GENEVA

ACTION:

Origin

Info:

USG has full confidence in the assurances given by both parties with respect to the safety and security of the route. For its part, this Government will support fully the efforts of the ICRC to maintain such safety and security. UNQUOTE

3. We have considered ICRC proper party to receive parallel bilateral understandings and guarantees or unilateral statements of understandings such as partly envisaged in Fisher formulation. However, would prefer not to reopen question of proper addressee at this time, before Biafrans have decided on whether to send the ~~the~~ worked out between Fisher and Okigbo. ~~Okigbo~~ letter ~~XXXXXX~~ Ferguson might wish to discuss with Naville whether ICRC would be agreeable accept such a Biafran message under simple transmittal from Ferguson, undertaking directly with Biafrans such further follow-up and clarification as ICRC may deem necessary.

4. Merit of ~~XXX~~ Fisher formulation is that it would leap over impasse created by Biafran insistence on third party (i.e., US) guarantees. In essence, Biafrans would simply condition their safe conduct on unilateral statement of their understanding that neither side would conduct military operations in area where shipments are being unloaded. (This is similar

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

0029

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

Page 3 to US Mission GENEVA

ACTION:

Origin

Info:

to formulation used in North Viet Nam bombing halt ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
that we expected North Viet Nam not to take advantage of bombing
pause to increase rate of infiltration.) Please note that ~~MM~~
Fisher formulation does ^{repeat not} ~~not~~ require parallel response from FMG,
(See Viet Nam example,) although ICRC would want to assure
itself, in obtaining FMG's safe conduct assurances, that FMG
would rule out military operations ^{particularly} in the area of LSM landing
sites. Also note that this formulation implies commitment by
Biafrans not to engage in such military operations.

5. We are somewhat concerned from statements made by Houphouet
Boigny and Schumann (Paris 11270 and 11259 respectively) that they
may be contemplating considerably more complicated guarantee
arrangements than envisioned above. This may prove inevitable
but we believe we should endeavor gain acceptance for simple
formulation such as that set forth para 2, or Fisher formulation,
possibly substituting ICRC for USG as intermediary. If indeed
Biafran authorities should be prepared to accept Fisher formula-
tion, it would merit most careful consideration.

6. In view of the uncertainty as to whether problem of third
party guarantees can in fact be overcome ^{in this way} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

0030

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

Page 4 of USMission GENEVA

ACTION:

Origin

Info:

Ferguson in meeting with Naville may also wish to explore how such guarantee could be arranged, including: a) willingness of ~~MM~~ ICRC to act as sole guarantor with parallel assurances from Biafra and FMG; (b) possibility use by ICRC of neutral observers (e.g., Canadians) on route to ensure compliance both parties. (We doubt Naville contemplating international control force, which would be difficult to negotiate and emplace.)

7. We appreciate that the Geneva negotiations might ~~MM~~ result in development other guarantee formulations acceptable to both parties and to ICRC.

END

RICHARDSON

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0031

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

No. Copies
Received 30

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count 201

OUTGOING

SECRETARIAT	Distribution by <i>S/S-06 Malone</i>	Ex Secy
S/S	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	Post GENEVA	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	Serial No. 124662	
S/S-0	Date 7/27/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS
S <i>✓ 4</i>	AF <i>✓✓ 14/15</i>
U <i>✓✓ 5/6</i>	ARA
J <i>✓ 7</i>	EA
D	EUR <i>✓✓ 16/17</i>
C <i>✓ 10</i>	NEA
J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
S/P	White House <i>✓✓ 2/3</i>
S/CPR	Vice President
U/CF <i>✓ 12</i>	Defense
	State Rep
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS	CIA <i>✓ 18</i>
E	ACDA
H	AID
INR <i>✓ 13</i>	AID/VN
IO	USIA
L	NSA
O	Treasury
P	
<i>(Returned by ACS)</i>	OTHER
<i>MS 26-78169 Mr Brown</i>	
COPIES DESTROYED	

1/28/69

0032

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *VND 954503*
By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/05*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
granted by S.S.
Cat. C - Caption and entry
retained by S.S.

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Wilman, II

Date: 3/3/76

11597

7/26/69

~~SECRET - NO DIS~~

TO : The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : EUR - Martin J. Hillenbrand *MSH*
SUBJECT: Call by the French Ambassador -
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

You have agreed to receive Ambassador Lucet on Monday, July 28 at 12 noon. The Ambassador has told us that he wishes to touch base with you on key diplomatic problems, especially Viet-Nam, a European security conference, and Nigeria/Biafra, just before returning to France on July 30 for his annual summer leave and consultation. He will be talking with President Pompidou, Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, and Foreign Minister Schumann.

Regarding Viet-Nam, which you discussed with the Ambassador on July 14, you may wish to express our appreciation that his government has conveyed to the other side our strong admonitions as to the need for them to talk seriously with the GVN. You may also wish to mention the useful talk which Ambassador Shriver had on July 22 with President Pompidou on this subject.

A recent French oral statement to the Soviet Union expressing French willingness to discuss the "aims, composition and preparation" of a European security conference was conveyed to us on July 18 by a French Embassy officer. Ambassador Lucet has indicated that he would like to put this statement in proper focus. Although we do not have serious

EUR/FBX: R Long

~~SECRET - NO DIS~~

0033

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 950503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

66



POL 17 IRE NIGERIA
TR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 958

PAGE 01 AODS 03273 261318Z

52
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, OODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, UCF 05,

ACDA 16, RSR 01, 164 W

090141

PI 261110Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 278
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L AODS ABABA 3273

SUBJ: NIGERIA: IRELAND-IEG TALKS

1. AODS FRENCH-LANGUAGE EVENING DAILY AODS SOIR
JULY 24 REPORTED THAT AMBASSADOR OF REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
TO NIGERIA, J.G. KEATING, HAD ARRIVED IN AODS TO
CONSULT WITH ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES ON NIGERIAN CRISIS.
IN AIRPORT ARRIVAL STATEMENT, KEATING REPORTED TO HAVE
SAID OBJECT HIS VISIT SIMPLY TO COMPARE POINTS OF VIEW
WITH IEG AND FIND SOLUTION TO NIGERIAN CRISIS. WE
UNDERSTAND HE DEPARTED AODS FOR DUBLIN TODAY.

2. BRITISH EMBASSY SAID THEY HAD NO PRIOR WORD OF HIS
ARRIVAL. ITALIAN EMBASSY SAID APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE AODS
ALSO APPARENTLY UNINFORMED ABOUT KEATING VISIT. REUTERS
CORRESPONDENT INFORMED BRITISH EMBASSY THIS MORNING
KEATING HAD BEEN CALLED HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON
NIGERIA, AND DECIDED RETURN VIA AODS FOR BRIEFINGS ON
CURRENT IEG AND OAU VIEWS. WE WILL REPORT ANY
INFORMATION RECEIVED CONCERNING SUBSTANCE KEATING'S TALKS HERE.

MALL

CONFIDENTIAL

Chick Chaka 3373
7-26-69

0034

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Origin

ACTION: ALL AF DIPLOMATIC POSTS

Amembassy BONN

Info:

COPENHAGEN

US MISSION GENEVA

DUBLIN

THE HAGUE

HELSINKI

LISBON

LONDON

OSLO

OTTAWA

STOCKHOLM

ROME

PARIS

INFO: USUN

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Public Opinion on Nigerian Civil War

1. Department would appreciate addressee posts impression of course of public opinion in respective countries over past year on subject Nigerian civil war.

2. Specifically it requests information on:

A) attitudes on political issues of war and form ultimate result should take;

B) attitudes on relief issues, their importance, and relative degree fault ascribed to Nigeria/Biafra, including where applicable breadth or cyclical nature of public participation in relief fund campaigns.

3. What degree of interest in Nigerian war and relief activities is now shown by local media and principal contacts?

RICHARDSON

Drafted by:

AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 7/25/69

Tel. Ext.

2105

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF/W - Mr. Melbourne

Clearances:

EUR/P - Mr. Jerabek

USIA/IAA - Mr. Hedges

FORM 8-65 DS-322

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

MMARA Date

10/5/05

0035

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

XPOL 27-9 BIAFRA - 123842

NIGERIA

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

25 Jul 69 21 59Z

123842



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 260

PAGE 01 NIAMEY 00910 251744Z

52

ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, SR 01,

ORM 03, UPW 01, AIDI 28, PC 04, RSR 0, /157 W

082903

R 251321Z JULI 69
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 223
INFORUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 668
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN NEW YORK 074

CONFIDENTIAL NIAMEY 0910

SUB: NIGERIA

1. WHILE SECSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SIDIKOU, IN TALKS WITH ME ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON STATUS OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, DID NOT MENTION ANY LIKELIHOOD NEW OAU, OCAM, ETC. INITIATIVES, HE DID SUGGEST RECENT LESSENING OF DIFFERENCES SEPARATING NIGER AND IVORY COAST ON QUESTION NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. HE SAID, QTE PRESIDENT DIORI HAS TENDED MORE RECENTLY TO SEE SITUATION WHERE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF BIAFRANS AND FMG CAN NO LONGER AS SUCH BEA CONSIDERATION UNQTE. FOR DIORI, ACCORDING TO SIDIKOU, THE INESCAPABLE REALITY NOW ABOVE ANYTHING ELSE, IS THAT THE WAR MUST END. HOUPHOUET, HE SAID, WAS OF THE SAME VIEW. DIORI STILL LOOKED WITH PARTICULAR DISDAIN ON OJUKWU'S USE RHODESIANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS WHO QTE HAVE NO SYMPATHY FOR AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS UNQTE. BUT THE SITUATION OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR HAS REACHED POINT WHERE IVORY COAST AND NIGER PRESIDENTS NOW SEE THAT DIFFERENCES WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

29

0036

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NIAMEY 00910 251744Z

HAVE EXISTED RESPECTIVELY IN IVORY COAST AND NIGER ATTITUDES ABOUT BIAFRA AND FMG CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO MATTER.


2. SIDIKOU ADDED NOTHING NEW ABOUT WHAT THIS QTE RECENT UNQTE ATTENUATION IN NIGER AND IVORY COAST ATTITUDES WOULD MEAN FOR THE RESPECTIVE ACTIONS PRESIDENT DIORI OR PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO TAKE. HE DID RELATE THEIR VIEWS TO A WIDENING FEELING IN AFRICA GENERALLY, REGARDLESS OF POSITIONS TAKEN ORIGINALLY, THAT THE WAR MUST BE HALTED. HE TALKED ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLICATION JEUNE AFRIQUE. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THE FURTHER ACCOMMODATIONS IN DIFFERING ATTITUDES ABOUT THE CONFLICT, BY REFERRING TO THE CONSIDERABLE CONCERN BY PRESIDENT DIORI AND OTHERS THAT IS EMERGING OVER THE TREMENDOUS PROBLEM FORESEEN OF HUMAN REHABILITATION OF THE MALNOURISHED, THE MAIMED, THE CRIPPLED, THE WOUNDED. THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUES THE MORE INESTIMABLE WILL BE THE HANDICAP THE FUTURE NIGERIA WILL FACE. HIS COMMENTS FURTHER HIGHLIGHTED NIGER'S CONCERN OVER HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF NIGERIA'S PROBLEM OF REHABILITATION WHICH BEAR DIRECTLY UPON ANY HOPES NIGER HAS OF AMELIORATING ITS INCREASING ECONOMIC STAGNATION WHICH IN PART WORSENS WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. NIGER COULD EXPECT TO BENEFIT FROM REVITALIZATION OF TRADE, PARTICULARLY OF CATTLE, AND FURTHER COOPERATION

WITH A HEALTHY NIGERIA NOT EXCESSIVELY OVER-BURDENED BY COSTS AND TRAUMA OF REHABILITATION.
ADAMS

CONFIDENTIAL

29

0037



66

July 25, 1969

RS/R
SSK
H/T
WFM 2/21

Honorable Warren G. Magnuson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

To: RS/AN-C:
Original (with courtesy
copy of the correspondence
was signed, dated & dispatched
direct from "H").

Dear Senator Magnuson:

Secretary Rogers has asked me to reply to your thoughtful letter of June 10 giving us your views on the tragic Nigerian situation. I can assure you that we share your deep concern about the situation and welcome your suggestions.

Although international relief cannot resolve the issues underlying the war, it has been much more successful than generally recognized in mitigating the suffering brought about by the conflict. The incidence of starvation was dramatically reduced during the winter and spring months through the infusion of relief supplies via the night airlifts to Biafra to the point that only a few weeks ago General Ojukwu himself stated publicly that starvation was no longer a problem.

For the past few weeks, however, the ICRC airlift has been suspended and the Joint Church Aid airlift is operating on a very reduced scale. The Federal Military Government is insisting that only daylight relief flights, subject to inspection in Lagos, will henceforth be acceptable. It holds that night airlifts are unauthorized invasions of Nigerian air space and provide cover for clandestine air delivery of arms to Biafra. Negotiations are in process with both sides in the effort to reach agreement on daylight flights as well as on the details of the operation of a river route through Federal territory to the Biafran enclave. This last is a proposal which Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson, our Special Relief Coordinator, has been particularly active in developing. There are various international efforts in course aimed at breaking the relief impasse, and our own efforts to this end are continuing, but each side is keenly sensitive to possible military and political ramifications of any relief proposal. Obtaining the agreement of both has always been a major obstacle to assuring a sustained flow of relief supplies to those in need.

As you point out, active US participation in the relief effort does not solve the problem of civil war. The underlying conflict,

AF/W: PPSmith/AF: CK Moore
7-25-69

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

0038

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/05

despite foreign arms and other international ramifications, is deeply rooted in issues internal to Nigeria and more generally to Africa as a whole. We have avoided direct intervention in this complex situation because we believe that U.S. capacity to influence either side toward a settlement is limited and because it seems clear that the day is past when outside powers can, without the cooperation of Africans, help settle the problems of independent Africa. Nevertheless, we have made - and continue to make - every effort to encourage a peaceful settlement of this conflict within an African framework.

Basic to this problem is the way the African nations themselves regard the issues involved. To four of them, the issue is self-determination. To the vast majority, however, the issue is defined as one of secession in a continent inhabited by more than 2,000 different tribes with varying degrees of commitment, at this stage of national development, to the states in whose boundaries they find themselves. Most African leaders are convinced that any application of the principle of self-determination to regions or tribes in such circumstances would lead to chaos and bloodshed throughout the continent. This viewpoint explains the overriding importance attached to the concept of territorial integrity of African states in meetings of African leaders. Article 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity provides that member states "solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to . . . respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state." The sensitivity of this issue is attested to by the resolution supporting Nigerian territorial integrity passed by the OAU Heads of State in 1967 and 1968 and by the many statements of various African leaders. Whatever the merits of such arguments, they are strongly held by Africans about their continent. Thus we do not believe that a U. S. pronouncement on the highly controversial issue of the applicability of the principle of self-determination to the Biafran situation would contribute to a peaceful settlement or to wider understanding between this country and that continent.

Nor do we believe that it would be effective at the present time for the U. S. to offer to mediate the conflict, as has been proposed in some quarters. Quite apart from the resentment of African states over extra-African intervention, the strong position held by the Federal Military Government on the basic issue of a united Nigeria makes it unlikely that it would agree to mediation efforts, except in the general framework of a united Nigeria. This, of course, the Biafrans would in turn be unlikely to accept. The central problem is not the absence of auspices under which negotiations might take place, but the positions of the two sides, which have thus far been irreconcilable on this core issue.

Recognizing the limitations on our capacity to act, we have nevertheless sought to encourage all efforts which offered hope

0039

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

of contributing to a negotiated solution. We have fully supported the peace efforts of the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and individual African leaders, and we have consulted from time to time with delegations at the United Nations to explore the feasibility of useful United Nations consideration of the Nigerian problem. Numerous peace initiatives, many of which have not become public, have been undertaken with U.S. support but thus far unfortunately none has been successful. I can assure you that in consultation with other governments, and with African governments in particular, we shall continue to look actively for opportunities to encourage the peaceful resolution of the conflict and shall continue to support any promising initiative to that end.

As I know you will be interested, I am enclosing a copy of the statement made by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson before the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 15. If you would like any further information or should you desire to discuss these issues with Department officers, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

WBM

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

WBM 7/25

Enclosure:

As stated.

AF/W:RPSmith/AF:CRM Moore:nm
7/25/69 x 5208

Clearances: U/CF - Mr. Schott
UNP - Mr. Briggs
AF/W - Mr. Melbourne
H - SSL

0040

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

spell out

of contributing to a negotiated solution. We have fully supported the peace efforts of the OAU, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and individual African leaders, and we have consulted from time to time with delegations at the UN to explore the feasibility of useful UN consideration of the Nigerian problem. Numerous peace initiatives, many of which have not become public, have been undertaken with U.S. support but thus far unfortunately none has been successful. I can assure you that in consultation with other governments, and with African governments in particular, we shall continue to look actively for opportunities to encourage the peaceful resolution of the conflict and shall continue to support any promising initiatives to that end.

As I know you will be interested, I am enclosing a copy of the statement made by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson before the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 15. If you would like any further information, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

As stated.

AF/W: RPSmith/AF: CRM: am
7/24/69

Clearances: U/CF - Mr. Schott
UNP - Mr. Briggs
AF/W - Mr. Melbourne
H -

discuss
discuss with representatives of the press

0041

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JULY 15, 1969

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 199

TESTIMONY BY
THE HONORABLE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
5110 NEW SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
July 15, 1969 - 10:00 A.M., E.D.T.

Mr. Chairman:

I genuinely welcome the opportunity to discuss with this Committee the Nigerian civil war and the agonizing problems we are encountering in our efforts to aid the innocent victims of this conflict. I would value your advice on this matter, which is of such deep and common concern.

Let me begin by outlining what the difficulties are and what the United States has done to date to deal with them.

This Administration recognizes that we neither can nor should impose our own moral concepts on other nations. At the same time, we believe the United States has an obligation -- an obligation that is internationally recognized -- to seek to relieve human suffering in a conflict such as that now going on in Nigeria.

On February 22, President Nixon said: "I know that I speak for all Americans in expressing this nation's deep anguish... It is tragic enough to watch a military conflict between peoples who once lived together in peace and developing prosperity. But that tragedy has been compounded, and the conscience of the world engaged, by the starvation threatening millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the battle."

The United States has been at the forefront of the international relief effort ever since it began. We have played a central role in two respects:

-- Roughly one-half of all international relief contributions have come from the United States;

-- Secondly, over the past four and one-half months we have led a major diplomatic effort seeking to obtain the agreement of both sides on an expansion of international relief arrangements.


Specifically, since January 20, this Administration has taken the following steps:

-- New financial pledges have been made to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the amount of \$15 million. These pledges have brought total contributions since the beginning of the relief effort to \$75 million, including \$65 million from official and \$10 million from private sources.

-- Ambassador Ferguson was appointed as Special Relief Coordinator to direct all United States Government activities in this field and, most important, to make an all-out effort to negotiate new arrangements that would permit a more adequate flow of relief to victims on both sides of the battle line.

--Ambassador

0042



-- Ambassador Ferguson has sponsored extensive logistical surveys of possible relief routes into the Biafran enclave. The major result of these surveys has been the formulation of a new relief route proposal -- the so-called Cross River route through the port of Calabar north to Biafran controlled territory. We also assisted the ICRC in the chartering of two shallow draft vessels which could operate on the Cross River. Ambassador Ferguson has pursued vigorous diplomatic efforts to obtain the agreement of both sides to this corridor, which we regard as an effective and workable supplement to the airlift.

-- In addition, Ambassador Ferguson extensively explored with both sides the acceptability of other relief arrangements, including expansion of the airlift, the possibility of daylight flights, and the feasibility of land corridors.

Until recently, the international airlift by ICRC and Joint Church Aid had been effective in preventing a recurrence of last summer's mass starvation in the Biafran enclave. By the common agreement of observers visiting the area, the airlift helped substantially to meet minimum food requirements. However, the flow of supplies was never fully adequate. Medical surveys found a serious dietary imbalance, and thus a great danger of epidemics. Most tragically of all, the enclave's children were -- and remain -- dependent on shipments of protein rich foods to ward off crippling and ultimately fatal deficiencies.

It is often overlooked that a relief problem of almost comparable scope exists on the Federal side. There, too, the margin of survival is perilously slim. The international relief agencies report that they care for approximately one million people on the Federal side and between two and three million people in the Biafran enclave.

Such, then, is the stark outline of tragedy. Yet, despite our most energetic efforts, we were unable to obtain the agreement of the parties to an expansion of relief beyond the hazardous and sporadic night airlift which had been operating for more than a year into Biafra. Now even this airlift has been severely curtailed. The curtailment followed the shooting down of an ICRC aircraft by the Nigerian air force and a subsequent imposition by the Federal military government of strict new conditions on relief flights into the Biafran enclave.


The ICRC has now suspended its airlift pending agreement by the two parties on flight arrangements. Religious and voluntary agencies have continued occasional flights despite these new restrictions. The flow of airborne relief into the enclave has been reduced by more than seventy-five per cent.

President Naville of the International Committee of the Red Cross flew to Lagos last weekend to explore with the Federal Military Government possible arrangements to resume the airlift. Negotiations are proceeding. Thus far, no specific agreement has been reached even with the Federal side. The Biafran authorities continue their long-standing objections to a daylight airlift under the conditions upon which the Federal Nigerian Government now insists.

At present, therefore, not only is there an impasse on negotiations for new arrangements; most of the fragile night time airlift has been lost as well.

What

0043



-3-

What are the obstacles to agreement?

There exists on the Federal side:

-- First, a concern that international relief has aided the Biafran war effort. For example, the Federal Military Government charges that the relief effort generates foreign exchange which the Biafrans use for the purchase of arms, that the night time airlift provides a cover for arms flights, and that food and medicine intended for civilians, are allocated to Biafran troops.

-- Second, a belief that starvation in the enclave is exaggerated by Biafran propaganda to enlist international sympathy and political support.

-- Third, popular pressures on the Federal Military Government, as the war drags on, to exercise the most stringent controls over international relief, regardless of the consequences.

There exists on the Biafran side:

-- First, a fear that Federal control over relief shipments would enable the Federal Military Government to regulate the flow and contents to serve its own political or military purposes;

-- Second, a professed fear that food passing through Federal territory might be poisoned.

-- Third, a belief that Biafran military security would be jeopardized by relief corridors, including daylight flights, that were not guaranteed by third parties.

As a result of all these factors, we have been unable to break the impasse. For example, although both sides had agreed in principle to the Cross River proposal and there are vessels now standing by in West African waters, neither of the parties has allowed the use of the route.

What is the U.S. now doing to cope with this situation? Our immediate objective is, of course, to restore the flow of relief into the Biafran enclave.

We have moved ahead with several urgent steps to pursue this goal. The Committee will appreciate, I know, that I am not at liberty to discuss all the details of our actions. However, I can outline some of them.

-- The United States is addressing appeals to all parties to agree promptly to resume the airlift and to implement the Cross River route.

-- We have approached the Secretary General regarding the role of the United Nations in resolution of the relief impasse.

-- We have just concluded intensive discussions on the Nigerian problem with Emperor Haile Selassie during his visit here last week. We shall continue the closest consultations with the Emperor; and through him, the Organization of African Unity.

--We

0044

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05

-- We have exchanged views with the British and French Governments on the relief problem and asked their help in breaking the impasse.

-- Ambassador Ferguson will leave shortly after this Hearing on an urgent mission to Europe, where he will discuss relief problems with His Holiness, Pope Paul, with the Red Cross in Geneva, and with the French Government.

-- We are also in close touch with other concerned governments to coordinate our efforts.

We are under no illusions that there are quick and easy answers, however vigorously we pursue new initiatives. But this Administration remains committed, despite the obstacles, to do all it can to work with others and to encourage the two parties to save innocent lives.

I should stress once more that the focus of all these efforts is relief. I fully recognize the argument has been made that relief questions are inextricably bound to the political and military issues of the civil war. It is true that relief is haunted by the bitter passions of civil strife and the military demands of the two sides. It is true that the only lasting solution to the relief problem is an end to the war.

I shall not, therefore, beg the question of U.S. political involvement in the Nigerian civil war as a logical step in the relief effort. This Administration has faced that question directly, and I want to address the Committee with equal candor on that subject today. There are really two questions here: First, should we intervene in an effort to bring an end to the fighting and eventually to bring about some sort of political settlement? Second, would such a direct political initiative by the United States serve our immediate and urgent objective of restoring and even increasing relief?


To be concise, a United States political initiative in the civil war must reckon immediately with several obdurate realities.

1. At present the two sides show no willingness to agree even on the context for political discussions, let alone terms of a possible settlement. The Federal Military Government has insisted adamantly on the principle of a unified Nigeria as the only basis for settlement. The Biafran authorities have rigidly refused to renounce their claim to independence as a basis for settlement. The Federal Government has insisted on negotiations prior to a ceasefire. The Biafrans have insisted on a ceasefire or truce prior to negotiations.

These positions rest on a hard truth -- both sides continue to believe that they can gain by fighting what they might lose by talking. There is, at present, no readiness to compromise. This is the reality that thwarted the most recent OAU mediation effort in Monrovia last April. This is the obstacle that has frustrated numerous unpublicized efforts by third parties.

2. The

0045



2. The United States has had to face the fact that we have no effective influence with either party to alter these realities. Our influence rests largely on the moral suasion of world opinion. Since both parties see their vital interests at stake, they subordinate the opinion of others to their own concerns and interests. We are not, as this Committee knows, a supplier of arms to either party. This Administration certainly does not intend to alter the arms embargo the United States wisely adopted at the onset of the conflict.

3. Finally, we labor under self-imposed limitations, which we believe have wide support in the U.S. Congress and among the American people. We do not intend to become militarily involved in this conflict.

Beyond this question of influence with the two sides, there are equally serious limits to our ability to influence other parties whose role would be crucial to the end of the conflict.

The British strongly support the Federal side. They have important political and economic interests at stake in Nigeria.

The Soviet Union supplies arms to the Federal side. This also constitutes a major political interest in the conflict.

On the other hand, governments which have given their support to the Biafran cause have done so as a matter of national policy. Thus far we see no sign that the policies of these nations will change, or that the United States could induce such change.

The United Nations has been unable to take up this problem because strong African opposition has precluded the introduction of the Nigerian civil war before the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Within this context, let me now discuss our views on certain specific proposals that have been put forward.

First, an arms embargo. The difficulties of obtaining agreement on this directly relate to the national policies I have just discussed. However, even if agreement could be obtained among major suppliers, an embargo would still be most difficult to enforce. The two parties could readily obtain arms on the international market -- as, in fact, they now do. Then, too, our sponsorship of an embargo would be regarded as hostile by at least one side and perhaps both, thereby undercutting whatever effectiveness we may now retain as a mediator on relief. Of course, we would not oppose an arms embargo if one were negotiated.

Four Power Talks. We must recognize that there are serious problems here. The day is past, Mr. Chairman, when outside powers can impose a peace or redraw the map for the people of Africa. Talks among non-African powers, in and of themselves, are not an answer to the problem.

This brings me to the ultimate political question which has been raised so often in criticism of our official posture toward the Nigerian civil war. Is our relief policy hostage to some deeper political commitment to the unity of Nigeria? And in the same vein, is United States recognition of an independent Biafra the answer to our dilemma?

Mr. Chairman,

0046

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

Mr. Chairman, this Administration has tried to consider every aspect of the Nigerian question.

Recognition of an independent Biafra is not a panacea, either for relief, an end to the war, or for the future stability of West Africa. We understand the concern of the Ibo people. We appreciate their insistence on guarantees for their personal safety, just as we appreciate the desire of the Federal Government to restore the high promise of a unified Nigeria. We have repeatedly urged the Federal Military Government to make a precise and unequivocal declaration of these guarantees.

Furthermore, recognition would have no tangible effect on the hostilities. To the contrary, it would only harden the positions of both sides, at the risk of rising Soviet influence in Federal Nigeria.

Whatever the course of the present fighting, an independent Biafra could be a source of recurring conflict. Within the territory claimed by the Biafrans there are numerous tribes with a history of hostility to the dominant Ibo tribe. It would be ironic indeed if we validated one claim for self-determination only to incite new and equally bitter irredentisms threatening the stability of the area.

This Administration, therefore, does not contemplate either support for or recognition of the secessionist authorities. We regard a peaceful and just reconciliation of Nigeria as in the best interests of Africa and all those, like the United States, who wish her well.

In summary, then, we plan to pursue urgent steps in two directions:

1. Our immediate concern is relief. This means a way must be found to reach agreement on daylight flights and the Cross River route. We shall do all we can to make this possible.
2. We shall give continuing support and encouragement to any efforts that might produce constructive talks between the two sides and an end to the fighting. We will be exploring possibilities with other concerned governments in the days and weeks ahead.

The Administration recognized that the Nigerian tragedy deeply concerns the Congress and the American public. We share this concern and we welcome every suggestion in the common interest of saving lives.

* * * * *

0047

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

FORM OS-1563 *
12-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ACTION SLIP
(To Remain With Correspondence)

CONTROL NO.

S/S 9187

TO

AF - Mr. Alexander

DATE

6/12/69

SUBJECT

Ltr to S fm MAGNUSON (USS) dtd 6/10

ACTION

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required _____

Prepare reply.

A response for signature by ~~xxx~~ **AWMX** Mr. Macomber

Clear with _____

XXXXX

Prepare a _____ to _____

Refer to White House request of _____

Due in ^H~~xxx~~ by **JUNE 16, 1969**

XXXXX

For your information.

REMARKS

COPIES TO

S - Mr. Robinson (w/ltr)
U - Mr. Stempel (w/ltr)
U/CF - Mr. Dawson (w/ltr)
H - Mr. Briggs (w/ltr)
IO - Mr. Garland (w/ltr)
C - Mr. McHenry (w/ltr)

OFFICE OF THE ASST.
SECRETARY - AF

1969 JUN 12 PM 5 23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GIKelly x4735
SECRETARIAT STAFF
EXT.

0048

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN/ARA Date 10/5/05

URGENT

A CONGRESSIONAL - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

A reply or written acknowledgment must be made within Three Working Days (See 5 FAM 1524.3 or H - Guide Lines).

If for any reason, a problem is anticipated, drafting officer should immediately call H - Extensions 4286 or 7579.

M - 115
3 - 62

GPO 935559

0049

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN
 JOHN O. PASTORE, R.I.
 A. S. MIKE MONROE, OKLA.
 FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO
 E. L. BARTLETT, ALASKA
 VANCE HARTKE, IND.
 PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
 HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
 DANIEL B. BREWSTER, MD.
 RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
 FRANK E. MOSS, UTAH
 ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C.

FREDERICK J. LORAN, STAFF DIRECTOR

NORRIS COTTON, N.H.
 THRUSTON, B. MORTON, KY.
 HUGH SCOTT, PA.
 WINSTON L. PROUTY, VT.
 JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
 ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 10, 1969

ACTION
 is assigned to

AF

The Honorable William P. Rogers
 Secretary of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The tragedy of Nigeria/Biafra is well-known to all Americans. For two years now the war has persisted with the number of deaths from starvation mounting by the thousands each day. How we as individuals and as a country can act effectively to alleviate this suffering has not been as clear as the obligation we all rightly feel. The anguish and sympathy of the people of the United States for the innocent victims of this senseless conflict has been manifest in the outpouring of letters which all of us in Congress are receiving and in the generous contributions of the American people to the international relief effort. Unfortunately, this relief effort has not been enough. The war, the starvation, continue. Two years of conflict has witnessed the progressive increase in the number of deaths, without any progress toward a settlement.

No one familiar with the situation doubts its agonizing complexities. Like so many problems that confront the United States today, the avenues open to us are limited and uncertain. We wisely announced at the onset of the war that we would not sell arms to either side and we established ourselves as the only world power that did not embroil itself with the military aspect of this problem. At the same time we embarked on a policy which the Department of State has labeled as one of neutrality. In an effort to deal solely with the humanitarian crisis, we have tried to avoid involving ourself politically by continuing to maintain our policy of recognition of the Nigerian Federal Government. To intervene politically appeared to be neither advisable nor beneficial to solving the problem. Instead,

2

6-12-69

14877

/S/ WARREN G. MAGNUSON, U.S.S.

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

0050

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: VMD 959503
 By: MVA/ARA Date: 10/5/03

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Page two

the United States Government has concentrated on supplying the major portion of the international relief program. Unfortunately, this aid has served as only a temporary palliative. Not until a truce or cease-fire has been put into effect is it anticipated that a relief program can be initiated on the massive scale required. In the interest of promoting the establishment of a cease-fire, I co-sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 8 which calls upon the government of the United States to use all its diplomatic influence to bring about an immediate cease-fire. As you know, all efforts along this line have been fruitless.

I, like many of my colleagues in the Congress, have been deeply concerned that no end to this war is in sight. I am particularly disturbed that our policy and efforts have been without results. We have chosen to concentrate our attention on meeting the present humanitarian crisis without delving into the source of the starvation. Yet, the problem lies rooted in the war itself, in the basic question over which the war is being fought -- whether there will be one Nigeria or two separate countries. Until we can effectively address ourself to this issue, we shall have to be satisfied with trying to curb the suffering of the population without any hope of it ending. This is a sad prospect and one not worthy to be considered the policy of a great world power.

As you know, our policy has been one of support for a solution of the war along lines of a unified Nigeria. I now question whether the premises upon which this policy is based are still valid. I believe that we should look at the situation as it now exists and review our policy accordingly. There are certain salient facts that need to be considered, notably, that the Biafrans are no less determined, no less able to continue their fight now as they were in June of 1967, the onset of the war. The secessionist movement continues unabated after two years of fighting. The failure of the Nigerian government to provide for the security of life and property of its citizens has convinced the Ibos that their only hope of survival is in asserting their sovereignty. There may have been a time when Nigerian federalism could have been saved, but the situation has

0051

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MMARA
Date	10/5/05

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Page three

since deteriorated seriously. The Biafrans now feel that they have no choice, no alternative, but to continue to fight. This preeminent fact cannot be overlooked in assessing the usefulness and practicality of our present policy.

It appears to me to be unrealistic for us to continue to push for a solution along the lines of reunification. While our policy of a unified Nigeria may have appeared to be the only reasonable course for us to pursue two years ago, I now question its relevancy. Too much has transpired, too many have died to expect that the two sides can come together as one people. If unity is accomplished by military force, it is unlikely that peace will also result. True unity can only be accomplished by the common will to live together, and there is little hope that the warring parties can reconcile their differences and create a national unity.

In the light of these considerations, I doubt the wisdom of continuing this policy. I believe we should re-assess our position and explore what alternatives are open to us. To assume that we can do nothing because of the complexities of the problem is to rationalize our unwillingness to be creative. We must look to a policy which can contribute to the settlement of the war. We must abandon a policy which is unproductive and contains no promise for a peaceful settlement.

By our acquiescence, we have joined forces with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in their support for a military solution to this catastrophe. As a great power, our so-called neutrality has had a crucial effect. The result of our support for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Nigeria has been to line up the three great powers on one side. Who can deny that this position does not give Nigeria cause for continuing to seek a military victory and, thereby, contribute toward a continuation of the war?

The belligerents must work out a solution amongst themselves. However, our policy interferes with this process insofar as it favors Nigeria and does not encourage the negotiation of a settlement. Instead, by contributing nothing toward a resolution

0052

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MNARA Date 10/5/05


The Honorable William P. Rogers
Page four

of the conflict, we have indirectly contributed to its continuation. Surely, we can formulate a more constructive, positive policy: one which incorporates one of the basic principles of our foreign policy -- self-determination. This principle is no less valid when applied to Nigeria/Biafra than with respect to Viet-Nam. Although it certainly is not up to the United States to decide or impose a form of government on the warring parties, we certainly have an obligation to lend our good offices to bring about a peaceful solution to the war.

I write this letter not with the desire or even the belief that the United States can set aright this agonizing situation, but in the hope that we can lend our energy in a direction which will contribute to an early resolution of this war and an end to this tragedy.

I would appreciate any comments you might have concerning the content of this letter.

Sincerely,


WARREN G. MAGNUSON, U. S. S.

WGM:en

0053

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



31

Department of State

TELEGRAM

Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria

SECRET 066

PAGE 01 LONDON 05848 241820Z

54
ACTION SS 30

ACTION COPY

INFO OCT 01/031 W

074477

R 241745Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1789
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T LONDON 5848

EXDIS

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: STATE 121122

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL, EMBOFF TOOK ADVANTAGE OF GENERAL DISCUSSION ON NIGERIAN PROBLEMS WITH MOBERLY (ACTING HEAD, WEST AFRICA DEPT.) TO MENTION MATTER OF SOVIET ROLE.

2. ECHOING UK SENTIMENTS NOTED IN PARA TWO REFTEL, MOBERLY DESCRIBED FONOFF AS HAVING SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY APPROACH TO SOVIETS ON POSSIBLE ARMS EMBARGO. NOT ONLY WOULD SOVIETS EXPLOIT ANY APPROACH WITH WHICH UK ASSOCIATED TO UNDERCUT

BRITISH AND FREE WORLD POSITION IN LAGOS, BUT IT DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY ADVANTAGE FOR SOVIETS IN EMBARGO IDEA. CURRENT SITUATION IS TO SOVIET LIKING, THEY CAN APPEAR FORTHCOMING BY CONTINUING TO SELL ARMS TO FMG AT SAME TIME THAT THEY CAN ENSURE LEVEL OF ARMS SHIPMENTS IS NOT GREAT ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT DECISIVE END OF CONFLICT. MOBERLY FEELS SOVIETS WANT PRESENT SITUATION TO DRAG ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND SPECULATES THAT MOSCOW IS EMPLOYING TECHNIQUE OF OFFERING NIGERIANS OVERLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY. ADVANTAGES ARE THAT SOVIETS APPEAR HIGHLY COOPERATIVE, THAT NIGERIANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE SUCH ARMS EFFECTIVELY ENOUGH TO TERMINATE CONFLICT, AND THAT SOPHISTICATED SOVIET ARMS IN NIGERIA MEAN MORE RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS AND TRAINERS ON THE GROUND THERE.

3. CONCERNING IDEA THAT SOVIETS MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

*London - 5848
7-24-69
31*

0054

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDISDepartment of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 05848 241820Z


NON-AFRICAN POWER TALKS: LOOKING TOWARD MITIGATION NIGERIAN
CONFLICT, MOBERLY WAS SIMILARLY UNENTHUSIASTIC. WHILE
OTHER NON-AFRICAN POWERS MIGHT POSSIBLY BE CONSIDERED,
MOBERLY THOUGHT "NON-AFRICAN POWERS" WOULD COME TO MEAN
FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS: UN AS WITH MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.
IT ALWAYS CONCEIVABLE THAT SOVIETS MIGHT REGARD TALKS IN SUCH
CONTEXT AS VEHICLE WHEREBY ATTEMPTS AT MITIGATION COULD
BE SUBVERTED FROM WITHIN, SO TO SPEAK, BUT IT MORE LIKELY
THAT MOSCOW WOULD HAVE NO DESIRE TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH
ANY SUCH EFFORT. USSR WOULD BE AS AWARE AS US AND UK OF
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ANY ATTEMPT BY NON-AFRICAN POWERS IN
ASSOCIATION TO ZEGYORSGE#PRESENT CONFLICT, AND MELIORATION
IN ANY CASE IS EXACTLY WHAT RUSSIANS DO NOT WANT, PARTICULARLY
IF IT MIGHT ENHANCE POSSIBILITIES OF GENUINE SETTLEMENT. THEY
PREFER, IN MOBERLY'S OPINION, TO SEE PRESENT UNRESOLVED
SUEUATION CONTINUE AND FOR THIS REAEN ARE UNLIKELY TO BE
COOPERATIVE EITHER IN EFFORTS AT GENAINE MELIORATION OR
IN MOVES TOWARDS ARMS EMBARGO. MOBERLY NOTED IN CONCLUSION
THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF SOVIET THOUGHTP RE NIGERIA HAS CON-
SISTENTLY BEEN RE-
QFORCED BY HIS CONTACTS IN SOVIET EMBASSY
HERE.
ANNENBERG

NOTE: AS RECEIVED.
SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

SECRET 27

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0055



No. Copies
Received **30**

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

275

Monthly Count

I N C O M I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by	RL Brown	Ex Secy
S/S	8-9	Classification	SECRET	
S/S-Screener	27-28-29	Post	LONDON	
S/S-S-CMS	30	Serial No.	5848	
S/S-O	11	Date	7/24/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ 4	28 -	AF ✓ 14-15	-
U ✓ 5-6	28 -	ARA	
J ✓ 7	28 -	EA	
D	28	EUR ✓ 16	-
C ✓ 10 19	✓	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓ 2-3	(25)
S/CPR		Vice President	(25)
U/CF ✓ 12	✓	Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA ✓ 17	✓
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓ 13	✓	AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0056

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

(11)



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XL POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

UNCLASSIFIED 747

PAGE 01 KADUNA 00712 241240Z

50
ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, UCFI 05, UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCSEI 00, SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

JPM 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, AID 28, IO 13, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 153: W

072076

R 241130Z JULI 69
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1234
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 0712

SUBJ: NEW NIGERIAN ON THE AIR WAR AND RELIEF FLIGHTS

JULY 24 NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL REFERRING TO "FIERCE AIR
BATTLE OVER ULTI-ITHIALA ON JULY 21 STATES THAT REBELS MAY
HAVE SOME "FIGHTER CAPACITY." THERE IS "SUSPICION" THAT
AIRCRAFT ACCOMPANYING JCA NIGHT FLIGHTS FROM SAO TOME "MAY
CARRY ARMS AND MAY BE ARMED." EDITORIAL THEN REITERATES
NEWSPAPER'S STAND THAT NIGHT FLIGHTS SHOULD BE STOPPED AND
DAY FLIGHTS SUBJECT TO INSPECTION SINCE GENUINE RELIEF
ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE WILLING DELIVER SUPPLIES IN "BROAD
DAYLIGHT."
HUTCHINSON

(2)

UNCLASSIFIED

27

0057

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Pol 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
* Pol 27-9 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 397

PAGE 01 PARIS 11265 241956Z

84

ACTION EUR 22

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, UCF 05,

UPW 01, RSRI 01, 148 W

075222

PIR 241900Z JUL 69

FMI AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5726

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 11265

SUBJ: JULY 23 CALL ON POMPIDOU: NIGERIA-BIAFRA

WE HAD ONLY A FEW MINUTES TO DISCUSS AFRICA, BUT POMPIDOU BROUGHT UP THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA SITUATION AND USED IT AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE IMPROVING RAPPORT BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS. HE KNEW THAT AMBASSADOR FERGUSON AND I WERE MEETING LATER IN THE DAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHUMANN AND AS A CONSEQUENCE HE DID NOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS ON THE QUESTION OF RELIEF OR ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. OUR SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH SCHUMANN, HOWEVER, CONFIRMS MY IMPRESSION ON THE SUBJECT OF NIGERIA-BIAFRA, NAMELY THAT WE CAN EXPECT FRENCH SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A BETTER HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND SOME GREATER FRENCH SUPPORT WITH THE BIAFRANS TO BREAK THE LOGJAM POLITICALLY. SHRIVER

CONFIDENTIAL

0058

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

37

JULY 24, 1969

Honorable Joseph M. Montoya
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Senator Montoya:

I have received your inquiry dated July 15 regarding the present situation in Nigeria/Biafra.

I am enclosing Secretary Rogers' July 2 statement which may be helpful to you since it explains our present position deploring recent events of the conflict. At the moment we are updating the Department statement on the "Nigerian Relief Problem". I will forward several copies of the statement to your office as soon as possible.

Please continue to call upon me whenever you believe that we may be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,


William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Material as stated.

P/PF /PCD:KDurkin:mak

H#17235

lang. prev. clrd. 7/23/69

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

①

0059

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW/ARA Date 10/3/05

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA., CHAIRMAN
 ALLEN J. ELLENDER, LA.
 JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.
 WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH.
 SPENCER L. HOLLAND, FLA.
 JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS.
 JOHN O. PASTORE, R.I.
 ALAN BIBLE, NEV.
 ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
 GALE W. MC GEE, WYO.
 MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
 WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS.
 RALPH YARBOROUGH, TEX.
 JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.

THOMAS J. SCOTT, CHIEF CLERK
 WM. W. WOODRUFF, COUNSEL

MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
 KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.
 MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE
 ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
 GORDON ALLOTT, COLO.
 NORRIS COTTON, N.H.
 CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
 HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
 J. CALB BOGGS, DEL.
 JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

3

ACTION
 is assigned to

P/P/S

July 15, 1969

Honorable William P. Rogers
 Secretary of State
 U. S. Department of State
 2201 C Street, N.W.
 Washington, D. C. 20520

KD

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have recently received several letters regarding the situation in Biafra.

I would appreciate having a full up-to-date report on assistance rendered by the United States to the Biafran people. I would be grateful for a reply at your earliest convenience in order that I might have more complete information with which to respond to my constituents.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,

Joseph M. Montoya
 Joseph M. Montoya
 United States Senator

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1969 JUL 17 AM 9 54

RS/AN
 ANALYSIS BRANCH

sn

17235

2

7-17-69

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

0060

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND954503
 By MWA Date 10/5/05

37

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRET 330

066320

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

2. WE AWARE UK VIEWS A FEW WEEKS AGO TO EFFECT THAT RAISING WITH SOVIETS IDEA OF ARMS EMBARGO TO FURTHER PEACE WAS STEP ON WHICH THEY HAD VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS. BRITISH THEN CONSIDERED

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 121122

SOVIETS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY INFORM FMG OF ANY APPROACH ON ARMS LIMITATION IN OBVIOUS EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND UNDERCUT THAT OF UK AND REST OF FREE WORLD.

3. AT NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY DEPARTMENT ASKS, HOWEVER, IN GENERAL EMBASSY DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA WITH RESPONSIBLE UK OFFICIALS THAT YOU RAISE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET ROLE. EMBASSY IN THIS CONTEXT SHOULD ASCERTAIN BRITISH VIEWS ON WHETHER RUSSIANS COULD USEFULLY BE BROUGHT INTO ANY NON-AFRICAN POWER TALKS SEEKING TO MITIGATE NIGERIAN CONFLICT. SIGNED ROGERS
UNQTE. RICHARDSON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

0062

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 950503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

(6b)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

NR POL 7 KAT

SECRET 452

PAGE 01 ROME 04617 232026Z

82
ACTION SS:30

ACTION COPY

INFO OCT 01/031 W

066853

P R 231750Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1686
USMISSION GENEVA
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET ROME 4617

EXDIS:

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

REF: ROME 4520

1. IN COURTESY CALL JULY 23 ON ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI, SECRETARY VATICAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EMBOFFS LEARNED THAT MONSIGNOR BAYER, SECGEN CARITAS INTERNATIONAL, LEFT FOR FERNANDO PO ON JULY 22.


2. CASAROLI EXPRESSED HOPE THAT, IN CONNECTION NIGERIA, "SOMETHING MORE THAN WORDS" WOULD COME OUT OF POPE'S VISIT TO KAMPALA JULY 31 - AUGUST 2. HE INDICATED POPE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WHAT FURTHER MOVES HE MIGHT MAKE, HAVING IN MIND FERGUSON'S CONVERSATION. CASAROLI SAID IF WE HAD ANY FURTHER VIEWS TO EXPRESS ON THIS MATTER, WOULD BE USEFUL HAVE THEM BEFORE POPE LEAVES.

3. CASAROLI WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT IF POPE SHOULD DESIGNATE ONE AS SPECIAL EMISSARY, AN AFRICAN BISHOP COULD MAKE MUCH HEADWAY WITH GENERAL GOWON OR COLONEL OJUKWU. REVEALED THAT IN FEBRUARY 1969 VATICAN HAD ARRANGED MEETING IN ROME OF THREE AFRICAN BISHOPS FROM NIGERIA AND THREE FROM "BIAFRA" TO ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH MOVEMENT TOWARD NIGERIAN PEACE. CASAROLI SAID STUMBLING BLOCK WAS APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OF NIGERIAN BISHOPS "SPEAK UP" TO GOWON.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0063



No. Copies,
Received 1

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count 266

I N C O M I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by <u>RL Sam</u>	Ex Secy
S/S	8,9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	28-30	Post ROME	<u>Ady</u>
S/S-S-CMS	31	Serial No. <u>4617</u>	Dpty
S/S-O	11	Date 7/23/69	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ 4		AF ✓ 14-15	
U ✓✓ 5,6		ARA	
J ✓ 7		EA	
D		EUR ✓ 16-17	
C ✓ 10		NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓ 2-3	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF ✓ 12		Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA ✓ 18	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓ 13		AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0064

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

120665

12

22 JUL 69 16 10Z

USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH

Info:

STATE

EXDIS

FOR FERGUSON FROM UNDER SECRETARY

REF : PARIS 11044

(ref STATE 117302)

1. As we have previously indicated to French and as President himself has indicated we are interested in any views or ideas that others may have that might lead to progress on meeting the relief problem as well as a settlement of the Nigeria/Biafran war. We have assumed from previous messages that French themselves, in addition to expressing thoughts on relief aspects would use occasion your meetings to give their views on a wide range of issues relating to war and possibly suggest political initiatives.
2. Our desire is to learn as much as we can about how French are looking at Nigerian problem and their thoughts on possible approaches to its settlement. Therefore, should French themselves not cover such issues in expected tour d'horizon you can in your discretion take initiative to solicit their views on cease fire, possible UN role in relief or political arrangements, arms problem, non-African powers talks. You should, of course, make clear that this is only an

TT20665
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Drafted by:

AF:RAMoore:nm

Tel. Ext.

5208

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF:DDNewsom

Clearances:

U - Mr. GrempeL JAS
U/CF - Mr. Schott
AF/W - Mr. Melbourn

S/S - Mr. Brown

SECRET
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0065

DECLASSIFIED

Authority VNP 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Page 2

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

~~SECRET~~

Info:

exploratory discussion in effort help US Government itself
formulate its thoughts and that any US reactions to any specific
suggestions would have to be conveyed to French at a later date.

~~SECRET~~

3. For time being at least, we wish to preserve relief context of
your mission but at same time take advantage your presence to
obtain French views on wider aspects of Nigerian problem.

END

ROGERS!

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0066

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

Pol 27 Biofra - Nigeria

121122

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

31

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW

STATE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Nigeria

1. Possibility has been raised from time to time by those interested in Nigerian problem of usefulness of discussions by US or others with USSR. Soviet role as salesman to FMG of aircraft and certain other heavy military equipment would, of course, involve them in any serious international effort seeking an embargo on arms to both sides. On other aspects of political situation, such as talks between both parties or cease-fire, there could be problem in discussing these with Soviets, who would be strongly motivated to exploit them for their own political ends.
2. We aware UK views a few weeks ago to effect that raising with Soviets idea of arms embargo to further peace was step on which they had very strong reservations. British then considered Soviets would automatically inform FMG of any approach on arms limitation in obvious effort to strengthen their political influence and undercut that of UK and rest of free world.

Drafted by:

AF/W:RMMelbourne:nb

Tel. Ext.
6219

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF - Amb. Newsom

Clearances:

EUR/SOV - Mr. Bowden

EE -

U - Mr. Ruser

S/S - Mr. Brown

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0068

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD954503
By: MWA Date: 10/5/03

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

Page 2 of 2

Info:

3. At next available opportunity Department asks, however, in general Embassy discussion of Nigeria with responsible UK officials that you raise various aspects of Soviet role. Embassy in this context should ascertain British views on whether Russians could usefully be brought into any non-African power talks seeking to mitigate Nigerian conflict.

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0069

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

Monthly Count 160

O U T G O I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by	Ex
S/S	8-9	Classification	Secy
S/S-Screener	27-29	Post	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	30, 26	Serial No.	Dpty
S/S-O	11	Date	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4	AF	14-15
U	5-6	ARA	
J	7	EA	
D		EUR	16
C	10	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House 2-3 25	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF 12		Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA 17	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR 13		AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

COPIES DESTROYED

1/28/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



59
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 737

ACTION COPY 31

PAGE 01 PARIS 11044 221118Z

21
ACTION: SS-30

INFO: OCT 01, SSO: 00, CCO: 00, /031 W

054246

O: 221105Z JULY 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5614

SECRET PARIS 11044

EXDIS:

UNDERSECRETARY FROM FERGUSON

REF: STATE 120426

1. FERGUSON NOT CLEAR INTENT PARA 5 REF. TEL. UNDERSTAND FRENCH TO BE REMINDED LIMITS OF MANDATE AND FERGUSON REACTIONS DO NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE U.S. POSITION. BUT FERGUSON WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY OFFICERS, HENCE INTENT OF INSTRUCTIONS TO REFER SPECIFIC POLITICAL PROPOSITIONS TO OUR EMBASSY (PARA 5 REFTEL) IS UNCLEAR.

2. UNDERSECSTATE RICHARDSON SPEECH GIVEN WIDE CIRCULATION HERE AND CREATING CONSIDERABLE STIR. REACTION IS THAT USG NOW WILLING ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE PEACE EFFORTS.

3. ALL INDICATIONS ARE FRENCH PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN FULL TOUR DE HORIZON ON NIGERIA. FACT CONFIRMED TO FERGUSON BY QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL AND IVORY COAST AMB TO WASHINGTON.

4. URGENTLY REQUEST DEPT COMMENT OR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS LIGHT OF FOREGOING. FIRST MAJOR EXERCISE IS WORKING DINNER AT QUAI WITH LEBEL TODAY 6:30 P.M. PARIS TIME.
GP-3. SHRIVER

(1)

PARIS 11044
7-22269

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0071

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

No. Copies
Received

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count 240

I N C O M I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by <i>AKB</i>	Ex Secy
S/S	<i>8-9</i>	Classification <i>Secret</i>	
S/S-Screener	<i>28-30</i>	Post <i>Paris</i>	
S/S-S-CMS	<i>31</i>	Serial No. <i>11044</i>	<i>PAW</i>
S/S-O	<i>11</i>	Date <i>July 22, 1969</i>	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	<i>✓ 4</i>	AF	<i>✓ (a) 14-15 ✓ ✓</i>
U	<i>✓ (a) 5-6</i>	ARA	
J	<i>✓ 7</i>	EA	
D		EUR	<i>✓ 16 ✓</i>
C	<i>✓ 10</i>	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House	<i>✓ 2-3 ✓ ✓</i>
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF	<i>✓ (a) 12 ✓</i>	Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA	<i>✓ 17</i>
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR	<i>✓ 13</i>	AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0072

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *VND 959503*
By *MM* NARA Date *10/5/05*

37



POL 7 to CST
 Department of State ^{XR} POL 27 BIAFRA -
TELEGRAM
 NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 124

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 02028 221654Z

47
ACTION AF 18INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01,AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, 158 W
056269

R 221505Z JUL 69
 FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4277
 INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 USMISSION GENEVA
 USMISSION USUN
 ZEN AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
 ZEN AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 ZEN AMEMBASSY LOME
 ZEN AMEMBASSY COTONOU

CONFIDENTIAL ABIDJAN 2028

SUBJECT: BIAFRA

1. JULY 19 FRATERNITE-MATIN QUOTES HOUPHOUET AS STATING TO PRESS
 IN PARIS THAT INSCRIPTION OF BIAFRA ON UNGA AGENDA IS UNDER STUDY.
 THIS CONFIRMED BY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY
 OFFICIAL WHO EXPECTS ATTEND UNGA.

2. BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT STRONG PRESSURE FROM GOIC TO SUPPORT
 INSCRIPTION.
 MORGAN

Abidjan 2028
7-22-69


(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

249

0073

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND 959503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/05



XR POL 27 Bisha-Nigeria

SECRET 479

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 ROME 04529 191209Z

54.
ACTION SS 30

INFO: OCT 01, SSO: 00, NSCEI: 00, CCO: 00, /031 W

043173

O R 19150Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1627
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA.
AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
AMEMBASSY LONDON:

~~SECRET~~ ROME 4529

EXDIS-

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF COMMENTS REFTEL

REF: ROME 4520

1. CLEAR AT TIME OF PAPAL AUDIENCE POPE THINKING ABOUT ALL NIGERIAN INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF KAMPALA VISIT. FERGUSON ARGUED IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT CONTEXTS THAT SUCH POSITION IS MISTAKE.
2. CLEAR THAT BLACK BISHOP MOVE RE BIAFRA PROBE HAD NOT BEEN PUT TO POPE BY IEG AMBASSADOR. BISHOP MARCINKUS VERY MUCH TAKEN WITH IDEA.
3. ALTHOUGH POPE BEGAN DISCUSSIONS ON PREMISE HE SHOULD WORK BOTH SIDES OF STREET, I.E. APPROACH TO BOTH FMG AND BIAFRA, FERGUSON OF OPINION POPE WILL COME AROUND TO NOTION OF SINGLE BIAFRAN PROBE.
4. FROM REQUESTS MADE BY POPE TO FERGUSON ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH "TALKING FORMULA" CLEAR POPE EXPECTS CONSIDERABLE DIPLOMATIC HELP FROM USG.
5. POPE IS QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT THE CHINA THREAT AS BASIS FOUR POWER TALKS AND UNIMPRESSED WITH "WHITE POWER" ARGUMENT.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0074

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/3/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

120426

19 JUL 69 23 19Z

ONLY
FOR C

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info:

STATE

EXDIS

REF PARIS 11012

FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

SUBJECT: Nigerian Relief

1. In your discussions on relief you should raise question French support with Ojukwu to obtain early agreement on modalities for operation Cross River route. We consider it appropriate that you raise with French your plan bring both sides together in Geneva for discussion modalities Cross River. U.K. High Commissioner Lagos will be informed of your letter to Arikpo.
2. Success of effort bring both sides together in Geneva may depend on British and French as well as ourselves convincing respective parties that the other side will not show, leading to eventual propaganda score or at least self-justification on Cross River vis-a-vis U.S. for responsive party.
3. You should also inquire extent to which French have and will use their influence with Biafrans in behalf daylight flights. What is French assessment of outcome ICRC negotiations daylight flights and implications if no agreement eventuates. Do they expect French Red Cross airlift to expand?

120426

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POL 27-3 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Drafted by: 7-19-69 Tel. Ext. 5208 Telegraphic transmission and The Under Secretary
AF:CRM/CF:SCS:da1 classification approved by: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Clearances:

AF/W - Mr. Melbourne
EUR/FBX - Mr. Edgar Beigel (info)

S/S-O H. Heymann

SECRET
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0075

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET - 2

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION:

Info:

PAGE TWO TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

4. In your discussion of your visit with Pope and U.S. backed Ethiopian initiative you should probe for further French reasoning behind estimate of possible future of Papal initiative indicated para 3 reftel.

5. If as suggested by Paris ref, French intend to come forward with proposals on dealing with political issues, you should indicate willingness and interest in listening to their ideas. However you should remind them humanitarian relief nature your assignment does not place you in position to indicate through your comments U.S. reaction. If French have specific political propositions you, of course, would refer them to our Embassy.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET - 2

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0076

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MMARA
Date	10/3/05

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count

141

O U T C O I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by S/S-O: HEYMANN	Ex Secy
S/S	8-9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	27-28-29	Post TO PARIS	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	30	Serial No. 120426	
S/S-O	11	Date 7/19/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	✓ 4	AF	✓ ✓ 13-14
U	✓ 576	ARA	
J	✓ 7	EA	
D		EUR	✓ 15
C	✓ 10	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓ 2-3	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF ✓ 26		Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓ 12		ATD/VN	
IO		USTIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Department of State *ORG 74/CF*
Y.R. POB 15-1 VBT
TELEGRAM

SECRET 132

PAGE 01 ROME 04520 01 OF 02 181938Z

ACTION COPY

42
ACTION: SS: 30

INFO: OCT 01,SSO 00,NSCEI 00,CCO 00,/031 W

037807

O: P 181755Z JULI 69
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1621
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 4520/1

EXDIS:

STATE FOR: U/CF

SUBJECT: PAPALI AUDIENCE AMB: FERGUSON

1. FERGUSON AND EMBOFFI CHRISTIANSEN CALLED ON POPE JULY 18 AT CASTEL GANDOLFO. AUDIENCE PRIVATE WITH ONLY POPE, FERGUSON AND BISHOP MARCINKUS. (VATICAN FINANCIAL OFFICIAL AND AMERICAN) PRESENT. AUDIENCE LASTED ONE AND ONE/HALF HOURS.

2. POPE OPENED CONVERSATION BY OBSERVING: "WE HAVE BEEN WAITING TO SEE YOU. YOU MUST HAVE BEEN VERY PRESSED." FERGUSON REPLIED THAT PREVIOUS APPOINTMENT WAS MISSED DUE TO EXTENSION TO STAY IN LAGOS IN EARLY JUNE. EXPLAINED THAT US WAS THEN SO CLOSE TO HAVING TWO SIDES TOGETHER ON CROSS RIVER RELIEF AGREEMENT IT BECAME IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH ROME IN TIME. FERGUSON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FOR OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE USG CONCERN NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH POPE.

3. POPE ASKED CURRENT SITUATION RELIEF BOTH SIDES. FERGUSON SUMMARIZED ENTIRE RELIEF PICTURE BOTH SIDES INDICATING FEDERAL SIDE NOW UNDER CONTROL FROM STANDPOINT OF FOOD BUT GENERAL MEDICAL SITUATION REMAINED POOR. FURTHER INDICATED THAT MUST ANTICIPATE NEW PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE AS RELIEF OPERATION FMG SIDE IS TRANSFERRED TO FMG GOVERNMENT OVER NEXT MONTHS. FERGUSON INFORMED POPE USG BELIEVED MAY BE ON BRINK MAJOR TRAGEDY ON BIAFRAN SIDE. INDICATED.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0078

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MM NARA Date: 10/5/03

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

(6)



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

ORG 7 4/CF
XR POL 27 Bldg
Nigeria

SECRET 850

PAGE 01 ROME 04509 181646Z

45:
ACTION: SS: 30

ACTION COPY

INFO: OCT 01, SSO: 00, NSCE: 00, CCO: 00, /031 W

086477

OI PI 181830Z JULI 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1612
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET ROME 4509

EXDIS

SUBJECT: FERGUSON MEETING WITH IEG AMBASSADOR TO HOLY SEE

REF: ROME 4479

1. AT MEETING AMBASSADOR FERGUSON WITH IEG AMBASSADOR TO HOLY SEE IT WAS LEARNED THAT DURING IEG AMBASSADOR'S AUDIENCE WITH POPE OF JULY 16 HE PRESENTED PROPOSAL THAT POPE NAME DELEGATE TO ASCERTAIN FROM OJUKWU BIAFRA'S MINIMUM WAR AIMS.

2. ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR DID NOT FEEL IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO SUGGEST TO POPE WHO SHOULD BE VATICAN DELEGATE, I.E., AFRICAN BISHOP, AND DID NOT DO SO. FERGUSON WAS ABLE TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION IN ROUND-ABOUT WAY DURING HIS AUDIENCE WITH POPE TODAY (SEE SEPTELI).

GP-1

ACKLEY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0079

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 950503
By MN/ARA Date 10/5/09

59

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGER 115034

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE
Amembassy ROME "

Info:

~~XXXXXX~~ EXDIS

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR FROM UNDER SECRETARY

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

SUBJECT: Nigeria

REF: a) State 117302, b) State 116676, c) Abidjan 1983

1. If it can be appropriately raised in your conversation July 18 with Chaban-Delmas, request you refer to my July 14 conversation with Amb. Lucet on Nigeria (ref a) and draw upon my statement before Senate sub-Committee as exposition of Administration policy (ref b). If not raised with Premier, request you seek early appointment with subject FonMin in order raise ~~xxxxxx~~ with him.
2. You should tell him that Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson, our relief coordinator arrives in Paris July 20 for talks on relief problem. We trust this will provide opportunity ~~xxx~~ to sustain dialogue on relief.
3. PrimMin should know that the President has now addressed appeals, alluded to by Under Secretary, to Gowon and to Biafrans via Houphouet, urging agreement on resumption relief shipments. We would be interested in knowing whether French Government believes Houphouet

Drafted by:

AF/W:GBSherry:emb 7/17/69

Tel. Ext.

6402

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy (draft)
U - Mr. Ruser
AF/W - Mr. Melbourne
S/S - Mr. Brandt

AF - Ambassador Moore
U/CF - Mr. Schott (draft)
White House - Mr. Morris (draft)

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

MARA Date

10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

~~SECRET~~ Page 2 - Amembassy PARIS, Rome IMMEDIATE

Info:

could play role in support Papal initiative which we discussed with Lucet, assuming of course Pope agreeable. We have noted with interest July 17 press report (ref c) that Houphouet, after his meeting with President Pompidou, expressed the wish that US use its influence to bring peace to Biafra, saying that those who claim this affair must be settled by Africans alone are abandoning their responsibilities. How does the French Government interpret this observation?

4. Finally, we regard continuing dialogue on Nigerian problem as most useful. We would welcome French ~~GOVERNMENT~~ Government views at any time on ways and means of breaking the impasse and any suggestions for a practicable approach to problem of getting the parties to peace table.

5. For Ferguson. You authorized to draw upon contents this message, as necessary in addition to your earlier instructions, in your audience with the Pope.

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0082

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

No. Copies
Received

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count

123

OUTGOING

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by	GMALONE	Ex
S/S	8,9	Classification	SECRET	Secy
S/S-Screener	27-29	Post	PARIS	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	30	Serial No.	119064	Dpty
S/S-O	11	Date	17 July 69	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4	AF	15-16
U	5-6	ARA	
J	7	EA	
D		EUR	17-18
C	10	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House	2-3
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF	12	Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA	
E		ACDA	
H	13	AID	
INR		AID/VN	
IO	14	USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0083

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



37
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 201

PAGE 01 STATE 116456 *nc*

81
ORIGIN SS: 10

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, /011 R

01

66648
DRAFTED BY: AF/W:GBSHERRY 7/18/69
APPROVED BY: AF/W:ROY M. MELBOURNE
AF/CW:MR. SCHAUFEL
S/S-MR. BROWN

038122

O 181810Z JUL 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 116456

EXDIS

pl 27 Biafra Nigeria
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION GENEVA FROM SECSTATE 17 JULI 69
REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOR GUTMAN

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION PARIS, GENEVA, JULY 15 FROM SECSTATE
REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS SHRIVER AND TUBBY FROM UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

REF: ABIDJAN 1948

1. ABIDJAN'S REFTEL INDICATES HOUPHOUET IN PARIS, ALTHOUGH

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0084

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 116456

WE UNDERSTOOD HE REMAINING GENEVA UNTIL JULY 16.

2. EITHER PARIS OR GENEVA, WHICHEVER HAS ACCESS TO HOUPHOUET, SHOULD DELIVER PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO HIM IMMEDIATELY WITH UNDERSTANDING FRENCH TEXT WILL BE SENT SOONEST. TEXT FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM WELL AWARE OF YOUR DEEP HUMANITARIAN CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA. AS A FRIEND OF AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES ALSO DEPLORES THIS TRAGEDY, PARTICULARLY THE SUFFERING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

"THE PRESENT INTERRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT, IF IT CONTINUES, COULD BRING ABOUT CATASTROPHE. I AM ADDRESSING URGENT APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, JOINT CHURCH AID AND THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST FLEXIBILITY AND COOPERATION IN AGREEING TO A PROMPT RESUMPTION OF THE RELIEF AIRLIFT INTO BIAFRA AND THE REALIZATION OF THE CROSS RIVER CORRIDOR. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO TAKING OTHER STEPS TO ENCOURAGE THE IMMEDIATE ACTIVATION OF THESE RELIEF ROUTES WITH REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS TO MEET THE SECURITY CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY BOTH FEDERAL NIGERIA AND BIAFRA.

"I APPEAL TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO USE YOUR GREAT STATURE AND SPECIAL POSITION TO ENCOURAGE THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES TO SHOW THE SAME STATESMANSHIP WE HAVE URGED SO STRONGLY UPON FEDERAL NIGERIA.

"MY LETTER TO GENERAL GOWON OBSERVED THAT HISTORY WOULD JUDGE HARSHLY ANY GOVERNMENT'S HEEDLESS ACCEPTANCE OF SUFFERING IN THIS CONFLICT. THAT VERDICT WOULD FALL MOST HEAVILY, HOWEVER, ON THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD THEY SACRIFICE, FOR MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, THE VERY PEOPLE WHOSE SURVIVAL THEY CLAIM TO BE THEIR GOAL.

"IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN, I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY THIS APPEAL TO GENERAL OUKWUI ALONG WITH YOUR OWN STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN EQUITABLE AND IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF THE OBSTACLE TO AN EFFECTIVE RELIEF PROGRAM.

SINCERELY,

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0085

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW:ARA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 116456

RICHARD NIXON" ROGERS UNQUOTE ROGERS UNQUOTE ROGERS:

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0086

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW/ARA
Date	10/3/05

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



59
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 783

PAGE 01 PARIS 10932 181614Z

ACTION COPY 31

42
ACTION: SS: 30

INFO: OCT 01, SSO: 00, NSCE: 00, CCO: 00, /031 W

036238

O 181600Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5554

S E C R E T PARIS 10932

EXDIS

DEPT PASS EMBASSY ROME FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON
FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: STATE 119064

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE AS YET HEARD NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER TO HOUPHOUET, ALL SIGNS POINT TO EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF NIGERIA/BIAFRA PROBLEM BY FRENCH AT HOUPHOUET. WE SHOULD GET RESULTS OF THIS CONSIDERATION DURING COURSE OF AMBASSADOR FERGUSON'S VISIT, IF NOT BEFORE.

2. YOUR JULY 15 SPEECH WAS SUPERB. WE HAVE MADE WIDE USE OF IT IN PREPARING GROUND FOR FERGUSON VISIT AND REINFORCING, IN TALKS WITH QUAI (LEBEL) AND FOCCART'S OFFICE (ROPARTZ), POINTS YOU MADE WITH LUCET THAT TIME HAS COME FOR FRENCH TO MAKE SERIOUS TRY AT FINDING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED SUPPORT CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO THIS END. IN ADDITION TO COPIES GIVEN TO QUAI AND FOCCART'S OFFICE, WE HAVE SENT YOUR SPEECH TO HOUPHOUET AND TO ALL INFORMATION MEDIA. I WILL GIVE COPY PERSONALLY TO PRIME MINISTER WHEN I DISCUSS NIGERIA/BIAFRA WITH HIM THIS EVENING.

3. QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL HAS INFORMED US THAT FONMIN SCHUMANN WILL MEET WITH FERGUSON AT 1800 JULY 23, AFTER HIS RETURN FROM BRUSSELS (JULY 22) AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING (EARLIER ON JULY 23). LEBEL ALSO SAID THAT HOUPHOUET HAD 70 MINUTES ALONE WITH SCHUMANN YESTERDAY EXCLUSIVELY ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA BUT THAT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0087

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 10992 181614Z

HE DOES NOT YET KNOW WHAT WAS SAID.

4. ROPARTZ SAID HE THOUGHT NIGERIA/BIAFRA PROBLEM ENTERING "VERY INTERESTING PERIOD" SO FAR AS IT CONCERNS RELIEF AND PEACE-FULL SETTLEMENT, BUT WOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. HE INDICATED THAT POMPIDOU TAKING PERSONAL INTEREST IN MATTER AND FOLLOWING IT CLOSELY. SHRIVER

NOTE, NOT PASSED ROME BY OCT.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0000

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/5/05

No. Copies
Received

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count 207

I N C O M I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by <i>Rh/L</i>	Ex Secy
S/S	8-9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	28-30	Post PARIS	<i>Pety</i> Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	31	Serial No. 10932	
S/S-O	11	Date 7/18/69	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ 4 ✓		AF ✓✓ (a) 14-15 ✓✓	
U ✓✓ 5-6 ✓✓		ARA	
J ✓ 7 ✓		EA	
D		EUR ✓✓ 16-17 ✓✓	
C ✓ 10 ✓		NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓✓ 2-3 ✓✓	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF ✓ 12 ✓		Defense	
		State Rep	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA ✓ 18	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓ 13 ✓		AID/VN	
IO ✓		USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0089

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 959503
By MWA Date 10/3/05

(11)



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 701

PAGE 01 LIBREV 00737 181514Z

52:
ACTION: AFI 18:

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,

LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16,

SRI 01, ORM 08, EI 15, AID 28, RSR 01, /183 W

035774

RI 181100Z JULI 69:
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2721
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY PARIS:

CONFIDENTIAL A LI LIBREVILLE 737

SUBJECT: FMG CLAIMS FOUR PLANES DESTROYED
- POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
REF: STATE 117400 NOTAL LIBREVILLE 731

1. WOULD APPEAR THERE NO TRUTH TO ENAHORO CLAIM.
COL. MERLE, FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE AND HEAD OF FRENCH
RED CROSS MISSION LIBREVILLE, TELLS US HE CHECKED ENAHORO
CLAIM WITH FRENCH RED CROSS PILOTS WHO HAD BEEN ULT NIGHTS
JULY 11-12 AND 12-13 AND THEY REPORTED CLAIM TOTALLY WITHOUT
FOUNDATION. MERLE CONFIRMED FRENCH RED CROSS MAKING AT
LEAST ONE FLIGHT PER NIGHT FROM LIBREVILLE WITHOUT ANY
PROBLEM. MERLE ADDED THERE ARE AT LEAST SIX (6) FLIGHTS
BEING MADE FROM SAO TOME EVERY NIGHT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

2. NONE OF DC-4'S WE PRESUME TO BE REGULARLY FLYING TO ULT
WERE MISSING MORNING JULY 12. AS REPORTED PARA 2 LIBREVILLE 731,
WE BELIEVE TWO DC-4 AND ONE DC-6 FLIGHTS WERE MADE NIGHT
JULY 11-12.

3. LIBREVILLE 731 PARA 3 REPORTED THAT ONE UNIDENTIFIED DC-7
DEPARTED LIBREVILLE NIGHT JULY 11-12 AND HAS NOT RETURNED.
DC-7 TR-LOKI DEPARTED SOMETIME PRIOR 1745 JULY 11 AND HAS NOT
RETURNED DUE HOUR DEPARTURE. IT UNLIKELY DESTINATION WAS
BIAFRA. SHOULD BE NOTED FROM OUR PREVIOUS REPORTING THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

23

Libreville 737
7-18-69

0090

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 950503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LIBREV 00797 181514Z

VARIOUS DC-7'S HAVE REGULARLY SPENT RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIODS AT LIBREVILLE BEFORE DEPARTING FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS.

4. THE NUMBERS OF PLANES REGULARLY INVOLVED IN THE AIRLIFT FROM LIBREVILLE ARE THREE DC-4'S AND ONE DC-6. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE ONE DC-3 (IF BRAM) HAS MADE ONLY ONE FLIGHT IN LAST THREE WEEKS.
NELSON

CONFIDENTIAL

23

0091

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The entire emblem is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 002

PAGE 01 STATE 116456

47
ORIGIN SS 10

INFO OCT 01 1961

DRAFTED BY: UVCF SC SCHOTT
APPROVED BY: UVCF STEPHEN C. SCHOTT
SYS: RLBROWN

028416

REF ID: A66544
R 171720Z JUL 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UMBMISSION GENEVA

SECRET STATE 116456

EXD1S:

FORI GUTMAN

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION PARIS, GENEVA, JULY 15 FROM SECSTATE
REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS SHRIVER AND TUBBY FROM UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

REF: ABIDJANI 1948

1. ABIDJAN'S REFTEL INDICATES HOUPHOUET IN PARIS, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD HE REMAINING GENEVA UNTIL JULY 16.
2. EITHER PARIS OR GENEVA, WHICHEVER HAS ACCESS TO HOUPHOUET, SHOULD DELIVER PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO HIM IMMEDIATELY WITH UNDERSTANDING FRENCH TEXT WILL BE SENT SOONEST. TEXT FOLLOWS.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM WELL AWARE OF YOUR DEEP HUMANITARIAN CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0092

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02: STATE 116456

OF THE CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA. AS A FRIEND OF AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES ALSO DEPLORES THIS TRAGEDY, PARTICULARLY THE SUFFERING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

"THE PRESENT INTERRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT, IF IT CONTINUES, COULD BRING ABOUT CATASTROPHE. I AM ADDRESSING URGENT APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, JOINT CHURCH AID AND THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST FLEXIBILITY AND COOPERATION IN AGREEING TO A PROMPT RESUMPTION OF THE RELIEF AIRLIFT INTO BIAFRA AND THE REALIZATION OF THE CROSS-RIVER CORRIDOR. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO TAKING OTHER STEPS TO ENCOURAGE THE IMMEDIATE ACTIVATION OF THESE RELIEF ROUTES WITH REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS TO MEET THE SECURITY CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY BOTH FEDERAL NIGERIA AND BIAFRA."

"I APPEAL TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO USE YOUR GREAT STATURE AND SPECIAL POSITION TO ENCOURAGE THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES TO SHOW THE SAME STATESMANSHIP WE HAVE URGED SO STRONGLY UPON FEDERAL NIGERIA."

"MY LETTER TO GENERAL GOWON OBSERVED THAT HISTORY WOULD JUDGE HARSHLY ANY GOVERNMENT'S HEEDLESS ACCEPTANCE OF SUFFERING IN THIS CONFLICT. THAT VERDICT WOULD FALL MOST HEAVILY, HOWEVER, ON THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD THEY SACRIFICE, FOR MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, THE VERY PEOPLE WHOSE SURVIVAL THEY CLAIM TO BE THEIR GOAL.

"IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN" I HOPE YOU WILL
CONVEY THIS APPEAL TO GENERAL OUKWU ALONG WITH YOUR OWN STRONG
SUPPORT FOR AN EQUITABLE AND IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF THE OBSTACLES
TO AN EFFECTIVE RELIEF PROGRAM.

SINCERELY,

RICHARD NIXON" ROGERS UNQUOTE ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

0093

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

66



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Handwritten: 6453
7-17-69

CONFIDENTIAL 917

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06453 171657Z

50
ACTION: AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, IO 13, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, SR 01,

ORM 03, RSR 01, 123

027932

R 171535Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7837
INFO AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 6453

SUBJECT: FMG CLAIMS FOUR PLANES DESTROYED

REF: STATE 117400W

1. ON BASIS AVAILABLE INFORMATION DATT INCLINED TO BELIEVE
CLAIM EXAGGERATED.

2. DATT ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP FURTHER INFORMATION.

GP-3.
MATHES:

①

CONFIDENTIAL

27

0094

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Pl 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 074

PAGE 01 STATE 117439

42

ORIGIN SS 10

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66605

DRAFTED BY: AF/W - RMMELBOURNE

APPROVED BY: AF/W - ROY M. MELBOURNE

S/S - MR. BROWN

019766

O 161722Z JUL 69 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 117439

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE, JULY 15, FROM PARIS
REPEATED TO YOU

QUOTE

SECRET PARIS 10733

EXDIS

DEPT PASS GENEVA IMMEDIATE

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: STATE 116456

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON GIVEN TO PRESIDENT
HOUPHOUET BOIGNY HERE AT 1645 JULY 16 IN BOTH
ENGLISH AND FRENCH (TRANSLATED BY ALEC TOUMAYAN).
HOUPHOUET READ IT CAREFULLY AND SAID HE WOULD CONTACT
LOCAL BIAFRAN REP FIRST THING JULY 17 AND BE BACK
IN TOUCH WITH US. HE HAD NOT TIME TO SAY MORE
SINCE PRESIDENT DIORI OF NIGER ARRIVED AT THAT
MOMENT TO SEE HIM. SIGNED BLAKE UNQUOTE ROGERS

SECRET

24

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0095

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

59 POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

117654

FOR USE ONLY

16 JUL 69 20 25Z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ROME IMMEDIATE

Info:

~~XXXX~~

/ Secret EXDIS

Coderoom: Please repeat Addis Ababa 3153, 161555z

to Rome.

Pol 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria

END

117654

(1)

[ROGERS]

Drafted by:

AF/W: RMMelbourne:rls 7/16/69

Tel. Ext.
2619

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF/W - Roy M. Melbourne

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Brown *RMB*

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

Row

0096

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *VND 959503*
By *MMNARA* Date *10/5/05*

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Pal 27 Refra Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 324

PAGE 01 STATE 117654

85
ORIGIN SS 10

01

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66646
DRAFTED BY AF/W MELBOURNE
APPROVED BY AF/W MELBOURNE
S/S BROWN

O 162025Z JUL 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

020984

SECRET STATE 117654

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM ADDIS ABABA 16 JUL 69

QTE ADDIS ABABA 3153

EXDIS

REF: STATE 117365

TELEPHONED KETEMA IN ABSENCE ROME 4411 NOT YET
RECEIVED TOLD KETEMA I ASSUMED PROBLEM IN GETTING PAPALI
AUDIENCE FOR IEG AMBASSADOR AND URGED IEG
INITIATIVE BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION BENELLI IMMEDIATELY
IN VIEW FERGUSON ARRIVAL JULY 18. KETEMA SAID HE
WOULD CABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TONIGHT
TO DO SO.

YOST UNQTE ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0097

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/3/05

⑩
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

117400

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

12

16 JUL 69 16 18Z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LIBREVILLE

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
US Mission GENEVA

SUBJECT: FMG Claims Four Planes Destroyed

1. FMG Information Commissioner Enahoro announced NAF had destroyed two DC-4's on ground at Uli airport the night of July 11-12. Later his ministry claimed an additional two DC-3's destroyed on ground at Uli several hours later, apparently same night.

2. In light these claims, Dept would be interested knowing whether any of regular DC-3's and DC-4's have turned up missing at Libreville. It possible, of course, these aircraft regularly plying run from Sao Tome.

117400

END

ROGERS

③

Drafted by:

AF/P - Mr. Perkins

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF/W - Roy M. Melbourne

Clearances:

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0098

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

(S)



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 195

PAGE 01 USUN N 02411 161856Z

47
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, IO 13, SS 20, NSC 10, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, RSR 01, RSC 01,
/098. W

020299

R 161845Z JUL 69
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7983

SECRET USUN 2411

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: DEPTEL 117373

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO BISHOP SWANSTROM DELIVERED TO
HIS OFFICE JULY 16 AT 2:30 P.M.

GP-2
BUFFUM

SECRET
45

*USUN 2411
7/16/69
1178 NWSH*

0099

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 *Deafis-Nyena*
Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 424

PAGE 01 IBADAN 00206 171111Z

17
ACTION: AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, AID 28, UCF 05, UPW 01, IO 13, SRI 01,
ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, CUI 04, RSR 01, 133 W

025717

PIR 161540Z JUL 69
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 866
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IBADAN 206

JOINT CONSULATE/USIS MESSAGE

1. PROFESSOR A. BABS FAFUNWA, PROFESSOR AND HEAD OF INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, IFE UNIVERSITY, IN ARTICLE "NIGERIA VERSUS FOREIGN MEDDLERS" IN NIGERIAN TRIBUNE AND LAGOS MORNING POST, 16 JULY, SAYS NIGERIA NOT FIGHTING "BUNCH OF REBELS" BUT "HOST OF INTERNATIONAL MEDDLERS AND ADVENTURERS." "THOSE NOT WITH US ARE AGAINST US."
2. ALTHOUGH U.S. NOT MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS "MEDDLER" U.S. CLEARLY AMONG MAJOR TARGETS OF CERTAIN OF 18 QUESTIONS POSED IN ARTICLE: "HOW MANY TONS RELIEF AID HAVE YOU SHIPPED TO NORTH VIETNAM...? HOW MANY TONS RELIEF AID TO NORTH KOREA? DID YOU EVER VIOLATE ANY NATION'S AIR SPACE IN ORDER TO CARRY AID...? WHAT AID HAVE YOU OFFERED MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA NEGROES...? WHAT HAVE YOU DONE ABOUT SUPPRESSED AND STARVING MILLIONS OF AFRICANS IN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA? DO YOU REALIZE WORD 'HUMANITARIAN' HAS BECOME SYNONYMOUS AMONG NIGERIANS WITH 'SPY', 'SUPPORTERS OF REBELS', 'ARCH COLONIALIST' AND LIKE?"
3. FAFUNWA CITES FMG'S UNIQUE RECORD IN PERMITTING RELIEF TO REBELS, "YET NIGERIA BEING BLACKMAILED LEFT AND RIGHT BY HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS." HE CRITICIZES ROLE OF CHURCHES AND DESCRIBING NIGERIAN CHURCHES AS "COLONIAL CHURCHES." CALLS FOR NATIONALIZATION OF ALL RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0 1 0 0

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGP

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02: IBADAN 00206 171112Z

RM AN AMERICAN-TRAINED EDUCATOR (PH.D. NYU) FAFUNWA IS HIGHLY
RESPECTED AND HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. AGENCIES AND FOUNDA-
TIONS. SUCH EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS FROM NORMALLY REASONABLE
ACADEMICIAN IS MEASURE OF EXTENT TO WHICH EVEN OUR NIGERIAN
FRIENDS NOW PRONE TO VENT THEIR FRUSTRATIONS ON WESTERN GOVERN-
MENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN RELIEF EFFORTS WHICH THEY
REGARD AS AT LEAST INTERFERENCE IN NIGERIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
AT WORST COVERT SUPPORT FOR REBELS. STRONG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MN/ARA Date 10/5/05

106 F763303-0982 POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
 Classification

116876
 45
 15 JUL 69 19 42Z
 FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
 LONDON
 PARIS
 USUN
 US MISSION GENEVA; ~~XXXX~~ ABIDJAN
 Amconsul IBADAN MONROVIA
 KADUNA ROME

620370
 This document released to
 public per S.F. Gatch AF
 6/14/76

SUBJ: Under Secretary Statement on Nigeria before Senate Subcommittee
 Following is text of statement delivered by Under Secretary Elliot L.
 Richardson morning of July 15 before Senate Subcommittee on Refugees of
 Senate Judiciary Committee:

QTE I genuinely welcome the opportunity to discuss with this Committee
 the Nigerian civil war and the agonizing problems we are encountering in our
 efforts to aid the innocent victims of this conflict. I would value your
 advice on this matter, which is of such deep and common concern.

Let me begin by outlining what the difficulties are and what the US
 has done to date to deal with them.

This Administration recognizes that we neither can nor should impose our
 own moral concepts on other nations. At the same time, we believe the US has
 an obligation--an obligation that is internationally recognized--to seek to
 relieve human suffering in a conflict such as that now going on in Nigeria.

On February 22, President Nixon said: "I know that I speak for all
 Americans ~~who~~ in expressing this nation's deep anguish... It is tragic

Drafted by: *GB*
 AF/P - RLP:mb 7/15/69 Tel. Ext. 2105
 Clearances: Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *CRH/MB* AF - Amb. Moore

GBS/MB
 AF/W - Mr. Sherry

UNCLASSIFIED
 Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0102

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: VMD 954503
 By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

F782300-0983

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of Tel to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

enough to watch a military conflict between peoples who once lived together in peace and developing prosperity. But that tragedy has been compounded, and the conscience of the world engaged, by the starvation threatening millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the battle."

The US has been at the forefront of the international relief effort ever since it began. We have played a central role in two respects:

-- Roughly one-half of all international relief contributions have come from the US;

-- Secondly, over the past four and one-half months we have led a major diplomatic effort seeking to obtain the agreement of both sides on an expansion of international relief arrangements.

Specifically, since January 20, this Administration has taken the following steps:

--New financial pledges have been made to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the amount of \$15 million. These pledges have brought total US contributions since the beginning of the relief effort to \$75 million, including \$65 million from official and \$10 million from private sources.

-- Ambassador Ferguson was appointed as Special Relief Coordinator to direct all US Government activities in this field and, most important, to

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0103

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MNA Date 10/5/00

F760000-0984

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 3 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

make an all-out effort to negotiate new arrangements that would permit a more adequate flow of relief to victims on both sides of the battle line.

-- Ambassador Ferguson has sponsored extensive logistical surveys of possible relief routes into the Biafran enclave. The major result of these surveys has been the formulation of a new relief route proposal--the so-called Cross River route through the port of Calabar north to Biafran controlled territory. We also assisted the ICRC in the chartering of two shallow draft vessels which could operate on the Cross River. Ambassador Ferguson has pursued vigorous diplomatic efforts to obtain the agreement of both sides to this corridor, which we regard as an effective and workable supplement to the airlift.

-- In addition, Ambassador Ferguson extensively explored with both sides the acceptability of other relief arrangements, including expansion of the airlift, the possibility of daylight flights, and the feasibility of land corridors.

Until recently, the international airlift by ~~ICRC~~ ICRC and Joint Church Aid had been effective in preventing a recurrence of last summer's mass starvation in the Biafran enclave. By the common agreement of observers visiting the area, the airlift helped substantially to meet minimum food requirements. However, the flow of supplies was never fully adequate. Medical surveys found a serious dietary imbalance, and thus a great danger of epidemics. Most tragically of all,

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0104

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954/503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

F769000-0985

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Page 4 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

the enclave's children were--and remain--dependent on shipments of protein rich foods to ward off crippling and ultimately fatal deficiencies.

It is often overlooked that a relief problem of almost comparable scope exists on the Federal side. There, too, the margin of survival is perilously slim. The international relief agencies report that they care for approximately one million people on the Federal side and between two and three million people in the Biafran enclave.

Such, then, is the stark outline of tragedy. Yet, despite our most energetic efforts, we were unable to obtain the agreement of the parties to an expansion of relief beyond the hazardous and sporadic night airlift which had been operating for more than a year into Biafra. Now even this airlift has been severely curtailed. The curtailment followed the shooting down of an ICRC aircraft by the Nigerian air force and a subsequent imposition by the Federal military government of strict new conditions on relief flights into the Biafran enclave.

The ICRC has now suspended its airlift pending agreement by the two parties on flight arrangements. Religious and voluntary agencies have continued occasional flights despite these new restrictions. The flow of airborne relief into the enclave has been reduced by more than 75 percent.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0105

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/3/05

F769999-0986

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 5 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

President Naville of the ICRC flew to Lagos last weekend to explore with the FMG possible arrangements to resume the airlift. Negotiations are proceeding. Thus far, no specific agreement has been reached even with the Federal side. The Biafran authorities continue their long-standing objections to a daylight airlift under the conditions upon which the Federal Nigerian Government now insists.

At present, therefore, not only is there an impasse on negotiations for new arrangements; most of the fragile night time airlift has been lost as well.

What are the obstacles to agreement?

There exists on the Federal side:

-- First, a concern that international relief has aided the Biafran war effort. For example, the FMG charges that the relief effort generates foreign exchange which the Biafrans use for the purchase of arms, that the night time airlift provides a cover for arms flights, and that food and medicine intended for civilians, are allocated to Biafran troops.

-- Second, a belief that starvation in the enclave is exaggerated by Biafran propaganda to enlist international sympathy and political support.

-- Third, popular pressures on the FMG, as the war drags on, to exercise the most stringent controls over international relief, regardless of the

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0106

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

F768803-0987

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 6 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

consequences.

There exists on the Biafran side:

-- First, a fear that Federal control over relief shipments would enable the FMG to regulate the flow and contents to serve its own political or military purposes;

-- Second, a professed fear that food passing through Federal territory might be poisoned.

-- Third, a belief that Biafran military security would be jeopardized by relief corridors, including daylight flights, that were not guaranteed by third parties.

As a result of all these factors, we have been unable to break the impasse. For example, although both sides had agreed in principle to the Cross River proposal and there are vessels now standing by in West African waters, neither of the parties has allowed the use of the route.

What is the US now doing to cope with this situation? Our immediate objective is, of course, to restore the flow of relief into the Biafran enclave.

We have moved ahead with several urgent steps to pursue this goal. The Committee will appreciate, I know, that I am not at liberty to discuss all the details of our actions. However, I can outline some of them.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0107

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VVD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

F7622003-0988

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 7 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

-- The US is addressing appeals to all parties to agree promptly to resume the airlift and to implement the Cross River route.

-- We have approached the Secretary General regarding the role of the United Nations in resolution of the relief impasse.

-- We have just concluded intensive discussions on the Nigerian problem with Emperor Haile Selassie during his visit here last week. We shall continue the closest consultations with the Emperor, and through him, the Organization of African Unity.

-- We have exchanged views with the British and French Governments on the relief problem and asked their help in breaking the impasse.

-- Ambassador Ferguson will leave shortly after this Hearing on an urgent mission to Europe, where he will discuss relief problems with His Holiness, Pope Paul, with the Red Cross in Geneva, and with the French Government.

-- We are also in close touch with other concerned governments to coordinate our efforts.

We are under no illusions that there are quick and easy answers, however vigorously we pursue new ~~initiatives~~ initiatives. But this Administration remains committed, despite the obstacles, to do all it can to work with others and to encourage the two parties to save innocent lives.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0108

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

F762003-0989

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 8 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

I should stress once more that the focus of all these efforts is relief. I fully recognize the argument has been made that relief ~~xxxxxxxx~~ questions are inextricably bound to the political and military issues of the civil war. It is true that relief is haunted by the bitter passions of civil strife and the military demands of the two sides. It is true that the only lasting solution to the relief problem is an end to the war.

I shall not, therefore, beg the question of US political involvement in the Nigerian ~~38ix~~ Civil War as a logical step in the relief effort. This Administration has faced that question directly, and I want to address the Committee with equal candor on that subject today. There are really two questions here: First, should we intervene in an effort to bring an end to the fighting and eventually to bring about some sort of political settlement? Second, would such a direct political initiative by the US serve our immediate and urgent objective of restoring and even increasing relief?

To be concise, a US political initiative in the civil war must reckon immediately with several obdurate realities.

1. At present the two sides show no willingness to agree even on ~~therefx~~ the context for political discussions, let alone terms of a possible settlement. The FMG has insisted adamantly on the principle of a unified Nigeria as the

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0109

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VNP 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

F780003-0990

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 9 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

only basis for settlement. The Biafran authorities have rigidly refused to renounce their claim to independence as a basis for settlement. The Federal Government have insisted on negotiations prior to a ceasefire. The Biafrans have insisted on a ceasefire or truce prior to negotiations.

These positions rest on a hard truth--both sides continue to believe that they can gain by fighting what they might lose by talking. There is, at present, no readiness to compromise. This is the reality that thwarted the most recent OAU mediation effort in Monrovia last April. This is the obstacle that has frustrated numerous unpublicized efforts by third parties.

2. The US has had to face the fact that we have no effective influence with either party to alter these realities. Our influence rests largely on the moral suasion of world opinion. Since both parties see their vital interests at stake, they subordinate the opinion of others to their own concerns and interests. We are not, as this Committee knows, a supplier of arms to either party. This Administration certainly does not intend to alter the arms embargo the US wisely adopted at the onset of the conflict.

3. Finally, we labor under self-imposed limitations, which we believe have ~~wide~~ wide support in the US Congress and among the American people. We do not ~~intend~~ to become militarily involved in this conflict.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0110

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA NARA Date 10/5/05

F782203-0991

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 10 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

Beyond this question of influence with the two sides, there are equally serious limits to our ability to influence other parties whose role would be crucial to the end of the conflict.

The British strongly support the Federal side. They have important political and economic interests at stake in Nigeria.

The Soviet Union supplies arms to the Federal side. This also constitutes a major political interest in the conflict.

On the other hand, governments which have given their support to the Biafran cause have done so as a matter of national policy. Thus far we see no sign that the policies of these nations will change, or that the US could induce such change.

The UN has been unable to take up this problem because strong African opposition has precluded the introduction of the Nigerian civil war before the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Within this context, let me now discuss our views on certain specific proposals that have been put forward.

First, an arms embargo. The difficulties of obtaining agreement on this directly relate to the national policies I have just discussed. However, even if agreement could be obtained among major suppliers, an embargo would still be

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/3/05

F762303-0992

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 11 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

most difficult to enforce. The two parties could readily obtain arms on the international market -- as, in fact, they now do. Then, too, our sponsorship of an embargo would be regarded as hostile by ~~them~~ at least one side and perhaps both, thereby undercutting whatever effectiveness we may now retain as a mediator on relief. Of course, we would not oppose an arms embargo if one were negotiated.

Four Power Talks. We must recognize that there are serious problems ~~there~~ here. The day is past, Mr. Chairman, when outside powers can impose a peace or redraw the map for the people of Africa. Talks among non-African powers, in and of themselves, are not an answer to the problem.

This brings me to the ultimate political question which has been raised so often in criticism of our official posture toward the Nigerian civil war. Is our relief policy hostage to some deeper political commitment to the unity of Nigeria? And in the same vein, is US recognition of an independent Biafra the answer to our dilemma?

Mr. Chairman, this Administration has tried to consider every aspect of the Nigerian question.

Recognition of an independent Biafra is not a panacea, either for relief, an end to the war, or for the future stability of West Africa. We understand the concern of the Ibo people. We appreciate their insistence on guarantees

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0112

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

F768003-0993

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 12 of tel to Amemb LAGOS

Info:

for their personal safety, just as we appreciate the desire of the Federal Government to restore the high promise of a unified Nigeria. We have repeatedly urged the FMG to make a precise and unequivocal declaration of these guarantees.

Furthermore, recognition would have no tangible effect on the hostilities. To the contrary, it would only harden the positions of both sides, at the risk of rising Soviet influence in Federal Nigeria.

Whatever the course of the present fighting, an independent Biafra could be a source of recurring conflict. ~~Within~~ Within the territory claimed by the Biafrans there are numerous tribes with a history of hostility to the dominant Ibo tribe. It would be ironic indeed if we validated one claim for self-determination only to incite new and equally bitter irredentisms threatening the stability of the area.

This Administration, therefore, does not contemplate either support for or recognition of the secessionist authorities. We regard a peaceful and just ~~reconciliation~~ reconciliation of Nigeria as in the best interests of Africa and all those, like the US, who wish her well.

In summary, then, we plan to pursue urgent steps in two directions:

1. Our immediate concern is relief. This means a way must be found to

reach agreement on daylight flights and the Cross River route. We shall

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0113

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

F782003-0994

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Page 13 of tel to Amemb Lagos

Info:

do all we can to make this possible.

2. We shall give continuing support and encouragement to any efforts that might produce constructive talks between the two sides and an end to the fighting. We will be exploring possibilities with other concerned governments in the days and weeks ahead.

The Administration recognizes that the Nigerian tragedy deeply concerns the Congress and the American public. We share this concern and we welcome every suggestion in the common interest of saving lives. UNQUOTE

END

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0114

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

59 POL 27 BIAERA-NIGERIA
XR POL 7-IV CST
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA 06456

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMission GENEVA "

Info:

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS SHRIVER AND TUBBY FROM UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Nigeria *per 7-15-69*

REF: Abidjan 1948

1. Abidjan's reftel indicates Houphouet in Paris, although we understood he remaining Geneva until July 16,
2. Either Paris or Geneva, whichever has access to Houphouet, should deliver Presidential letter to him immediately with understanding French text will be sent soonest. Text follows:

"Dear Mr. President:

I am well aware of your deep humanitarian concern over the effects of the civil war in Nigeria. As a friend of Africa, the United States also deplores this tragedy, particularly the suffering of innocent civilians.

"The present interruption of the international relief effort, if it continues, could bring about catastrophe. I am addressing urgent appeals to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Joint Church Aid and the Federal Military Government to exercise the utmost flexibility and cooperation in agreeing to a prompt resumption of the

Drafted by:

AF/W:GBSherry:emb 7/14/69

Tel. Ext.

6402

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

U - Under Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Brandt
AF - Amb. Moore
White House - Mr. Morris
AF/CW - Mr. Schauffele

EUR/FBX - Mr. Long
U/CF - Amb. Ferguson
U - Mr. Ruser

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

MMARA Date

VND 954503
10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

FOR OC/IT USE ONLY

Origin

Info

~~ACTION~~ Page 2 - Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMission GENEVA "

relief airlift into Biafra and the realization of the Cross River corridor. The United States is also taking other steps to encourage the immediate activation of these relief routes with reasonable safeguards to meet the security concerns expressed by both Federal Nigeria and Biafra.

"I appeal to you, Mr. President, to use your great stature and special position to encourage the Biafran authorities to show the same statesmanship we have urged so strongly upon Federal Nigeria.

"My letter to General Gowon observed that history would judge harshly any Government's heedless acceptance of suffering in this conflict. That verdict would fall most heavily, however, on the Biafran authorities should they sacrifice, for military or political advantage, the very people whose survival they claim to be their goal.

"In a spirit of mutual humanitarian concern, I hope you will convey this appeal to General Ojukwu along with your own strong support for an equitable and immediate elimination of the obstacles to an effective relief program.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon"

ROGERS

END

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0116

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MVA NARA Date 10/5/05

No. Copies
Received **30**

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count **87**

O U T G O I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by	WBrandt	Ex
S/S	8&9	Classification	Secret	Secy
S/S-Screener	27, 28, 29	Post	Paris	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	30	Serial No.	116456	Dpty
S/S-O	11	Date	July 14, 1969	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4	AF	17, 18
U	5, 6	ARA	
J	7	EA	
D	10	EUR	19, 20
C	12	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House	2, 3
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF	13	Defense	21
		State Rep	22
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA	23
E		ACDA	
H	14	AID	
INR	15	AID/VN	
IO	16, 24	USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1-28/69

0117

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



59
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 353

PAGE 01 PARIS 10733 151841Z

41
ACTION SS 30

ACTION COPY

INFO OCT 01 CCO 00 SSO 00 NSCE 00 / 031 W

011869

O 151830Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5433

SECRET PARIS 10733

EXDIS

DEPT PASS GENEVA IMMEDIATE

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: STATE 116456

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON GIVEN TO PRESIDENT
HOUPHOUET BOIGNY HERE AT 1645 JULY 16 IN BOTH
ENGLISH AND FRENCH (TRANSLATED BY ALEC TOUMAYANI).
HOUPHOUET READ IT CAREFULLY AND SAID HE WOULD CONTACT
LOCAL BIAFRAN REP FIRST THING JULY 17 AND BE BACK
IN TOUCH WITH US. HE HAD NOT TIME TO SAY MORE
SINCE PRESIDENT DIORI OF NIGER ARRIVED AT THAT
MOMENT TO SEE HIM. BLAKE

NOTE: NOT PASSED GENEVA BY OCT.

PARIS 10733
7-1569

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POL 7 IV CST

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0 1 1 8

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/03

No. Copies
Received

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS)

Monthly Count 140

I N C O M I N G

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by <i>RH Don</i>	Ex Secy
S/S	8-9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	28-30	Post PARIS	
S/S-S-CMS	31	Serial No. 10733	<i>DPD</i>
S/S-O	11	Date 7/15/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ 4	-	AF ✓✓ (a) 14-15	--
U ✓✓ 5-6	--	ARA	
J ✓ 7	-	EA	
D	✓	EUR ✓✓ 16-17	--
C ✓ 10	✓	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House ✓✓ 2-3	--
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF ✓ 12	✓	Defense ✓ 18	✓
		State Rep ✓ 19	✓
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA ✓ 20	✓
E		ACDA	
H 1	✓	AID	
INR ✓ 13	✓	AID/VN	
IO	--	USIA	
L		NSA	
O		Treasury	
P			
		OTHER	
COPIES DESTROYED			

1/28/69

0119

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *VND 959503*
By *MW* NARA Date *10/5/05*



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

21

Pol 1 DCST

CONFIDENTIAL 143

for Pol 17 Biafra - Nigeria

PAGE 01 ROME 04388 151625Z

45

ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01,

AIO 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 158 W
010922

R 151525Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1555
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 4388

SUBJECT: BIAFRA

REF: ABIDJAN 1948

1. FOREIGN OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY PEDINI (DC DEPUTY IN OUT-
GOING GOVERNMENT) INFORMED US JULY 15 THAT HOUPHOUET NOW
SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN ROME LATE AFTERNOON JULY 21 AND WOULD
BE IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED BY BOTH PRESIDENT SARAGAT AND PRIME
MINISTER RUMOR AND WOULD LATER BE GIVEN FORMAL DINNER BY
SARAGAT. ON JULY 22 HOUPHOUET WILL BE RECEIVED BY POPE AT
CASTELGANDOLFO. UNSEC SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE
PRINCIPALLY RELATED TO BIAFRA AND PROBLEM AND THAT ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PARTICULAR EFFORTS TO MAKE THIS VISIT
POSSIBLE EVEN DURING GOVERNMENT CRISIS. GOI ATTACHED SPECIAL
IMPORTANCE TO THIS VISIT. UNSEC SAID HOUPHOUET VISIT WAS
OUTGROWTH OF PEDINI'S MISSION TO BIAFRA AND THAT GOI WAS
DEEPLY INTERESTED IN WHATEVER COULD BE DONE TO BRING
ABOUT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN BIAFRA AND NIGERIA. WITHOUT
GOING INTO DETAILS, UNSEC SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ITALY
MIGHT TAKE IN INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER, BUT APPEALED FOR
FURTHER EFFORTS BY U.S., U.K. AND EVEN U.S.S.R. TO PUT
PRESSURE ON BIAFRA AND NIGERIA TO END FIGHTING. PEDINI

CONFIDENTIAL
32

Rome - 4388
7-15-69

0120

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



Re: 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 670

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06336 141914Z

48

ACTION: AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCSE 00, RSR 01,

UCF 05, UPW 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, NIC 01, /146 W

004614

RI 141635Z JUL 69

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7771

INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY COTONOU

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 6336

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUND-UP JULY 13 AND 14


1. ALL PAPERS ON EITHER 13 OR 14 REPORT REGULAR SATURDAY PRESS CONFERENCE BY COMINFO ENAHORO. ONI WAR ENAHORO ANNOUNCED NAFI HAD DESTROYED TWO PLANES ON GROUND AT KLI NIGHT JULY 11 AND ALSO THAT ARMY HAD TAKEN TWO MORE TOWNS NEAR ABIRBA WHICH WAS TAKEN LAST WEEK. STATED THAT THIRD MARINE COMMANDOS MAKING "STEADY PROGRESS" IN DRIVE TOWARD OWERRI BUT NO "LANDMARK" TO REPORT YET. STATED UMUHIA FIRMLY UNDER FMG CONTROL. DENIED REBEL CHARGES FMG USING NAPALM OR PHOSPHORUS BOMBS AND ALLEGED THAT "OUUKWUS FOREIGN FRIENDS" IN FACT PLANNING TO SUPPLY REBELS WITH THESE WEAPONS AND THREATENED THAT "FMG WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETALIATE ON VAST SCALE IF SINGLE NAPALM BOMB DROPPED ON NIGERIAN SOIL". IN REPLY TO REBEL CHARGES OF BOMBING OF RC INSTALLATIONS IN

UNCLASSIFIED

47

*LAGOS 6336
7/14/69*

0 1 2 1





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06336 141914Z


REBEL TERRITORY, ENAHORO SAID IT NOTEWORTHY THAT ICRC HAD NOT PROTESTED SUCH ACTS IF THEY HAD ACTUALLY HAPPENED. ALSO WARNED ICRC NOT TO PLACE ITS FACILITIES NEAR REBEL POSITIONS.

2. JULY 13 TIMES COVERS ENTIRE FRONT PAGE WITH EDITORIAL ON ICRC PRES. NAVILLE TITLED "CAN YOU TRUST THIS MAN?". CALLS NAVILLE "TOO SMOOTH, TOO CLEVER BY HALF". ACCUSES NAVILLE OF NOT ANSWERING DIRECTLY QUESTION PUT TO HIM BY PRESS AT AIRPORT IF ICRC RECOGNIZED REBEL HELD TERRITORY AS PART OF NIGERIA. BY SAYING ICRC INVOLVED ONLY IN HUMANITARIAN QUESTION. STATES TIMES' VIEW THAT SINCE REBELLION IS POLITICAL QUESTION AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTION HELPS SUSTAIN REBELLION, POLITICAL QUESTION CANNOT BE CLEARLY DIVORCED FROM HUMANITARIAN QUESTION. ALL JULY 14 PAPERS FEATURE NEWS THAT ACCORD REACHED BETWEEN FMG AND ICRC. IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE, IT ANNOUNCED THAT ICRC UNDERTAKING TO EXAMINE WAYS AND MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING FMG'S POLICY ON RELIEF FLIGHTS TO REBEL AREAS. DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD BETWEEN ICRC TECHNICAL EXPERTS, NATREHABCOM AND NIGERIAN RC TO DETERMINE DATE OF TAKE-OVER CONTROL FROM ICRC OF ALL RELIEF WORK. FMG AT SPECIAL REQUEST OF NAVILLE WILL PERMIT ONE EMERGENCY AIR OPERATION BY ICRC IN ORDER TO EVACUATE SOME PERSONNEL AND TAKE IN MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THOSE STAYING AND THAT ALL CONCERNED WITH RELIEF OPERATIONS WILL MAKE EFFORT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO FIND MORE EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL WAY THAN AIR FLIGHTS TO GET RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO REBEL AREAS. IN COMMUNIQUE ICRC ALSO PLEDGED IT WOULD NOT MAKE FLIGHTS WITHOUT FMG APPROVAL AND STRESSED IT HAD NEVER CARRIED ARMS. FMG IN TURN STATED IT HAD NOT ACCUSED ICRC ITSELF OF HAVING TRANSPORTED ARMS. COMMUNIQUE ALSO STATED THAT RELIEF SITUATION IN WAR-AFFECTED AREAS UNDER FEDERAL CONTROL HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY. NAVILLE WILL TOUR ICRC CENTERS IN EAST-CENTRAL STATE NOW.

3. JULY 14 TIMES AND POST REPORT STATEMENT MADE AT AIRPORT UPON RETURN FROM SHORT TRIP TO USSR BY SOVIET AMB ROMANOV. ROMANOV DENIED THAT REBEL DELEGATION OR ENVOY HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN MOSCOW AS HAD BEEN REPORTED BY BRITISH NEWSPAPER AND ACCUSED "WESTERN PROPAGANDISTS" OF TRYING TO UNDERMINE CORDIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND NIGERIA. ALSO ACCUSED HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS OF CREATING TOO MANY PROBLEMS FOR FMG BECAUSE "TOO MANY THINGS HIDE UNDER THESE HUMANITARIAN OFFERS".

UNCLASSIFIED

0 1 2 2





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03: LAGOS 06336: 141914Z

RM UPON HIS RETURN FROM ATTENDING FUNERAL OF TOM MBOYA, HEAD OF NIGERIAN NAVY ADM WEY REPORTED TO HAVE BROUGHT SECRET MESSAGE TO GOWON FROM KENYATTA. PAPERS ALSO REPORT WEY SAID IN NAIROBI THAT NIGERIAN PLAYWRIGHT WOLE SOYINKA WOULD REMAIN DETENTION UNTIL AFTER REBELLION ENDED, BECAUSE HE WAS SECURITY RISK.

5. MOST PAPERS PICKUP AND REPORT WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL ACCUSING OUKWUI OF TURNING DOWN RELIEF ROUTES IN ORDER TO USE HIS PEOPLE'S PLIGHT AS POLITICAL LEVER.

6. UAR VP AL-SHAFI IN IBADAN OVER WEEKEND WHERE HE FETED MILGOV WESTERN STATE.

7. IBADAN'S TRIBUNE HAS JULY 14 EDITORIAL AGREEING STRONGLY WITH SUGGESTION OF NIGERIAN ARMY COS KATSINA THAT MILITARY GOVERNORS SHOULD BE CHANGED. LISTS SEVERAL REASONS TO SUPPORT IDEA AND EXPRESSES HOPE THAT SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL WILL APPROVE THE IDEA.

8. JULY 14 OBSERVER EDITORIAL TITLED "WHERE ARE WE GOING" SAYS THAT NIGERIA NOW IS SEARCHING FOR POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH WOULD LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH "MANY AMONG US EAGER TO ADOPT ANY OLD SYSTEM AS LONG AS WE BELIEVE IT WILL SUIT INDIVIDUAL PURPOSE AND COMFORT RATHER THAN WEIGHING SYSTEMS... IN LIGHT OF FUTURE WELL-BEING OF NATION AS WHOLE". OPINES NIGERIA SHOULD ACCEPT NEITHER UNBRIDLED COMMUNISM NOR UNBRIDLED CAPITALISM... WE HAVE TO FIND SYSTEM OF OUR OWN OR PERHAPS TAKE BEST OF SEVERAL SYSTEMS". SAYS NIGERIAN COULD NOT TOLERATE RIGID REGIMENTATION AND SUPPRESSION OF FREEDOM FOUND IN COMMUNIST SYSTEM, BUT NEITHER CAN NIGERIA PROGRESS UNDER ABUSE OF FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUAL IRRESPONSIBILITY FOUND IN CAPITALISTIC SYSTEM. AFTER LONG APPEAL TO ALL NIGERIANS TO WORK HARD AND POINTING OUT NIGERIA CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE TOO MANY MISTAKES IN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP SAYS "PERHAPS THIS SYSTEM OF OURS WHICH SO APTLY DESCRIBED AS MILITARY DEMOCRACY IS NOT SO BAD, AFTER ALL. PERHAPS, IN FACT, IT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE NEED." MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

0123

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
		5
L	FBO	AID
		12
ORM	S/R	S/P
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-328
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

 INFO : ABIDJAN, ADDIS, COTONOU, DAR ES SALAAM, IBADAN, KADUNA,
 LIBREVILLE, LONDON, PARIS, ROME, STOCKHOLM, USMISSION
 GENEVA, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

SUBJECT : Some Reasons for Current Reactions in Nigeria

REF :

As has been reported in the Embassy's recent telegrams, the problem of getting relief to "Biafra" has reached a new impasse which will not be easy to surmount. On the one hand, Ojukwu continues to refuse to accept relief which passes through Nigeria and his position on daylight flights is ambiguous. On the other hand, rightly or wrongly, but understandably and predictably, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria has over-reacted to a situation which they believed to be intolerable.

The following represents an attempt to analyze the principal reasons which have led the FMG to react as it has:

1. The conviction that relief agencies have carried arms as well as relief supplies.

Comment: Public opinion and the news media tend to lump all relief agencies together in making this charge. The FMG itself, however, probably does not believe that the ICRC has carried arms to the rebels, although it has done little to defend the ICRC and has felt it necessary to accommodate its policies to some extent to aroused public opinion. The main thrust of their animosity is directed against the JCA, some of whose component agencies have taken the attitude that if the Biafrans are to survive, they must have arms as well as food.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

FORM
4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:EERamsaur Jr:mjr 7/10/69

Contents and Classification Approved by:


A/DCM:WGJ Jones

Clearances:

1969 JUL 14 AM 11 56

COPYFLO-PBR

0124



CONFIDENTIAL

2

2. Conviction that relief supplies are being used to feed Biafran troops.

Comment: The latest report of the International Observer team quotes Biafran prisoners of war to this effect. The FMG has also taken note of Ojukwu's recent statement that there is no acute shortage of food in Biafra. These reinforce FMG convictions that relief aids rebel troops and that legitimate relief requirements for "Biafra" have been overstated.

3. The belief that the relief agencies are in general sympathetic to the rebel cause.

Comment: Again the principal onus is on the JCA, which operates exclusively into Biafra and from "hostile" territory. JCA operations, unlike those of the ICRC, have never had even tacit approval from the FMG. However, the ICRC is also believed to sympathize with the rebels, and the declaring of Lindt as persona non grata is largely attributable to this factor. A contributing factor was Lindt's own seeming inability to deal tactfully with the FMG. His own staff has described him as arrogant, prideful, and of the view that if top FMG officials wished to see him they could ask.

4. Sensitivity over what the FMG believes to be an unprecedented series of violations of its sovereignty.

Comment: Nigeria is a young country in the early (and thus extremely touchy) stages of nationalism. Its leaders are young and not entirely secure. They believe that they have displayed great magnanimity in permitting relief supplies to reach the rebels and that their reward has been a contemptuous disregard of their national sovereignty. While initially incapable of defending its airspace, Nigeria, disturbed by the air supply of arms to the rebels, humiliated by the Von Rosen success and with improved capabilities of its own, is determined to take such offensive action as possible against "illegal" transit of its territory.

5. Reaction to unfavorable public opinion in North America and Europe.

Comment: The FMG is not unaware of the fact that this is partially attributable to its own shortcomings in the field of public relations, but this simply adds to the general frustration. Nigerians tend to take the childish attitude that the American public, for example, should somehow discover for itself that the FMG's cause is just and at least give credence to the observers' reports that the charges of genocide are untrue.

6. The growing pressure of Nigerian public opinion.

Comment: The Nigerian press, radio, and television are not subject to advance censorship. The press in particular (cf. the Embassy's

CONFIDENTIAL

0125

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

3

press roundups) has thus been given free rein to attack the relief agencies, decry violations of Nigerian sovereignty, and to inveigh against the foreign news media. Coupled with this campaign and associated with prolongation of the war have been calls for the FMG to take action against relief agencies, trial balloons on the possibility of return to civil government, and even suggestions that some members of the military are interested in prolonging the war. The cumulative effect has been to push the FMG to take actions which it might otherwise have put off, and the greatest pressure is on the program of relief to "Biafra."

7. Reaction to the activities of Von Rosen and his cohorts.

Comment: The raids led by Von Rosen came as a great shock to the Nigerians. They served to confirm in the minds of the Nigerians many of the points made above. Von Rosen's earlier association with relief flights out of Sao Tome, as well as his public statements at that time, were dredged up and taken as proof of the duplicity of all relief agencies. The lines were blurred, Von Rosen emerged as an "ICRC agent," and Lindt's downfall was hastened. Above all, the humiliation at the apparent ease with which Von Rosen could strike at will was beyond the tolerable and undoubtedly precipitated the ensuing action in which a relief plane was shot down and the takeover of the relief operation announced.

8. Euphoria over the new-found ability to intercept "arms" flights.

Comment: There can be no question but that the shooting down of an ICRC flight on June 5 was a great morale booster. The general reaction was one of "at last we have demonstrated that we are not going to be pushed around any longer." While the FMG expressed regret that it was an ICRC flight, it took the attitude that such flights had always been at the risk of the ICRC, and the FMG is still insinuating that the cargo was in any event a dubious one. Actually, the ability of the FMG to intercept flights in total darkness is yet to be demonstrated, but given a concentrated effort which has not yet been made, the odds are that another plane or two will be taken out. In the meantime, out-and-out arms flights are continuing, and the euphoria is beginning to wear off. Recent pronouncements by Information Commissioner Enahoro suggest that it is being replaced by xenophobic saber-rattling.

9. Frustration arising from the FMG's inability to terminate the war.

Comment: The psychological effect of the long-drawn-out civil war, particularly when coupled with the realization that it has been prolonged partly by sheer ineptitude on the FMG side, has added to the sensitivity of the FMG. Inevitably, this has led the Nigerians to look for excuses and scapegoats and heightened Nigerian xenophobia. The relief agencies and the United States are among the scapegoats.

Overall Comment: The recent actions and reactions of the FMG with respect to the relief picture have resulted in a propaganda setback for them.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 2 6

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

4

The FMG was fully aware of the consequences of its actions, but the factors listed above and the belief that no Nigerian Government could survive without taking drastic action have pushed the FMG into an attitude of belligerent disregard for world opinion. The FMG unquestionably believes that it has been forthcoming to a degree unparalleled in any comparable situation, that the responsibility for curtailment of the flow of relief supplies into Biafra rests squarely on Ojukwu, and that the world has chosen to judge -- and will continue to judge -- the issues unfairly.

It is characteristic of Nigeria that there is both logic and illogic in their reaction to this situation. By any yardstick drawn from other conflicts they measure up well, but their reaction or over-reaction is illogical and intemperate.

The point is, however, that the attitude is there and must be reckoned with. Our own leverage on the FMG has diminished and will not be increased through pressure. If we hope to break the log-jam, we must take into account the sensitivities of a thoroughly frustrated young nation with a good deal of justice on its side.

MATHEWS



CONFIDENTIAL

0127

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MW/ARA
Date	10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION
AF-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Col 27 Benin - Nigeria

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4		5
L	FBO	AID
		20
SPM	USC	ORM
1	4	2
AGR	COM	INT
	10	12
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
AMS	NSC	
1	6	

A-330

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR RM USE ONLY

TO : Department of State

INFO : GENEVA, IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, PARIS, CINCSTRIKE, DIA

FROM : AmEmbassy Lagos

SUBJECT : To Asaba and Back: A Glimpse of the Unreal War

REF : Lagos 5944; A-320 dated 10 July, 1969

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 14 8 31 AM 1969

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: 12 July 1969

file

In company of the Deputy British High Commissioner at Benin City and the British bank manager for Barclays Bank, the reporting officer made a trip from Benin City to Asaba and return on June 26, 1969. This airgram is an account of the trip, and conditions in Asaba, with a few preliminary remarks on the route from the Lagos State boundary to Benin City.

The crossroads town of Ore, some 20 miles west of the boundary between the Western and Mid-Western States, was the highwater mark of the rebel's military penetration of federal territory. From Ore the main road to Benin is in good condition and is heavily used by both military and civilian commercial vehicles. There are at least two bailey bridges between Ore and Benin City, replacing bridges blown up in 1967 by retreating rebel forces.

From Benin City east the main black top road to Asaba is in relatively good shape and carries much military and civilian traffic as far east as Agbor. Agbor is the first major town west of the area inhabited by the Mid-Western Ibo-speaking people, often called the Ika Ibos. For the federals, this is the beginning of what might be called "uncertain country" from the security point of view. Strung out on both sides of the main highway, Agbor is a bustling place, with plenty of goods, both domestic and imported, in the shops and traders' stalls. Petty traders appear to be doing a thriving business; an extra fillip is given retail trade by supplying the troops on garrison duty. Numerous patches of crop land line the road between Benin and Agbor, and farm produce was moving freely to local roadside markets.

GROUP 3

Downgrade Every Twelve Years
Not Automatically Declassified
CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:FPicard:kr 7/9/69

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:ERamsaur

Clearances:

0128

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 959503
By: MWA Date: 10/3/05

CONFIDENTIAL

A 330
Laguna

2

After Agbor the road is in good condition as far as Issele-Uku, after which it deteriorates steadily until Asaba is reached. The last ten miles are positively bad, and it is frequently necessary to travel in first gear. At one point the road has virtually been cut in two by water erosion, and unless necessary repairs are made before the full advent of the rainy season, only heavy duty vehicles with extra traction will be able to negotiate the way to Asaba. From Issele-Uku on, cultivated areas become increasingly scarce; houses are frequently deserted; few people are seen, and the windowless buildings on the outskirts of Asaba are almost all pock-marked from small arms fire.

In contrast with the roadblocks and checkpoints in parts of the Western and Lagos States, those between Benin and Asaba were manned by attentive and generally well-behaved troops and military police. On the day of our trip, at least, there was no evidence of beer drinking while on duty, a not uncommon sight along other Nigerian roads.

Units of the Federal Guard are still in evidence in Benin City, and Agbor appears to be fairly heavily garrisoned. East of Agbor, however, it was difficult to tell what additional federal troop strength there might be, if any, apart from the troops visible along the road. From a cursory inspection, we gained the impression that Issele-Uku and Asaba were not heavily defended.

In Asaba itself nearly every building along the main road shows signs of indiscriminate small arms fire. We called first on the Commander of the 7th Brigade Nigerian Army, Lt. Col. G. J. Omananyi, accompanied by Lt. Augustine Ehibe, Military Public Relations Officer, who later escorted us around the town.

Our meeting with Omananyi was cordial but brief. He has a businesslike but polite manner. The well-marked brigade headquarters (complete with "brigade mosque") is sited north of the main road just before entering Asaba town. The buildings and surrounding grounds (full of disabled vehicles) seemed quite well kept by Nigerian army standards, but this may have been the result of an extra cleaning effort in expectation of Brigadier Katsina's visit later in the same week. Omananyi fended off questions about rebel raids north of Kwale by disclaiming jurisdiction. He said there were none in his area, which he described as "quiet". He told the PRO to show us "anything" we wanted to see in town. (Omananyi was

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 2 9

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/3/05

CONFIDENTIAL

P 330
D
a g r e e 3

reduced in rank to Major in May, 1968 after a scandal involving supplies for the 1st Division (Rear) at Kaduna. He has apparently regained both his former rank and the confidence of the powers-that-be in the FMG.)

The Brigade Adjutant (FNU) and Lieutenant Ehibe have been about a year and a half in Asaba without leave, but were uncomplaining. All three officers seemed alert, well turned out, and possessed proper military bearing. The Adjutant had been in the Army 16 years (about half his life it seemed) and he had served with the Nigerian contingent of the UN peace keeping force in the Congo long enough to pick up some Kiswahili. Both the Adjutant and Ehibe were friendly but unforthcoming in response to low-key and generalized inquiries relating to military questions. Neither had alcoholic drinks during a brief midday stop at the officers' mess bar.

The troops in Asaba appear to be billeted in a large variety of government buildings and private homes. Most of them were lounging about in typical Nigerian fashion and mingling freely with local civilians. All appeared to have full kit and most were relatively well turned out. We saw no organized activity of any kind by the Asaba garrison, e.g., drilling, PE, repair work, etc.

Ehibe said the civilian population of Asaba is now possibly 17,000, a figure agreed to by Father Kennedy, an Irish Priest in Asaba and the only male European resident in town. (The other European is an Irish Sister on temporary duty at the Catholic Mission School.) The civilian population includes a number of indigenous males of military service age who moved about freely. Father Kennedy, a notably anti-FMG resident of the Mid-West for many years, said that there were nearly 3,000 children in school in Asaba. The Catholic Mission School (and a separate sewing course for girls) were in session.

We were taken to two camps for Ibos by Lt. Ehibe, who withdrew, and made no attempt to enter into our conversation. The refugees, consisting of men, women and children of all ages, number 1,200 according to both Army sources and the Ibos themselves. One camp had over 700 persons, the other more than 400. Both were located in unguarded compounds to which there was free access. The "camp leaders" approached us easily in both cases and gave no indication of being intimidated by FMG troops. They stated they were free to move about town; to fish on the west bank of

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 3 0

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

A 380
Lagos

4

the Niger and its tributaries (fishing nets were seen being repaired in the camps). They are free to move out of the camp when accommodation is available and they have "clearance" from the military, presumably on security grounds. Both camp leaders mentioned that "several hundred" former residents of the camps had left, primarily for Lagos and Western State. Nigerian Red Cross workers were present at the time of our visit to distribute U. S. supplied CSM, local rice, a variety of small local prawns, chilis and yams were also being distributed by the camp leaders. The inhabitants said their diet was adequate and they appeared to be reasonably well fed. Unsettled conditions prevented planting of sufficient food crops last year. This has naturally increased the need for relief food in Asaba, in contrast with the quieter areas further west (e.g. Agbar).

One camp leader, an accountant in normal times, said that he and most of the people in his camp had been hiding in the bush for eleven months. Most of those in the second camp had been in the bush for fourteen months. In answer to a question, the first camp leader said he and his fellows had returned simply because they had grown tired of life in the bush, and because they "became convinced we would come to no harm, and as we regained our confidence in the federal government". We were told, and it appeared to be correct, that the only reason for the continued use of the camps (which were actually former government office blocks) is the lack of other accommodation in the town. It was not clear when the present group of displaced persons came to Asaba but the majority of them were from neighboring villages, including the Onitsha area, or had houses in Asaba which were now damaged or commandeered.

Apart from the military headquarters area, there is no electricity in Asaba or piped water. There is a considerable amount of consumer goods for sale by indigenous traders. The effective market is almost totally military. Star Beer costs 5 shillings and the usual items found in Nigerian provincial markets are available in limited quantities, including imported cigarettes. However, commercial activity is confined to petty traders; and only one petrol station is open for use by the military. The textile factory is closed, although there has been an announcement that it will be reopened. It was damaged by rebel mortar fire last year when it was being used as an FMG Army HQ. As there is no large-scale commercial activity, the Barclays Bank manager from Benin City concluded it was not yet time to reopen the thoroughly looted branch in Asaba.

CONFIDENTIAL

0131

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

p 33
Lager 5

A request to see the Asaba-Onitsha bridge was granted without delay. Lt. Ehibe clambered into the British DHC's Zephyr and told the visibly nervous driver to proceed to the bridge. Passing US-freeway type signs admonishing us to "have exact change ready", we came to the bridge approaches without seeing any security precautions other than half a dozen soldiers lounging about the battered toll booth. Ehibe waved to two of them to follow us onto the bridge, which they did, yawning and buttoning up various parts of their attire. Once they saw the Union Jack fluttering from the DHC's car they seemed to realize that they had visitors and made visible efforts to smarten up.

We drove about halfway across the bridge, then walked to the point where the last spans are blown on the Onitsha side. Standing on the edge, there was dry land below us, as the river had not yet risen appreciably. There were prominent sand bars one-third of the way across the river from the Asaba side, upstream from the bridge. The bridge was stacked with bridging steel to complete the span, but other than clearing the wrecked portion, nothing had been done by way of repair.

Intermittent small arms fire, some automatic or semi-automatic, was audible at a distance estimated at one or two miles, but there was no way of knowing who was shooting at whom or what. While standing on the bridge, we heard a distinct "thump", which was followed by a graceful twenty-foot plume of water which rose some 50 yards from the Onitsha shore and perhaps 200 yards downstream from the bridge. Ehibe gave non-committal assent to the suggestion that it was a mortar round. (On the strong presumption that it was a mortar round, it is obvious that the Biafrans are in a good position to raise hob with any major attempt to repair the bridge. It seems likely that any effort to make repairs would provoke a strong rebel effort to prevent it.)

As viewed from the bridge, Onitsha seemed a dead town. No vehicles were seen or heard. POL storage tanks near the river bank had been holed, and some burned as well. A few FMG troops were visible walking, with no apparent purpose, through the streets, washing in the river, fishing, chopping wood, cooking, and otherwise giving the impression of a camping expedition in a ghost town.

We returned to Agbor and Benin via Ibusa and Ogwashi-Uku. The road from Asaba to Ibusa is in very poor shape, but several dozen soldiers were repairing it, with the aid of a small grader and a roller. There were perhaps a dozen check points, mostly at

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 3 2

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MW:ARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

P 330
Lagos

6

small bridges, between Asaba and Ibusa, They were lightly manned, but there may have been more troops in the area who were not visible from the road, which had dense bush on both sides. We were not stopped, having accepted Ehibe's offer of a soldier to escort us.

- Ibusa town showed much evidence of the FMG "reprisal" after the rebel raids of April, 1968, during which the Ibusa people were accused of collaborating with the raiders. Most of the houses, both those of cement and the more common tin-roofed mud hovels, were damaged by gun-fire or fire. Some seemed to have been hit by a recoilless rifle, or other large caliber weapon. Several hundred troops were seen in and around the town.

At Ogwashi-Uku, also visited by rebels last spring, we stopped at the former Barclay's bank branch, an unprepossessing adobe-like building just off the road. It is now an army communications center, as it houses a field radio, whose operator appeared to be listening intently to a constant stream of rapid and excited chatter in Nigerian English. Not a word was intelligible to any of the three of us. The bank manager found the premises in good order, and most of the records securely stored. We departed, noting that over the main doorway was chalked the ineluctably Nigerian inscription, "Wellcome. Love All".

We turned north to Issele-Uku to deposit our escort and returned to Benin by the way we had come.

MATHEWS *m*

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 3 3

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05

ORIGINATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 7 UK
XR EEC 6 SWE
XR POL 27 BIAFRA
FOR RM USE ONLY

ARMY	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	NSA
		5
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4	2	5
L	FBO	AID
SP	SP	
10		
AGR	COM	FRB
	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
HSC		
6		

A-451

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : BONN, COPENHAGEN, GÖTEBORG, HELSINKI, LAGOS, LONDON, OSLO, REYKJAVIK

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 16 8 28 AM 1969

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: July 12, 1969

SUBJECT : Visit of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Meeting of European Social Democratic Leaders

REF : Stockholm's 1947 and 1934; Stockholm's A-434

British Prime Minister Harold WILSON, accompanied by his wife, arrived in southern Sweden on July 4 to begin an official visit to this country. A call on King GUSTAF ADOLF VI at his summer residence in southern Sweden was followed by a dinner in Stockholm that evening with Prime Minister ERLANDER and other leading government officials at the Foreign Ministry. The official visit continued through July 5 but was considered to be at an end when Wilson left for Harpsund (Prime Minister Erlander's summer residence) on July 6 to participate in a meeting of European Social Democratic leaders. In addition to Erlander and Wilson, West German Foreign Minister Willy BRANDT, Danish Social Democratic leader Jens Otto KRAG, Norwegian Social Democratic Party chairman Trygve BRATTELI, Finnish Prime Minister Mauno KOIVISTO, and Finnish party leader Rafael PAASIO attended the Harpsund conference along with top Swedish Social Democrats including Foreign Minister NILSSON, Finance Minister STRÄNG, Education Minister PALME, and Industry Minister WICKMAN. There were small demonstrations at Angelholm Airport when Wilson arrived in Sweden and in Stockholm. The demonstrators protested Britain's role in the Nigerian conflict. All in all the visit went smoothly, however (see Stockholm's 1947). The Wilsons left Sweden on July 8.

The following subjects received particular attention during the Wilson visit and the meeting of Social Democratic Party leaders:

Economic Integration

There was considerable discussion about European as well as Nordic economic integration. This aspect was reported in Stockholm's 1934 and is covered in greater detail in Stockholm's airgram A-434.

Exempted from automatic decontrol.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:W.B. Jr. in 7/11/69

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:CABorg

Clearances:

ECON:ER

20 JUL 16 PM 12 19

COPY 10-888

0134

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 954503
By: MVA/ARA Date: 10/5/05

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 2
Stockholm A- 451

Nigeria

In a television interview on the evening of July 4, Wilson said that he was not prepared to alter the present British policy regarding Nigeria. When asked how he viewed an arms embargo, he pointed out that such an embargo did not make sense without a cease fire and, conversely, a cease fire did not make sense without an arms embargo; they therefore had to be part of the same package. He denied that the British Government had "intervened in the conflict" and said: "We did intervene before the war as friends of Nigeria to end the war. We continued to deliver arms to the Lagos side because we are traditionally the main suppliers of arms and equipment to the Nigerian defenses." He also made the point that the Soviets and others would be happy to fill any gap caused by a change in the U.K.'s arms policy.

Wilson said that the majority of Africans share the British view that Africa cannot be divided among ethnic lines. He also drew attention to British efforts to promote agreement between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the International Red Cross.

At a July 8 press conference at Harpsund, Wilson took essentially the same positions and pointed to the British Foreign Minister's statement in Parliament the same day. It is not surprising that Wilson did not receive much support for British Nigerian policy in the Swedish media. The Liberal press in particular has been quite vocal in its criticism of Britain's role as an arms supplier to the Nigerian Federal Government and, as described in Stockholm's 1947, Swedish Government officials privately showed little understanding for the complexities of the Nigerian conflict.

European Security Conference

At the July 8 press conference Jens Otto Krag spoke about the possibility of a European Security Conference. Krag said he thought that more should be done about bringing the conference into being, that the United States must take part in the negotiations preceding a conference, but that East Germany should also participate. Willy Brandt said that he was not making any conditions about German participation in a European Security Conference, thereby implying that the presence of East Germany would not prevent West Germany's participation.

Vietnam

Krag told the press that he found it regrettable that President NIXON had not yet fulfilled expectations of a change of U.S. Vietnam policy. It was a source of amazement and irritation, he said, that a war that all acknowledged could not be won by military means was nevertheless being continued by military means.

CAMERON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ve

0135

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW/ARA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

70L 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
L	FBO	AID
		20
5/5	5/1	J/PM
10	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

A-331
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : ADDIS ABABA, LISBON, IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, PARIS, USMISSION GENEVA, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK, OSD FOR CINSTRIDE

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

SUBJECT: Abortive Attempt at Secret Talks to End Nigerian Civil War

REF :

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 14 8 30 AM 1969
RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: 12 July 1969

Attached is a Memorandum of Conversation outlining attempts made earlier this year by an American citizen, George Coumantaros of New York City, to bring about secret talks between the two sides to the Nigerian conflict.

Mr. Coumantaros appears to have come close to his goal, but the Biafran side then backed off. Coumantaros believes that this is to be attributed to Von Rosen's planes, which gave the Biafrans new hope that they could win the war.

MATHEWS

Attachment:
As stated

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:EE Ramsaur Jr:mjr 7/11/69

Contents and Classification Approved by: A/DCM:WGJ ones William S. Jones

Clearances:

1969 JUL 14 AM 11 58

COPY/FLG-PBR

0136

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 950/503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Page 1 of 3
Encl. No. 1
A- 331 from Lagos

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: George Coumantaros, 944 Fifth Ave., NYC. Business:
Flour Mills of Nigeria, Ltd; Southern Star Shipping Co.
E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., Political Counselor, Lagos

Date: July 9, 1969

Place: Mr. Ramsaur's house, Lagos

Subject: Efforts by Mr. Coumantaros to bring about Nigerian-
Biafran secret talks

Mr. Coumantaros began by explaining that he had long been interested in finding some way to help shorten the Nigerian civil war. To that end he spoke to several senior civil servants, notably Ahmed Joda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information, when he was in Lagos last February. He told Joda that he was in touch with K. O. Mbadiwe in New York and asked if the FMG would be interested in a meeting with Mbadiwe to explore the possibility of secret talks. Joda and his colleagues, he says, jumped at the idea, and in March Joda came to New York and met Mbadiwe at Coumantaros' apartment.


Mbadiwe made several points to Joda at this initial meeting, including:
1) Negotiations on the Nigerian side thus far had been conducted primarily by Yorubas. The Biafrans would prefer to deal with a Hausa team to avoid the risk of repudiation of an agreement between Ibos and Yorubas. Mbadiwe specifically mentioned Aminu Kano and Ali Akilu. 2) The FMG's propaganda was wrongly directed. It should emphasize reconciliation and not crushing the rebellion. (Coumantaros believes that Mbadiwe's remarks about dealing with Northerners represent his own thinking only and not Ojukwu's, but it is interesting to note that the FMG took his advice.)

Mbadiwe and Joda talked privately for some time. Joda emerged from the meeting full of optimism and returned immediately to Lagos, cancelling a planned trip to Canada. Mbadiwe set about gathering a Biafran delegation to match the Nigerian one Joda was to return with.

At this point the negotiations flagged. Mbadiwe could get no cooperation from N. Otue, Biafran representative in New York, in communicating with Biafra, Otue taking the position that Mbadiwe had no official status. Mbadiwe eventually got through to C. C. Mojekwu (Biafran Commissioner of Home Affairs and roving representative in Europe), in Lisbon, who relayed the proposal to Ojukwu and apparently got the green light. Mbadiwe, Mojekwu, and Matthew Mbu, Biafran Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, were named to negotiate with the Nigerians, and Mojekwu obtained a visa at the American Embassy in Lisbon. At this juncture, according to Coumantaros, one Njoku (a Biafran), who teaches in Texas,

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 3 7



CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Page 2 of 3
Encl. No. 1
A-331 from Lagos

was dispatched to acquaint Ojukwu at first hand with the situation. He did not return on schedule and played no further role.

Meanwhile, things had moved slowly in Lagos, but in late April, Coumantaros received a cable announcing that Joda, Dr. R.A.B. Dikko, Commissioner for Mines and Power, and Akilu, all northerners, were arriving next day in New York.

Efforts were immediately made to get the Biafran delegation to New York while the Nigerians cooled their heels. Eventually word was received from Mojekwu that the Biafrans wished to shift the venue of the talks to Geneva. The Nigerians agreed, and they, together with Coumantaros and Mbadiwe, flew to London, whence Coumantaros called Mojekwu in Lisbon. The latter asked Coumantaros to come immediately to Lisbon.

Leaving the Nigerians in London, Coumantaros went to Lisbon, where on the night of May 14-15 he met with Mojekwu from 10:00 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. The conversation initially went well, and Coumantaros believed that he had persuaded Mojekwu that the Biafrans could no longer hope to win and of the advantages of a negotiated settlement. Finally, Mojekwu dropped a bombshell: The Biafrans would participate in talks with the Nigerians only if they received a written invitation through the Nigerian High Commission in London. Coumantaros pointed out that the talks were to be secret and exploratory and pleaded with Mojekwu to drop the condition. Mojekwu was adamant, and Coumantaros returned to London.

The Nigerian delegation was incensed but agreed to have one more crack at Mojekwu, who was eventually tracked down in Frankfurt a day or two later. Coumantaros put Joda on the telephone with Mojekwu, and the two talked for half an hour without result. Dikko, as head of the delegation, also spoke to Mojekwu to satisfy himself that there was no further hope. The Nigerians thereupon packed up and left for Lagos.

I. Kogbara, Biafran representative in London, and Mbadiwe tried unsuccessfully to catch the Nigerians at the airport with the message that they would settle for an oral invitation. On the following day Kogbara asked Coumantaros to telephone Joda in Lagos to convey this message. Joda washed his hands of the entire affair, and there the matter rests.

Coumantaros is of the opinion that Mbadiwe, Kogbara, and even Mojekwu were prepared to begin the talks and that Mojekwu suddenly received new instructions. In Coumantaros' view, Ojukwu had just at that moment become persuaded that Von Rosen and his planes were going to knock out the Nigerian Air Force and turn the tide of the war.

Coumantaros has not given up entirely and still, he says, has a mandate from the Nigerians to continue his efforts. He would be glad to have guidance from the Department but believes that he should not become identified with the Department by either side. He believes that there

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 3 8

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Page 3 of 3
Encl. No. 1
A- 331 from Lagos

are influential Ibos who think the time has come to accept the fact that they have lost and that every effort should be made to encourage such people to break with Ojukwu. Mbadiwe is such a one, but he is already under suspicion in Biafra, and his family is still in Biafra. Despite Mojekwu's adamant stand, Coumantaros thinks he is a likely target.

Coumantaros states that he believes that an outright military solution to the war could have grave consequences. He believes that the massacres of 1966 came about because the Ibos who were going back to their homeland were carrying money. He thinks this could happen again with victorious and undisciplined troops. He also fears that if the war drags on too long, the influence of the USSR will increase.

Coumantaros expects to spend the next two months in Greece, returning to New York in September. He visits Lagos about twice a year. A cousin, also George Coumantaros, is general manager of Flour Mills of Nigeria, Ltd. The New York Coumantaros presumably handles the New York end of the business, as well as another venture, Southern Star Shipping Co. He may have other interests as well.

POL:EERamsaurJr:mjr 7/11/69

CONFIDENTIAL

0139

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MM/ARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

31

Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 568

PAGE 01 LONDON 05503 111606Z

50

ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, ACDA 16, SR 01, ORM 03, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

UPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, UPW 01, SCS 04, SCA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, 174 W

061618

PIR 111513Z JULI 69
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1564
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
USUN NEW YORK 1771

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 5503


SUBJ: NIGERIA: DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS: JULY 10

1. LAST NIGHT'S DEBATE ON NIGERIA IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PRODUCED NO SURPRISES. FONSEC STEWART, SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME AND OTHER SPEAKERS ON BOTH SIDES OF HOUSE REHEARSED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS AND RESULT WAS RATHER ANTI-CLIMATIC REVIEW OF SITUATION WHICH HAD CHANGED LITTLE SINCE HOUSE OF COMMONS LAST DEBATED IT IN MARCH (LONDON 2023). AFTER SIX HOURS OF DEBATE, PRO-BIAFRA BACK BENCHERS FROM BOTH PARTIES FORCED HOUSE TO DIVIDE ON TECHNICAL QUESTION OF ADJOURNMENT. BY THAT TIME MANY M.P.'S HAD ALREADY HEADED HOME LEAVING 162 OF THEIR COLLEAGUES VOTING FOR THE GOVT AND 44 OPPOSING IT. CONSERVATIVE FRONT BENCH ABSTAINED. FINAL VOTE INDICATED CLEARLY THAT PRINCIPAL CRITICS OF GOVT'S POLICY HAD FAILED TO INCREASE THEIR STRENGTH. RESPIRE FROM PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE ON GOVT IS IN SIGHT SINCE HOUSE IS EXPECTED TO RAISE FOR SUMMER RECESS JULY 25.

2. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME LAUNCHED DEBATE FOR OPPOSITION AND GAVE HIS USUAL MODERATE APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0140





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 LONDON 05503 111606Z


AND PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT. HE AGREED WITH GOVT THAT UNILATERAL BAN ON ARMS TO NIGERIA BY UK WOULD BE FUTILE. HE WAS LESS SURE THAT GOVT WAS CORRECT WHEN IT ARGUED THAT CEASEFIRE MUST BE PRE-CONDITIONED BY GENERAL EMBARGO ON ARMS SUPPLIES OR POLICING OF POINTS OF RECEPTION OF ARMS. HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE GOVT SHOULD DO MORE TO EXPLORE USE OF SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACHIEVING GENERAL ARMS EMBARGO AND TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. IN LATTER CONNECTION, SIR ALEC HOPED FONOFF WAS STILL CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF SENDING MALCOLM MACDONALD TO BOTH LAGOS AND BIAFRA.

4. FONSECITY STEWART REVIEWED DIFFICULTY OF GETTING ARMS EMBARGO WHEN NO GOVT ADMITTED IT WAS SUPPLYING ARMS TO REBELS. "IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET PEOPLE TO AGREE TO STOP DOING SOMETHING THEY ASSERT THEY ARE NOT DOING." FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS HAD MADE IT PLAIN THEY WANTED NO PART OF GENERAL BAN ON ARMS TO LAGOS. BRITAIN HAD APPROACHED THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS SUBJECT AND RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT WHATEVER BRITAIN DID ABOUT ARMS, SOVS WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THEM. "MORE RECENTLY", SAID STEWART, "GENERAL SECRETARY OF LABOUR PARTY DISCUSSED THIS WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL AND GOT REPLY THAT ONLY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH RUSSIANS WOULD STOP SUPPLYING ARMS WOULD BE IF NIGERIAN GOVT REQUESTED CESSATION." FONSEC NOTED IN PASSING ALLEGATIONS IN PRESS THAT BRITAIN WAS SUPPLYING MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO NIGERIA AND SAID HE WANTED TO DENY THESE REPORTS CATEGORICALLY. REGARDING COMPETENCE OF UN TO INTERVENE IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT, U THANT HAD TAKEN VIEW IT WAS UNLIKELY NIGERIA COULD EVEN BE INCLUDED ON AGENDA.

5. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF RELIEF STEWART EXPRESSED SATISFACTION ICRC'S NAVILLE WAS IN LAGOS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH NIGERIAN AUTHORITIES. FMG WAS READY AND WILLING TO FACILITATE RELIEF SHIPMENTS BY LAND AND BY DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. PROBLEM WAS TO DEVISE ROUTES AND SYSTEMS OF INSPECTION WHICH WOULD SATISFY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES. FMG OPPOSED NIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS BECAUSE ARMS DELIVERIES WERE CONTAMINATING RELIEF SUPPLIES DELIVERED AT NIGHT. IT WAS NOT TRUE HOWEVER THAT FMG CONSIDERED STARVATION A LEGITIMATE WEAPON OF WARFARE. GENERAL GOWON HAD FLATLY DENIED THIS AND FMG'S POLICY OF PERMITTING RELIEF TO GO INTO BIAFRAN ENCLAVE WITH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0141





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 LONDON 05503 111606Z

ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS SHOWED HE WAS SPEAKING TRUTH. IT WAS NOW BEING SAID THAT FMG SHOULD AGREE TO DAYLIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WITH INSPECTION BY FMG AND NEUTRAL OBSERVERS, AND NOT INSIST ON ALL RELIEF PASSING THROUGH FEDERAL TERRITORIES. THIS QUESTION MIGHT WELL BE DISCUSSED BY ICRC IN LAGOS AND FONSECA COULD NOT SAY WHAT EVENTUAL OUTCOME WOULD BE. HE DID THINK IT APPROPRIATE TO REMIND HOUSE THAT NIGERIAN GOVT HAD MADE MANY CONCESSIONS ON RELIEF SHIPMENTS IN PAST AND IT REASONABLE TO EXPECT OUKWU TO MAKE SOME AS WELL. "IF GOVERNMENT OR ANYONE ELSE ASKS FMG TO GO FURTHER (IN FACILITATING RELIEF TO BIAFRA) THEY SHOULD NOT UNDER ESTIMATE HOW FAR IT HAS GONE ALREADY".

6. DEBATE WAS SUMMED UP BY PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECTY MAURICE FOLEY FOR GOVT AND FRONT BENCH SPOKESMAN BERNARD BRAINE FOR CONSERVATIVES. BRAINE CRITICIZED GOVT FOR CONSISTENT "OVER-OPTIMISM" AND SAID FONSECTY HAD COME CLOSE TO MISLEADING HOUSE EARLIER THIS WEEK WHEN HE STATED AGREEMENT ACHIEVED BY ICRC AND FMG ON RELIEF SHIPMENTS. HE THOUGHT GOVT SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO GET DAYLIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS STARTED, AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE NIGHT FLIGHTS ON INTERIM BASIS AND PUSH FMG TO ACCEPT CROSS RIVER PLAN. MAURICE FOLEY SAID IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON LIKELY OUTCOME OF ICRC'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH FMG IN LAGOS. HE HOPED THAT REASONABLE COMPROMISE COULD BE REACHED ON DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS AND OBSERVED THAT CROSS RIVER PLAN HAD BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY BOTH PARTIES SUBJECT TO SECURITY GUARANTEES. ANNENBERG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

27

0142

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND954503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

Pol 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

114392

23B

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

10 JUL 69 22 37Z

114392

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Origin	ACTION: Amembassy	PARIS	PRIORITY
Info:	INFO: Amembassy	ABIDJAN	PRIORITY
	"	ADDIS ABABA	"
	"	LAGOS	"
	"	LONDON	"
	"	OTTAWA	"
	USMission	GENEVA	"

SUBJECT: French Inquiry Re USG Interest in Possible French Initiative on Nigeria/Biafra

1. French Embassy Counselor requested appointment Department July 10 to inquire re report that US officials would look favorably on French initiative for possible meeting on Nigeria/Biafra situation in Ottawa of British, Canadian, French and American representatives. Counselor could not shed light on what kind of meeting report envisaged. Counselor speculated Paris needed prompt reply for early talk with Houphouet-Boigny.
2. Counselor informed that report was news to Department. US naturally deeply concerned with relief aspect of problem. We were open to all ideas in this field but it important for both sides in conflict to be more flexible in breaking present relief impasse. French might be helpful through their Biafran contacts in getting some flexibility into Ibo position on circumstances of inspection since, after all, relief supplies had to pass over Nigerian territory.

Drafted by: <i>Rm</i>	Tel. Ext. 2619	Telegraphic transmission end classification approved by: <i>CRM/Rm</i>
AF/W:RMMelbourne:emb 7/10/69		AF - C. Robert Moore

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Morris

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0143

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin: ~~WATON~~ Page 2 Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info:

3. Counselor was told that Relief Coordinator Ferguson was expecting to be in Europe shortly and in week July 21 might be available to come to Paris, as had been suggested previously but which he had then been unable to do, to discuss relief situation. We intended to make inquiry as to French convenience through our Embassy. FYI This being done by septel NOTAL. END FYI

4. Earlier same afternoon, another French Embassy representative saw White House NSC Staff Officer to inquire re same report described para 1. Department response to French inquiry was coordinated on ~~xxx~~ similar lines. NSC Staff Officer did recall hearing report analogous to French inquiry as one of ideas advanced by private American interested in problem.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0144

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION
AF-5

35
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

Pol 27-9 Biafra Nigeria
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
4		5
L	FBO	AID
		20
	HEW	5/PM
AGR	COM	FRB
	10	
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		75C
		6

Encl. reported
UNCLASSIFIED

A-83
HANDLING INDICATOR
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 16 2 04 PM 1969
RS-AM
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: July 9, 1969
R/R file

TO : Department of State
FROM : Amembassy LIBREVILLE
SUBJECT: "ABC" Program in Biafra
REF : Libreville 709

Enclosed is a document outlining the "Aid to Biafran Children" (ABC) program in Biafra. This paper was given to us by Dr. Omar Fareed during his stop in Libreville July 8. According to Fareed, the ABC program was worked out in Biafra the week before in close consultation with representatives of Church World Service, World Council of Churches, Joint Church Aid, Caritas, French Red Cross and others.

NELSON

Enclosure *act*

MR

960 JUL 16 PM 4 05

COPYFLO-PBR

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: HFNelson/raa
Clearances:
Contents and Classification Approved by: HFNelson, Jr. - Charge d'affaires

0145

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 954503
By: MWA Date: 10/3/05

ENCLOSURE LIBREVILLE A-83

Revised July 7, 1969 by Dr. Catchpool, Dr. Fareed, Dr. Ifekwunigwe, A-83
Dr. Udekwa.

Libreville

(Revised proposal responsive to that submitted to Normal Cousins by the
Biafran Government at Umuahia December 13, 1968)

AF

1. Medical Objectives:

We will perform the following functions in cooperation with the
University of Biafra Teaching Hospital (UBTH) Staff, the Ministry of
Health, and all available medical personnel:

**A. Provide supplementary/complimentary medical and health services
with emphasis on rural patients.**

1. Cooperate with Church World Service (CWS), the World Council of
Churches (WCC), Joint Church Aid (JCA), Caritas, French Red
Cross, I.C.R.C. and other existing agencies to coordinate
requests for and donations of medical supplies, equipment and
services. Avoid duplication by prompt communication as well
as proper record system and statistics.

2. Provide the following laboratory examinations for thousands
of malnourished patients:

a. Blood Tests:

1) Hemoglobin for anemia (photometers provided by ABC
and Carr Foundation).

2) Electrophoretic analyses for hereditary sickle cell
trait and disease - hemoglobinopathy (Shandon Kohn
Electrophoretic apparatus provided by ABC and
Carr Foundation).

3) Thick blood smears for malaria, microfilaria and other
parasites.

4) Blood serology for syphilis and/or yaws - at later
date

b. Feces examination for hookworms and other intestinal
parasites.

c. Sputum smears for TB and lung fluke (paragonimus westermani)

d. Tuberculin skin tests.

e. Urinalysis Labstix (Ames) Test for pH, Ketones, Blood,
Albumin due to kidney disease, and Sugar due to diabetes
mellitus.

f. Urethral smears for gonorrhea.

0146

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

3. Rural Malnutrition Clinics (Feeding Wards or Sick Bays):

Intenatal Clinics

- a. Cooperate with existing mobile units, clinics, Hospitals, doctors, nursing sisters and agencies to provide additional medical care.
- b. Survey existing teams to determine the area coverage, type of medical services provided, requirements to improve medical care (as per their requests).
 - 1) Contribute essential low-cost, high protein-vitamin-mineral supplements when and where emergency supplies needed or not supplied by existing mobile teams.
 - 2) Distribute essential medicines:
 - a) Iron - oral and parenteral for anemia.
 - b) Chloroquine for malaria.
 - c) Thiabendazole (Mintezole) for encylostomiasis (Hookworm).
- c. Treatment for minor medical problems will be provided. The more serious cases will be transported whenever possible to the Medical Center.

B. Health Personnel:

Paramedical workers would be deployed in the rural villages. These auxiliary medical personnel will be trained to provide medical attention to the rural population receiving minimal or no coverage. Every effort will be made to see that the standards set for the training programs conform to those set up by the Ministry of Health. However ABC anticipates and requests the cooperation of Biafran dynamic open minded leadership to adapt to new training programs and standards. The categories of staff required are:

1. Nursing aids, auxiliaries and nutritionists.
2. Dispensing medical assistants.
3. Laboratory technicians.
4. Dentists and Dental technicians.
5. Communications Technicians - Health broadcaster - radio, tape recorder amplification - duplication; and motion picture filming.
6. Social service workers (Nutrition and TB case finding and follow up especially).
7. X-ray technicians for mass chest mini-filming - TB detection.

0147

- C. Donation and Purchase of Medicines and Equipment including (transportation and storage). In cooperation with existing agencies, Direct Relief Foundation (DRF) and Interchurch Medical Assistance (IMA), JCA, French Red Cross, ICRC and others.

It is vital that essential items be delivered in substantial and regular quantities to existing and new dispensing clinics and mobile units. Ware-housing and inventory will be in cooperation with existing organization.

D. Mass Communication, Health Education and Health Information:

1. Continued cooperation with the Ministries of Health and Information officials in broadcasting essential Agriculture, Nutrition and Health data - village planting; farming and food production (including leaf protein); feeding habits; sanitation (latrine construction); hygiene; immunizations; TB prevention. (ACPO-Popular Cultural Action Program of Colombia, South America). (Ultimately educational television will be developed).
2. Educate the village people on how to regain and maintain health by means of tape recorded messages, demonstrations, audio-visual aids, and radio. (ABC now cooperates with Commissioner of Information, Dr. I. Eke, Harvard School of Economics graduate, and his staff.)

II. Mobile Medical Units

- A. Survey practices and coverage of existing units with determination of remote areas with little or no medical services.
- B. Provide preventive and curative medical services to as many people as possible daily, weekly and monthly. The existing Mobile Medical units (Jeeps) with trailers to be adapted for laboratory, X-ray, operating room, living quarters.
- C. Augment services of the existing immunization teams. (These teams immunized over two million patients for smallpox and nearly one million for measles in 6 months.)
 1. Medical care for the teams (eight existing teams each composed of eight Biafran paramedical workers).
 2. Laboratory testing of rural village populations prior to or combined with Mobile Medical Therapeutic Unit arrival at village.
 3. Medical services to the rural population in addition to immunization.
 - a. Anemia prevention and treatment:
 - 1) Iron - oral and intramuscular.
 - 2) Chloroquine - malaria.
 - 3) Thiabendazol - hookworm infestation.

0 1 4 8

- b. Acute infectious diseases treatment - antibiotics
 - 1) Dysentery
 - 2) Bacterial pneumonias
 - 3) Meningitis or outbreak of epidemic diseases
- c. TB Control and treatment
 - 1) BCG immunization
 - 2) INH for contacts to open contagious TB
300 to 400 mg at least two or three times each week-
prophylaxis
 - 3) Pyridoxine to be added when indicated.
- d. Intestinal parasites treatment
 - 1) Hookworm (ancylostomiasis)
 - 2) Ascaris lumbricoides
 - 3) Amoeba Histolytica

III. Technical Consultation and Assistance:

- A. Biafra has well educated and capable doctors, nurses, educators, agriculturists, administrators and leaders who are doing exceptionally well but require supplies, equipment and funds as well as moral support.
- B. USA and all other concerned countries can provide highly specialized technical consultants to cooperate on short term basis in Biafra and follow-up abroad. This includes members of ABC Advisory Board which includes:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Dr. George Azinn | 2. Dr. Roy Brown | 3. Dr. Mel Casberg |
| 4. Dr. Seymour Gray | 5. Dr. Aaron Ifekwuni-
gwe | 6. Dr. Michael Lathan |
| 7. Dr. Jean Mayer | 8. Dr. Fredrick Stare | 9. Dr. Davida Taylor |
| 10. Dr. Fabian Udekwa | | |

and all others who are interested in voluntarily contributing their time and services in scientific collaboration - Scientific Collaboration - University of Biafra Staff and Medical scientists from USA, Europe, Middle East (American University of Beirut) and others

- 1. Agriculture Self-development - Dr. Okigbo, Dean of Agriculture College and Head of Land Army, requested ABC and Carr Foundation assistance in development of Leaf Protein Supplement from the prevalent Siam weed (*Eupatorium orderatum*). The basic pirie equipment was ordered and shipped May First to Biafra. We arranged for the Siam weed leaf protein sample (provided by Dr. Adi) to be analyzed for amino acid composition and protein content (35%) at the American University of Beirut by Dr. Peter Pellett, Dr. James Cowan and Dr. Donald McLaren.

2. AMDOC:

- a. Biafran doctors unanimously recommended AMDOC (American Doctor) participation in February, 1969.
- b. Accommodations will be provided by Biafran doctors. The visiting doctors will be expected to provide their own travel expenses as well as current medical equipment, supplies and books. This arrangement is subject to requested specialists such as plastic surgeons, neurosurgeons, orthopedic surgeons.

0149

3. Medical Library requested by Ministry of Health and Biafran doctors agreed to be located at the University of Biafra Teaching Hospital in Ensekuku. ABC to obtain current medical books and periodicals.
4. Population Control - Family Planning Clinics. Augment existing Intra-Uterine Device (IUD) installation clinics of Dr. Ogan as per request of Ministry of Health (5 July, 1969 Dr. R.E. Onwumere, Chairman, Emergency Medical Services.
Women who are malnourished and/or have one or more malnourished infants or children should be given opportunity to receive IUD and/or other birth control advice and assistance.
5. Dental care
 - a. Survey dental problems and existing manpower.
 - b. Volunteer dentists to be obtained where non available.
 - c. Fluoridation for prevention of dental caries when requested or desired.
 - d. Mobile dental unit with audio-visual communication for teaching and preventive work.
6. Medical, Agricultural, and other Films:
 - a. Documentary, teaching audio-visual films for mass communications.
 - b. Technicians, equipment, film direction and production.
7. Communications Cooperation.
 - a. Liaison between Biafra and ACPO radiophonic education program of Colombia, South America.
 - b. Radio, audio visual experts advisory service - later television.
8. Private enterprise cooperation:
 - a. Products (woven fabrics and baskets) from Biafra to be shipped on returning empty planes to USA and Europe.
 - b. Organizations who can advise:
 - 1) International Executive Service Corp (Frank Pace)
 - 2) National Industrial Conference Board consultation (H. Bruce Palmer)
 - 3) Technoserve and Self-Help Handicrafts - SERV program (CWS - Dr. Reginalt Halfferich)
9. Amputee program - cooperation with U.S. manufacturing company and Dr. M. Vitali (Queen Mary Hospital, Roehampton)
10. Clothes, cotton, cloth, thread collection and shipment
11. Sister City program - New York or Los Angeles and Owerri or Orlu.

0150



Pol 27 Biapra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 303

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06222 101126Z

21
ACTION AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, UCF 05, UPW 01, SCSE 00,

SCA 01, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, ACDA 16, CU 04, 162 W

050687

R 091755Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7703
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 6222

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUND-UP JULY 9

1. ALMOST ALL PAPERS REPORT FMG ANNOUNCEMENT OF CAPTURE OF
ABRIBA, MEDIUM-SIZE TOWN NORTH-EAST OF BENDE. SKETCH CLAIMS
TOWN WAS IMPORTANT CENTER FOR MANUFACTURE OF WEAPONS BY REBELS.

2. TIMES REPORTS STATEMENT BY RIVERS STATE COMAGRICULTURE
DAPPA-BIRIYE AGREEING WITH RECENT SUGGESTIONS THAT MILGOVS
SHOULD BE GIVEN NEW ASSIGNMENTS. HE SAID SUGGESTION ALSO SUPPORTED
BY "LARGE MAJORITY OF NIGERIANS". QUOTED AS ADDING "ONE
PROBLEM IN COUNTRY TODAY IS HABIT OF PEOPLE TRYING TO ENTRENCH
THEMSELVES IN PUBLIC OFFICES, AS IF IT WAS THEIR PERSONAL
ESTABLISHMENT. MILITARY REGIME IN NIGERIA AS CORRECTIVE
GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FAILING IN VOWS TO WORLD SHOULD IT GIVE
IMPRESSION THAT OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IS PERMANENT TO ANY OF ITS

UNCLASSIFIED

28

*LAGOS 6222
7/9/69*

0151

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06222 101126Z

PRESENT HOLDERS".


NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL TITLED "WARNINGS ONLY WILL NOT DO" STATE GOVERNORS AND COMMISSIONER HAVE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS WARNED LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT HEADS OF DEPARTMENT TO ABSTAIN FROM CORRUPT PRACTICES WHICH IS "SIMPLY REPETITION OF WHAT WE HEARD ALMOST AD NAUSEUM DURING CIVILIAN REGIME. IRONY OF IT ALL WAS THAT EVEN THOSE DEEPLY ENGAGED IN CORRUPTION CALL UPON OTHERS TO KEEP AWAY FROM IT". SAYS WARNINGS NOT ENOUGH AND "RUTHLESS ACTION" MUST BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE FOUND TO BE CORRUPT.

3. POST, TIMES AND OBSERVER REPORT LETTER FROM NUMBER PEOPLE OF SE STATE TO MILGOVE SE STATE ESUENE AND HIS REPLY CONDEMNING USE OF CROSS RIVER AS RELIEF ROUTE AND PROMISING THAT NO RELIEF ROUTE OF ANY KIND WOULD PASS THROUGH SE STATE TO REBEL ENCLAVE (LAGOS 6189 NOTAL). NUMBER OF PICTURES OF "MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION" IN CALABAR IN PAPERS AND CONTENTS OF LETTERS SUMMARIZED WITH NUMBER OF QUOTES. SIGNS AND GOVERNOR'S REPLY HAVE STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN TONE. NEW NIGERIAN CARRIES LONG LETTER SIGNED BY SE STATE CITIZEN BITTERLY ATTACKING DONA MERCEDES AND PLAN TO USE CROSS RIVER FOR RELIEF CORRIDOR. ALSO BITTERLY ATTACKS AMERICANS OPERATING "UNDER GUISE OF RELIEF AGENCIES WHILE THEY ARE ACTUALLY REBEL CONSPIRATORS---(WHO WANT) TO TRANSPORT LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS HIDDEN ALL OVER SHIP IN SPECIAL CABINS THAT NO ONE CAN EASILY DISCOVER."

4. POST AND TIMES REPORT ICRC PRESIDENT NAVILLE ARRIVING LAGOS TODAY AND ALSO INCLUDE REPORT ON JCA PROPOSAL THAT RELIEF CARGOES SHOULD BE INSPECTED AT SOME SIGHT AGREEABLE TO ALL SIDES BY TEAMS MADE UP OF REPS FROM NIGERIA, REBELS AND INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY GOVERNMENT. OBSERVERS WOULD ALSO GO ALONG ON EACH FLIGHT. TIMES REPORTS STATEMENT IN LONDON BY REBEL REP KOGHARA COMPLETELY REJECTING ANY RELIEF SUPPLIES WHICH COME FROM OR PASS THROUGH NIGERIA. REPORTEDLY SAID REBELS WOULD ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OUTSIDE OF NIGERIA AT PLACES SUCH AS FERNANDO PO AND COTONOU WITH NIGERIANS REPRESENTED ON SUPERVISION TEAM. TRIBUNE EDITORIAL INVEIGHS AGAINST FMG AGREEMENT TO ALLOW REPRESENTATIVES OF ICRC TO INSPECT RELIEF SUPPLIES IN NIGERIA EN ROUTE TO REBEL TERRITORY CALLING AGREEMENT "WEAKLING STAND" AFTER FMG'S PREVIOUS STATEMENT ENDING ICRC'S COORDINATING ROLE IN RELIEF. SAYS THAT REBELS WILL NEVER ACCEPT THE PLAN. ALSO DENIES THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

0152





Department of State

TEL GRA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LAGOS 06222 101126Z

FMG WOULD TRY TO POISON FOOD AS REBELS CHARGE BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN FROM SO DOING. CALLS ON FMG TO TELL ICRC NIGERIA "MORE INTERESTED IN ENDING WAR THAN IN SENDING RELIEF SUPPLIES TO REBELS TO STRENGTHEN THEM--IF REBELS WILL NOT TAKE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES MEANT FOR THEM BECAUSE THEY PASS THROUGH FEDERAL TERRITORY THAT IS THEIR BUSINESS. EFFORTS OF ICRC COULD THEN BE MORE USEFULLY DIRECTED TOWARDS CONVINCING REBELS TO REVERSE SUICIDAL STAND...FMG MUST KNOW ALL THESE EXERCISES WITH RELIEF ARE DISTRACTION AND CAN ONLY BENEFIT REBELS". ASKS RHETORICALLY HOW MANY TIMES REBELS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO NEGOTIATE WITH VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS ON RELIEF AND STATES IT WS TIME TO END TALKS ABOUT RELIEF AND CONCENTRATE ON BUSINESS OF WINNING WAR.

5. OBSERVER EDITORIAL, TAKING OFF FROM COMINFOR ENAHORO STATEMENTS LAST WEEKEND, CALLS ON FMG TO CALL MEETING OF ENLARGED AND RECONSTITUTED "WAR COUNCIL" TO CONSIDER NEW THREATS BY FOREIGNERS AND "REORIENTATE WAR MOOD AND TEMPO" IN COUNTRY. DECLARES "NO DOUBT SOME OF BIG POWERS WOULD LIKE TO SEE NIGERIA DESTROYED EITHER BY BALKANIZATION OR IF THAT FAILS, BY WRECKING ECONOMY THROUGH COST OF WAR, THUS MAKING HER FOREVER DEPENDENT ON THEM ECONOMICALLY". OPINES THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, NIGERIA MUST TAKE A FIRM STAND TO SURVIVE AND "TO THIS END NIGERIA NEEDS TO BE TOUGH BUT NOT INFLEXIBLE. SHE MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BUT AT SAME TIME SHE MUST POSSESS SKILL TO DO THIS WITHOUT LOSING FACE". CALLS ON FMG TO BE ALERT AND READY TO DEFEND COUNTRY AGAINST INTRUDERS BY LAND, SEA OR AIR, INCLUDING CHASING ENEMY PLANES WHICH USE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS THEIR BASE ACROSS BORDERS TO THEIR BASES, IF NECESSARY.


6. TIMES AND NEW NIGERIAN REPORT STATEMENTS BY NIGERIAN UN REP OGBU IN KADUNA THAT "CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES HAVE LAUNCHED NEW CAMPAIGN AT UN TO GAIN RECOGNITION FOR SECESSIONIST TERRITORY". REFUSED COUNTRIES WERE FROM "HUMANITARIAN-ORIENTED WESTERN COUNTRIES". ALSO SAID SOME COUNTRIES WERE PLANNING TO RAISE NIGERIAN CONFLICT AT NEXT MEETING OF GA BUT HE AND NIGERIAN MISSION WOULD FIGHT PLACEMENT OF IOEM ON GA AGENDA. OGBU IN NIGERIA ON TEN-DAY PRIVATE VISIT.

7. POST REPORTS FIFTY STUDENTS FROM KADUNA COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

28

0153





Department of State

TEL GRA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 LAGOS 06222 101126Z

AND TECHNOLOGY HAVE LEFT FOR CENTRAL EASTERN STATE TO SPEND
SIX WEEKS WORKING ON RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.
MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

58

0154

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND959503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05



PP B 9 USSR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

NR POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 880

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03340 091717Z

46

ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, CIAEI 00, DODE 00, JPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

RSR 01/149 W

044942

R 091450Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3032
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 3340

SUBJ: IZVESTIYA ATTACKS SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

REF: MOSCOW 1184

POL SUP NR PP B 9 USSR

1. IZVESTIYA JULY 8 BRANDED AS "SENSATIONAL, MISCHIEVOUS LIE" A JULY 6 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE WHICH HAD REPORTED THAT A BIAFRAN DELEGATION WAS IN MOSCOW NEGOTIATING AN ARMS DEAL. IZVESTIYA HEAPED RIDICULE ON SUGGESTION THAT MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN UNITY WAS WAVERING. THE SOVIET POSITION IS CLEAR, IZVESTIYA DECLARED, IT "FULLY SUPPORTS STRUGGLE OF NIGERIAN PEOPLE FOR UNITY AND CONDEMNS SEPARATIST POLICY OF DIVIDING THAT COUNTRY, WHICH WOULD ONLY PLEASE IMPERIALISTS AND NEO-COLONIALISTS."

2. COMMENT: THIS ARTICLE, ENDING SEVERAL WEEKS HIATUS IN SOVIET COMMENTARY REGARDING NIGERIAN SITUATION, GIVES NO INDICATION OF CHANGE AWAY FROM WELL-KNOWN SOVIET SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL CAUSE. BEAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

27

0155

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

3

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

VZCZCEIC741 5--542VV NUA279

AF

OO RUDSVC RUDSC RUEHC
DE RUTANU 039GG 1881540
ZNR UUUUU

005556 PM 145

Info

O R 071535Z JUL 67
FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY 'NDON
INFO RUTGYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
RUTGHB/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
RUDSVC/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
L RUDSLB/AMCONSUL IBADAN
H UDSLK/AMCONSUL KADUNA
EUR RUEPJS/DIA
IO RUEPDSA/CINCSSTRIKE/CINCEAFSA
P STATE GRNC
BT

NSC

UNCLAS ENUGU 039

INR

ALD

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE BIAFRAN DEFENSE
MINISTRY ISSUED AT 1430Z JULY 7:

PG

SR

ORM

SCA

SCS

O

SY

PER

FBO

QPR

OC

1. BIAFRAN SOLDIERS HAVE BEATEN OFF AND INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES
ON TROOPS OF NIGERIAN ARMY WHO YESTERDAY OPENED A FOUR-PRONGED
ATTACK ON THE NORTHERN BORDBD OF BIAFRA.
2. THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE LED BY WHITE MERCENARIES WAS LAUNCHED
AT GAKEM, OBUDU, NYONYA AND ENUGU-EZIKE. IN ALL THE ENCOUNTERS
TROOPS REPELLED THE ATTACKERS AND THE ENEMY RETURNED WITH MANY
LOSSES. MANY OF THE NIGERIAN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN THE ENCOUN-
TER IN NSUKKA PROVINCE. IN THIS ENCOUNTER BIAFRAN TROOPS KNOCKED
OUT ENEMY POSITIONS WITH HEAVY MORTAR FIER, PUSHED THE NIGERIAN
ARMY BACK FIVE TULES INTO NIGERIA ANDHELD THE TOWN OF OKPO.

RSR

RSC

CCO

AS

3. INZKTD NFEMYOSSAGS*REVEALED THAT DURING THE BATTLE
LEADING TO OKPO SIX NIGERIAN OFFICERS WERE KILLED AND A WHOLE
COMPANY OF NIGERIAN SOLDIERS LOST. BIAFRAN CASUALTIES WERE
MAINLY WOUNDED. ALTHOUGH FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON IN OGOJA
PROVINCE, THE ENEMY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH.
BARNARD
BT

ADVANCED COPY PASSED WHITE HOUSE DOD CIA USIA NSA SS/O 7/7/67

*As received will be serviced upon request.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENUGU 39 7-7-67

0156

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 371

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06147 080807Z

21

ACTION: AF: 18:

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UPW 01, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, RSR 01, AID 28,

SCA 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCSE 00, 142 W

034169

R: 071703Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7656
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION
USMISSION USN NEW YORK
USIA WASHDC


UNCLAS LAGOS 6147

SUBJECT: - NIGERIAN PRESS ROUND-UP JULY 6 AND 7

1. MAIN NEWS JULY 6 PAPERS: PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS OF COMINFO ENAHORO (LAGOS 6102, NOTAL). ENAHORO WARNED RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST NIGHT FLIGHTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO "WAR IN SKIES IN NIGERIA... (WHOSE) CONSEQUENCES WILL BE GRAVE EVEN OUTSIDE THIS CONTINENT". POINTED OUT AGAIN FMG'S SUPPORT FOR DAYLIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS INTO REBEL TERRITORY AND STATED THAT FMG PREPARED TO ALLOW NEUTRAL OBSERVERS TO TAKE PART IN INSPECTION IN LAGOS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES INTENDED FOR REBELS SO AS TO SATISFY WORLD THAT RELIEF SUPPLIES NOT TAMPERED WITH BY FMG. ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT ICRC HAD BEEN INVITED BY NIGERIAN RC TO DISCUSS MATTERS UNDER NEW FMG RELIEF POLICIES. ON WAR ENAHORO SAID SEVERAL REBEL ATTEMPTS TO

UNCLASSIFIED

0157





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06147 080807Z

CROSS NIGER RIVER INTO MID-WEST HAD BEEN REPULSED RECENTLY AND REBELS ALSO HAD TRIED TO CROSS RIVER BETWEEN ITU AND IKOT OKPORO BUT ATTACK DRIVEN BACK. ONE "REBEL GUN-RUNNING DC 4" ALSO ANNOUNCED TO HAVE CRASHED AT ULI NIGHT JULY 4. NAF BOMBED PLANE AFTER CRASH AND DESTROYED IT. REBEL FORCES ALSO CLEARED FROM FOUR VILLAGES NEAR ABA AND ATTACKS NEAR UMUAHIA AND BENDE REPULSED.

2. JULY 6 SKETCH AND JULY 7 TRIBUNE HEADLINE THAT INVESTIGATION INTO MURDER OF TRADITIONAL RULER OF OGBOMOSHO REVEALS THAT MAIN CAUSE WAS DISPUTE BETWEEN HIM AND SOME OF HIS SUBJECTS OVER LAND AS WELL AS OTHER COMPLAINTS OF CORRUPTION AGAINST HIM. WHEN DELEGATION CAME TO DEMONSTRATE AT PALACE, RULER ALLEGEDLY DREW GUN AND SHOT SOME OF THEM, THEN REST OF GROUP OVERCAME HIM AND MURDERED HIM AND FIVE OF HIS ADVISOR CHIEFS. RULER'S FAMILY HAVE DENIED THIS STORY AND BLAMED POLICE FOR NOT ARRIVING SOONER TO AID IN MOB CONTROL. JULY 7 PAPERS REPORT RADIO BROADCAST OF WESTERN STATE MILGOV CHARGING DISTURBANCES CAUSED BY "FEW INFLUENTIAL AND AMBITIOUS PEOPLE".


3. SEVERAL ANTI-ICRC ARTICLES APPEARING BUT NOT RECENT EDITORIALS. MILGOV OF BENUE-PLATEAU STATE SAID ICRC DID MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO NIGERIA. COMMANDER NAF ALSO ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE STATED NAF READY TO MEET ANY CHALLENGE TO NIGERIAN SOVEREIGNTY BY SHOOTING DOWN ILLEGAL NIGHT FLIGHTS.

4. JULY 7 POST AND TIMES REPORT UK PM WILSON'S STATEMENTS IN STOCKHOLM BLAMING OJUKWU FOR BLOCKING SURFACE CORRIDORS, ADDING THAT HUNGER DID EXIST IN REBEL TERRITORY AND IT WAS UP TO OJUKWU TO RELIEVE THIS HUNGER BY ACCEPTING ANY OF VARIOUS SURFACE, RIVER OR DAY FLIGHT PLANS OFFERED. POST HEADLINES REPORT "US SECRETARY ROGERS EXPOSED" AND LEADS OFF "WHILE US SECSTATE WILLIAM ROGERS HAS ACCUSED FMG OF USING STARVATION AS WEAPON AGAINST REBELS, BRITISH PM MR. HAROLD WILSON SAID THAT QUESTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO PEOPLE IN REBEL-HELD AREAS WAS ONE TO BE DECIDED ENTIRELY BY OJUKWU"

5. POST AND TIMES ALSO REPORT NIGERIAN COMEXTAFF ARIKPO STATEMENTS IN LONDON THAT THERE WERE "HOPEFUL SIGNS" MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH ICRC HAD CLEARED UP WITH ICRC CONTINUING ITS WORK UNDER FMG'S SYSTEM OF INSPECTION ALTHOUGH ITS ROLE AS

UNCLASSIFIED

0158





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LAGOS 06147 080807Z

COORDINATOR OF RELIEF WAS OVER. POST REPORTS THAT ARIKPO CHARGED THAT ICRC PLANE WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN LAST MONTH CARRIED "DUBIOUS CARGO". ARIKPO ALSO REPORTEDLY DECLARED FMG WOULD NOT USE ITS CONTROL OVER RELIEF SUPPLIES TO FORCE REBEL SURRENDER.

6. ALMOST ALL PAPERS CARRIED ARTICLES RECOUNTING HISTORY OF CIVIL WAR ON SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF BEGINNING OF FIGHTING JULY 6-7. NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL SAYS WHEN WAR STARTED NO ONE EXPECTED IT TO LAST THIS LONG BUT NOW IS NOT TIME TO GO INTO ASSESSMENT OF WHY IT HAS LASTED THIS LONG. STATES "THIS IS TIME OF REDEDICATION TO CAUSE OF ONE NIGERIA AND RESOLVE THAT PEOPLE OF COUNTRY ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND ARMY IN EFFORTS TO DEFEAT INSURGENTS, WHATEVER COST AND NO MATTER HOW LONG IT TAKES...NO OTHER RESULT BUT SURRENDER BY REBELS OR MILITARY VICTORY WILL SATISFY PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY". PRAISES NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES FOR HAVING FOUGHT WAR WITH SCRUPULOUS CORRECTNESS AGAINST RUTHLESS ENEMY.

7. JULY 7 NEW NIGERIAN REPORTS KADUNA RADIO-TV INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION SHUWA DENYING THAT ARMED FORCES FOLLOWING "DELAYING TACTICS" IN WAR. SAID THAT "FROM INITIAL STAGE OF WAR, FEDERAL AUTHORITIES HAD UNDERESTIMATED STRENGTH OF REBELS, AND ADDED WHEN REBEL LEADER OJUKWU BOASTED THAT NO FORCE IN BLACK AFRICA COULD SUBDUE HIM, HE REALLY MEANT IT". SHUWA ALSO SAID TO HAVE SUGGESTED MILITARY GOVERNORS SHOULD BE ROTATED AND ADDED HE DID NOT SUPPORT IDEA THAT MILITARY GOVERNOR HAD TO BE NATIVE OF STATE OF WHICH HE WAS GOVERNOR. MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

0159

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Intelligence
Note - 512

July 7, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlh*

Subject: France: Pompidou Reinstates Foccart in African Affairs Job

On June 25 President Georges Pompidou renamed Jacques Foccart to his old position as Secretary-General of the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, from which he had been dismissed by Interim President Poher. Such an appointment would ordinarily cause little stir if it were not for the aura of mystery and intrigue that surrounds Foccart. The principal significance of his reinstatement is the indication it gives that French policy toward Africa will remain substantially unchanged in the near future. It is not certain whether the fact that Foccart will no longer have an office in the Elysée Palace means that his relations with Pompidou will be less close than they were with de Gaulle, or simply that Pompidou, sensitive to Foccart's reputation, would like it to be thought that such is the case.

Who is Jacques Foccart? Foccart can be described as an unreconstructed Gaullist whose ties with and unswerving loyalty to the General go back to Resistance days. His functions under de Gaulle appear to have been these:

- 1) Africa. Foccart, as Secretary-General of the Presidency for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, had an office in the Elysée Palace itself and was the General's right-hand man for French relations with African states. There has been a tendency, however, to

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Pol 15-1 ER
XR POL 1 AFR-ER
Pol 27 01 AFR-NIG-ER

0160

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

PAGE(S) MISSING IN ORIGINAL

0161

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA
Date	10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 552

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06099 051542Z

50
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, UPW 01, UCF 05, AID 28,

SR 01, ORM 03, SCSE 00, SCA 01, RSR 01, 142 W

023318

R 051356Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7631
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
USIA

UNCLAS LAGOS 6099

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUND-UP JULY 4 AND 5

1. MAIN NEWS ALL JULY 4 PAPERS IN MURDER AND DISMEMBERMENT OF TRADITIONAL RULER OF OGBOMOSHO IN NORTHERN PART WESTERN STATE, BY RIOTERS ON JULY 03. JULY 5 PAPERS REPORT TROOPS MOVED INTO TOWN AND ALL QUIET NOW. NUMBER OF PERSONS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FROM BOTH OGBOMOSHO AND OTHER TOWNS IN NORTHERN PART OF STATE WHERE RIOTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. ALL PAPERS HAVE CARRIED EDITORIAL COMMENTS CALLING FOR END TO RIOTS AND ACTION BY STATE GOVERNMENT TO BRING END TO AGITATION WHICH ATTRIBUTED WITHOUT NAMING ANY NAMES TO POLITICAL AGITATORS WHO USING TAX ISSUE TO STIR UP TROUBLE FOR OTHER REASONS. SKETCH STATES INTER ALIA "SEEMS CLEAR NOW THAT THERE IS UNDER GROUND MOVEMENT AT WORK WHICH WANTS TO ENSURE THAT ACT OF GOVERNING IS MADE IMPOSSIBLE. BECAUSE GOVERNMENT AND ITS

UNCLASSIFIED
20

*LAGOS 6099
7/5/69*

0162

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 9591503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06099 051542Z

MACHINERY REMAINS LAST HOPE OF PEOPLE, IT CANNOT AFFORD TO BE BROWBEATEN INTO SITUATION WHERE RIOTERS DICTATE AND EXPECT GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIESCE." TRIBUNE EMPHASIZES INVESTIGATION MUST BE HELD INTO WHO IS BEHIND RIOTS AND WHERE WEAPONS USED HAVE COME FROM. POST POINTS TO "HISTORIC POLITICAL ANARCHY THAT REIGNED IN WEST IN 1965" AND CALLS FOR "FIRM AND RUTHLESS BAND TO QUELL DISTURBANCE... AND IF SOLDIER-RULERS CANNOT CONTAIN THIS MERCURIAL TEMPERAMENT (OF WESTERNERS) THEN


THEY SHOULD BE SAD FOR HAVING LEFT BARRACKS AT ALL." CALLS ON MILGOV ADEBOYO TO EXAMINE REASONS BEHIND RIOTS AND COME UP WITH ANSWER WHICH WILL END AGITATION.

2. JULY 5 TIMES AND PILOT REPORT UK FOREIGN SECRETARY STEWARTS STATEMENT LABOR PARLIAMENTARY GROUP THAT LAND CORRIDORS MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO GET RELIEF INTO REBEL AREAS AND BLAME FOR BLOCKING PROPOSAL MUST BE PUT ON REBELS. TIMES ALSO REPORTS STEWART TOLD GROUP UK MAKING NEW INITIATIVES TO OPEN UP LAND ROUTES.

3. SECSTATES STATEMENT ON NIGERIA REPORTED JULY 4 TIMES UNDER HEADING "US SUPPORTS NIGERIA ON RELIEF STAND"; HOWEVER, JULY 5 POST AND OBSERVER HAVE EDITORIALS STRONGLY CONDEMNING STATEMENT. POST EDITORIAL TITLED "BLACKMAIL" QUOTES ROGERS STATEMENT ABOUT PROSPECT OF MASS STARVATION ABHORRENT AND ALMOST INCOMPREHENSIBLE IN THIS DAY AND AGE THAT US GOING TO DO EVERYTHING TO GET RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO REBEL AREAS. THEN SAYS "PRAYERFUL STATEMENT STAT. AFFECTED WITH HUMANISM, IT COMES FROM GODS OWN COUNTRY. IF ONLY UNCLE SAM PITING 400 YEAR STARVATION OF AFRO-AMERICANS... IN SORDID GHETTOES OF AMERICA... IF ONLY UNCLE SAM REPENTING FOR DESTRUCTION OF OIL REFINERIES AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS IN AND AROUND HANOI AND FOR CONCENTRATED DESTRUCTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FARMLAND- ALL TO STARVE VIETNAMESE OUT OF EFFORT AT UNIFICATION, WE SHOULD HAVE CALLED STATEMENT REVIVAL MEETING ON MORAL REARMAMENT." CHARGES US THINKS NOTHING OF SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT INVOLVED DIRECTLY AND NIGERIANS "SUBJECT TO BOREDOM WATCHING EACH DAY DISCOVER FRESH ORACLE IN AMERICA TO SPEAK ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. LATEST ORACLE IS WILLIAM ROGERS... IT WOULD DO TO MAKE JUST ONE STATEMENT TO WILLIAM ROGERS: NIGERIA HAS SHOWN MORE CONCERN TO HER REBELLIOUS

UNCLASSIFIED

0163





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LAGOS 06099 051542Z

BROTHERS THAN ALL KINDNESS AMERICA HAS SHOWN WORLD SINCE SHE ENTERED WORLD POLITICS. IN FINAL ANALYSIS WE CAN SEE ROGERS BLAB FOR WHAT IT IS. FOR THAT REASON WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT NIGERIA WILL NOT KOWTOW TO BLACKMAIL FROM WASHINGTON TO GET DONA MERCEDES AND DONA MARIA UP CROSS RIVER." STATES THAT NIGERIANS ALSO CONSIDER SITUATION SERIOUS AND DEPLORE THOUGHT OF REMOTE CONTROL FROM WASHINGTON.

OBSERVER EDITORIAL: "DIPLOMACY AT ITS WORST", CALLS SECSTATES STATEMENT "POMPOUS AND PIOUS" AND SAYS "BLESS YOUR BLEEDING SANCTIMONIOUS HEART".

SAYS OBSERVER DOES NOT KNOW WHO "GOADED" HIM INTO STATEMENT BUT SAYS IT PROVES "MR. ROGERS DEFINITELY MASTER OF CLICHE... (AND) US FOR SOME OBSCURE REASONS CONTINUES TO ENTRUST ITS MOST IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC POST TO RANK AND NAIVE AMATEUR." STATES THAT WISHES TO POINT OUT HE NOT TRAVELLING BACKWOOD ROADS OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN US... (AND) PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA DO NOT LIKE IDEA OF HAVE TO STARVE SECESSIONISTS INTO SUBMISSION ANY MORE THAN HE DOES. BUT NECESSITY IS FATHER OF INVENTION, NOT THAT STARVING ENEMY INTO SUBMISSION IS NEW INVENTION OR NEVER HAS BEEN USED BEFORE." SAYS THAT WHAT SECSTATE SAID IS "LESS GALLING THAN FACT THAT HE HAD TO OPEN HIS BIG MOUTH AT ALL." AND THAT IN ONE BREATH HE SAYS USG IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH FMG OVER RELIEF THEN IN NEXT HE INSULTS FMG. STATES THAT IF PRESSURE COMES FOM ICRC HE MIGHT AS WELL SAVE HIMSELF ALL.

TROUBLE. COUNTRY HAS HAD ENOUGH OF THAT. PERHAPS, MR. ROGERS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED IF HE GOT OFF HIS RUMP, CAME OVER AND ABOVE ALL TALKSED TO AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO LIVE AND WORK IN THIS COUNTRY. AND WHILE OVER HERE HE MIGHT DO WELL BY ALSO TALKING TO PEOPLE.

OF THIS COUNTRY WHO HAVE ENDURED SO MUCH PERSONAL SORROW AND HARDSHIP BECAUSE OF GROUP OF EVIL MEN WHO WOULD DESTROY UNITY OF OUR COUNTRY..JUST AS FOOTNOTE, OBSERVER WOULD LIKE TO REMIND MR. ROGERS ONCE AGAINST THAT WHEN YOU ARE NEGOTIATING

YOU KEEP YOUR TRAP SHUT. ONCE YOU HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT YOU MAKE JOINT NOT UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS.

THAT IS VERY ESSENCE OF SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMACY."


ENDS WITH NOTE THAT THIS FIRST

PART OF EDITORIAL WHICH IS TO BE CONTINUED. JULY 5 TIMES COLUMNIST "ALLAH-DE" ALSO ATTACKS ICRC, DONA

UNCLASSIFIED

20

0164





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 LAGOS 06099 051542Z

MERCEDES AND MARIA AND SECSTATES STATEMENT.
JULY 4 NEW NIGERIAN CARRIED CARTOON
SHOWING AMB FERGUSON STEPPING OFF DONA MERCEDES
CARRYING TWO SACKS,
ONE MARKED ARMS AND OTHER FOOD WHILE OOUKWU SAYS
"LET ME HAVE ARMS" AND NIGERIAN PUBLIC SHOUT NO, NO.
MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

0165

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

IGIN/ASTION		
RM R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	INR
L	FBO	AID
ACR	CDM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

AIRGRAM

Pol 27-9 Biafra
Nigeria
FOR RM USE ONLY
HANDLING INDICATOR

A-310
NO. UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State

INFO : Addis Ababa, Algiers, Ibadan, Kaduna, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Warsaw, Lagos (9) (w/attachment)

DEPT PASS: US Mission Geneva, OSD (For CINSTRIDE) (w/attachment)

FROM : AmEmbassy Lagos

DATE: July 3, 1969

SUBJECT : International Observers Team Report for Period 1 May 1969 - 27 June 1969

REF : Lagos A-220 of May 13, 1969; Lagos 5932

Enclosed is the full text of the report issued on July 1, 1969 by the team of International Observers from Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Reftel gives a summary of the report.

Much local interest was generated by the Observers' statement that several rebel prisoners said that "secessionist troops rations consisted of food supplied by relief agencies. This was confirmed by a civilian District Officer who had recently crossed over from the secessionist to the federal side".

MATHEWS

Enclosure: *att bmm*
Observer Team Report for 1 May 1969 - 27 June 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323	FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
Drafted by: POL:FPicard:kr 7/2/69	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out
Clearances:	Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:ERamsaur

0 1 6 6

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND954503
By: MVA NARA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

PAGE 01 LONDON 05298 031857Z

for Pol 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

50

ACTION AF: 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, UCF 05, UPW 01, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, 174 W
013930

P 031800Z JUL 69

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1440

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 5298

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NEW DEBATE SCHEDULED IN COMMONS

1. PRESS THIS MORNING (JULY 3) REPORTS CONSERVATIVES HAVE DECIDED TO PROVIDE TIME NEXT WEEK FOR FULL-DEBATE ON NIGERIA. THIS WILL PROBABLY OCCUR THURSDAY, JULY 10. TELEGRAPH REPORTS CHIEF OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN WILL BE SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME "WHO IS LIKELY TO SUGGEST THAT TIME HAS COME FOR BRITAIN TO SPONSOR MOTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLING FOR INTERNATIONAL BAN ON ARMS FROM ALL COUNTRIES INTO ANY PART OF NIGERIA." DAILY MAIL SPECULATES THAT PM WILSON MAY SEND HIGH-RANKING SPECIAL ENVOY TO LAGOS TO HELP MEDIATE BETWEEN FMG AND ICRC.

2. COMMENT: NEW FULL-SCALE DEBATE MEANS NONOFFICIALS AND MINISTERS CONCERNED WITH NIGERIA WILL HAVE HANDS FULL NEXT WEEK. WE SAW MAURICE FOLEY BRIEFLY EARLIER THIS WEEK AND HE SAID CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO SENDING LORD HUNT TO LAGOS TO HELP GET RELIEF PROGRAM BACK ON TRACKS. ANNENBERG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

27

*London - 5298
7-3-69*

0167

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

DEF. DISTRIBUTION
ORIGINATOR.

AF-5

RS/R	REP	AF	ARA
1			
EUR	FE	NEA	CU
5			
INR	E	P	IO
5			
L	PBO	AIO	S/P
			1
AGR	COM	FRB	INT
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSO
5	3	5	34
USIA	NSA	CIA	NSC
10	3	20	6

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info	Initials
AMB/PO			
OCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
ADM			
AIO			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

Date:

Initials:

Drafted by:

Clearances:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : LAGOS

INFO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BONN, MUNICH

FROM : USBER, Berlin

SUBJECT : East Germans Reportedly in Nigerian Air Force

REF :

According to an article entitled "Ulbricht's Condor Legion in Nigeria" which appeared in the June 30 issue of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, groups of East German air force personnel have been observed in Lagos. The article described the men as "members of the GDR Air Force, experts in the MIG-15 and Ilyushin-28 of the Nigerian Air Force." The East Germans reportedly travelled to Lagos via Prague and Zurich and were first observed at the beginning of June, at about the time of a Nigerian attack on the Biafran airport "Annabelle" and the destruction of a church sponsored Biafran relief plane. The article noted that at the time of the two incidents local observers were struck by the precision and different style of the attacks in contrast to earlier raids usually flown by Algerian, Egyptian or Nigerian pilots. In recent months, the reporter observed, the Nigerian Air Force concentrated on military rather than civilian targets, and showed a new aggressiveness. The reporter attributed this to increased confidence among the regular pilots because of more effective support operations provided by GDR mechanics. He even considered it likely that the East Germans were actually piloting Nigerian aircraft.

MORRIS

AK

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 10-64 DS-323

For Department Use Only

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

EAS:JPhayes:sth

Drafting Date:

7-1-69

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

EAS:AKlay

Clearances:

MIN:DKlein

O - 12634

0168

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 959503
By M. NARA Date 10/3/05

66



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Handwritten: Lagos 6025
7-2-69

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 412

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06025 021558Z

51
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, UCF 05, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 01,
SCS 04, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, RSR 01, /146 W
004851

P 021455Z JUL 69:
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7585

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 6025

SUBJECT: REPORTED MILITARY OFFENSIVE

REF STATE 108403 LAGOS 5930 *PL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA*

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. DATT HAS NO INFORMATION TO SUPPORT ENAHORO'S CLAIM
THAT 1ST AND 3RD DIVISIONS HAVE LAUNCHED NEW OFFENSIVE.

2. REORGANIZATION BEGUN WHEN FIELD COMMANDERS CHANGED IN
MAY APPEARS STILL UNDER WAY. AT MOMENT 1ST DIVISION SEEMS
TO BE UNDERGOING FURTHER READJUSTMENTS IN TACTICAL BOUND-
ARIES.
THIRD DIVISION FRONT ACTIVE BUT DIVISION SHOWS NO SIGN
OF GOING ALL OUT.
EXEMPT.
MATHEWS

①

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

23

0 1 6 9

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 792

PAGE 01 LAGOS 06034 021926Z

47
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, AID 28, UCF 05, UPW 01,

SCSE 00, SCA 01, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, 142 W

006217

R 021540Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7594
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 6034

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP JULY 2

1. POST AND TIMES REPORT RELIEF AGENCIES, WITH EXCEPTION OF ICRC, ALL SIGNED JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH FMG ACCEPTING ANNOUNCED FMG POLICIES ON RELIEF (LAGOS 6008 NOTAL). TIMES HEADLINES REPORT QTE ICRC SPURNS RELIEF PACT UNQTE. TIMES ALSO CARRIES REUTERS REPORT FROM GENEVA ON ICRC PRESIDENT NAVILLE PRESS CONFERENCE UNDER HEADLINE QTE ICRC FURIOUS OVER GOVERNMENT QUIT ORDER UNQTE. REPORT MOSTLY QUOTES FROM NAVILLE STATEMENTS INCLUDING HIS ATTACKS ON INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF ROLE OF QTE CERTAIN NON-AFRICAN POWERS UNQTE IN WQR.

① 2. ALMOST ALL PAPERS REPORT NEW WESTERN STATE TAX RIOTS IN THREE VILLAGES NEAR IBADAN. NUMBER OF POLICE REPORTED KILLED IN AMBUSH NEAR AKANRANI VARIES FROM TWO TO SIX.

UNCLASSIFIED

0170

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MVA NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 06034 021926Z

WITH NUMBERS OF CIVILIANS INJURED OR KILLED UNKNOWN.
(AMCONSUL REPORTING SEPARATELY NOTAL.) WESTERN STATE
GOVERNMENT HAS STATED DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE ACTIONS
AGAINST TAX DEFAULTERS.

3. PILOT AND LAGOS RADIO REPORTED REUTERS' CORRESPONDENT
LAGOS PICKED UP, QUESTIONED AND RELEASED BECAUSE REUTERS
DISTRIBUTED FMG STATEMENT ON RELIEF AHEAD OF OFFICIAL
RELEASE.

4. POST, TIMES AND SKETCH REPORT ANOTHER ATTEMPTED RAID
ON BENIN NIGHT JULY 1 BY ONE REBEL PLANE. PLANE REPORTEDLY
CHASED AWAY BY FMG ANT-AIRCRAFT FIRE. PAPERS ALSO REPORT
MID-WEST POLICE HAVE CARRIED OUT SURPRISE RAIDS AND SWEEP
IN NUMBER OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES ARRESTING NUMBER OF PEOPLE
AS REBEL SPIES AND CAPTURING SOME WEAPONS. POST AND TIMES
REPORT FMG CONFIRMATION THAT NAF RAIDS ON FOUR REBEL BASES
ALONG BANKS OF NIGER RIVER CARRIED OUT LAST WEEKEND AND WARE
HOUSES, REBEL CANOES USED FOR CROSSING RIVER AND OTHER MATERIAL
DESTROYED.

5. POST AND TIMES REPORT JULY 1 ISSUANCE OF LATEST
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS' REPORT. OBSERVERS STATED THAT
FMG TROOPS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF LIBERATED AREAS AND
EAST-CENTRAL STATE GOVERNMENT HEADED AND STAFFED BY
IBOS BELYING REBEL CHARGES OF GENOCIDE AGAINST IBOS.
ESTIMATES ABOUT 40,000 CIVILIANS NOW IN ENUGU. TIMES,
BUT NOT POST, ALSO REPORTS THAT NUMBER OF REBEL POW'S TOLD
OBSERVERS THAT REBEL TROOPS BEING FED WITH RELIEF SUPPLIES.


6. POST REPORTS NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA SANUI LEFT
LAGOS AFTER CONSULTATION FOR NEW YORK ON QTE SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENT UNQTE FOR FMG.

7. POST HAS LONG SIGNED ARTICLE ATTACKING TIME MAGAZINE
AS QTE ARCHITECT OF SECESSION UNQTE AND CALLS FOR IT TO
BE BANNED FROM NIGERIA. ALSO ATTACKS LONDON TIMES, SKETCH
AND FINANCIAL TIMES.

8. TIMES AND EKICH REPORT PRESS CONFERENCE IN KADUNA BY
NIGERIAN ARMY COS KATSINA. KATSINA DISCLOSED EIGHT
ARMY OFFICERS DETAINED FOR INDULGING IN CORRUPT PRACTICES.

UNCLASSIFIED

0171





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LAGOS 06034 021926Z


AND FIVE OTHERS HELD FOR DEALING IN SEIZED VEHICLES. STATED FMG'S DETERMINATION TO KEEP CORRUPTION OUT OF ARMED FORCES AND SAID ANY OFFICER CAUGHT RUNNING ANY BUSINESSES WOULD BE QTE RUTHLESSLY DEALT WITH UNQTE. ALSO REVEALED HE HAD PREPARED PAPER TO SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL RECOMMENDING CHANGES IN POSTINGS FOR MILITARY GOVERNORS BECAUSE IF PERSONS STAYED IN ANY POST TOO LONG THEY HAVE TENDENCY TO FORGET THEY ARE IN MILITARY SERVICE AND SHOULD BE READY FOR CHANGE OF POST ON 24-HOUR NOTICE. STATED THAT CHANGE OF WAR FRONT COMMANDERS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FAILURES OR MERITS OF MEN INVOLVED AND WAS MERELY ROUTINE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION, REPLIED THAT COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION SHUWA HAD REMAINED AT POST DESPITE EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD CHANGE JOBS WITH COL. BISALLA BECAUSE SHUWA HAD QTE SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT TO COMPLETE UNQTE. ALSO IN REPLY TO QUESTION KATSINA EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SUGGESTION FOR MILITARY TO HAND OVER POWER TO CIVILIANS AND CONCENTRATE ON WAR WOULD WORK.

9 . JULY 1 NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL CALLED FOR FMG TO ENFORCE TOTAL BAN AGAINST ANY FLIGHTS INTO ULI. POINTS TO OJUKWU STATEMENT END OF MAY THAT FOOD PLentiful IN REBEL AREAS AND SAYS RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS DID NOT DISPUTE THIS STATEMENT THEN BUT QTE WE HEAR OUTCRIES FROM GENEVA

AND JCA ABOUT KWASHOKOR AND MASS STARVATION... WHEN THEY CANNOT FLY TO ULI AT WILL UNQTE. ATTRIBUTES THIS TO RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS' SUPPORT FOR REBELLION. MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

0172



66

POL 27 ~~AFRA~~-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

108403

07

1 JUL 69 19 17Z

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

Info:

SUBJECT: Reported Military Offensive

REF: Lagos 5930

1. Would appreciate any additional information available concerning
offensive reported para 3 refel.

END

[ROGERS]

108403

Drafted by:

AF/W:DSSpigler:emb 7/1/69

Tel. Ext.

2619

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: AF/W - Donald S. Spigler

Clearances:

U/CF - Mr. Davidson (substance)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0173

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Draft Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 503

PAGE 01 IBADAN 00186 021657Z

40
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01,

AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSCE 00, SSO 00, RSR 01, 146 W
005255

P R 011655Z JUL 69
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 852
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL KADUNA
USMISSION GENEVA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IBADAN 186

SUBJECT: HARDENING ATTITUDE OF NIGERIAN MODERATES TOWARDS OUTSIDE
RELIEF EFFORTS

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH CONOFF JULY 1, DR. TAMUNO, HISTORY LECTURER AT UNIBADAN, COMMENTING ON TAKE-OVER OF RELIEF COORDINATION BY NIGERIAN REHABILITATION COMMISSION, EMPHASIZED HARDENING ATTITUDE OF MANY NIGERIANS, PRESUMABLY MAINLY AT UNIVERSITY, TOWARDS OUTSIDE RELIEF. WHILE THIS WOULD BE NO SURPRISE COMING FROM SOME AT UNIVERSITY, IT MEANS SOMETHING COMING FROM TAMUNO WHO HAS MODERATE, PRO-WESTERN REPUTATION. HE SAID THERE NO LONGER ANY ROOM FOR MODERATES AS MOST NIGERIANS CONVINCED OUTSIDERS EXPLOITING NIGERIAN SITUATION FOR OWN ENDS.

2. WHAT PARTICULARLY INCENSES SUCH NIGERIANS ARE SUCH THINGS AS ICRC AND JCA STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THEY WILL CONTINUE RELIEF ON OWN TERMS. HE SAID SUCH RELIEF PLANES WOULD PROVIDE TRAINING EXERCISES FOR NIGERIAN PILOTS. EVEN WORSE WAS SUGGESTION OF BRITISH MP BROCKWAY THAT RAF FLY IN RELIEF. HE DEPLORED WORLD'S DOUBLE STANDARD ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, E.G. APPLAUDING RESOURCEFULNESS VONROSEN REBEL BOMBINGS AND CONDEMNING CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR LIFE OF FMG BOMBINGS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0174

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 IBADAN 00186 021657Z

EM EXPULSION OF LINDT ALMOST UNIVERSALLY SUPPORTED AND FERGUSON ALMOST EQUALLY SUSPECT AS RESULT HIS STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON ON RELIEF SHIPS PLUS SUCH STATEMENTS AS ONE ON FMG USE OF FRAGMENTATION BOMBS (WHICH HE CLAIMED DISPROVED BY OBSERVERS BUT NEVER WITHDRAWN BY FERGUSON). THESE STATEMENTS CITED AS EVIDENCE OF INTERFERENCE AND PARTISANSHIP.

4. TAMUNO WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHILE MANY IN WESTERN NIGERIA HAD BLAMED PROLONGATION OF CIVIL WAR ON INERTITUDE NIGERIAN ARMY, WEIGHT OF BLAME NOW SHIFTING TO "HUMANITARIANS."

5. ANOTHER FACTOR IN HARDENING OF ATTITUDE OF MODERATES TOWARDS RELIEF IS THEIR CONVICTIONS SINCE MONROVIA CONFERENCE THAT REBELS DO NOT WANT NEGOTIATED PEACE. THUS, THERE NO ALTERNATIVE TO OUTRIGHT MILITARY VICTORY USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS.

6. SUPPORTING HIS THESIS OF SHIFT IN OPINION OF MODERATES, HE NOTED FOUR FORMER MODERATES ASSOCIATED WITH NIGERIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (REFS). HE ALSO NOTED GOWON'S SILENCE ON RELIEF CONTROVERSY AND OBSERVED EVEN HE COULD NOT TAKE MODERATE LINE IN PRESENT MOOD OF COUNTRY.

7. TAMUNO SAW GREAT POTENTIAL DANGER TO US-NIGERIAN RELATIONS IN PRESENT RELIEF CONTROVERSY. FEARED STATEMENTS MIGHT BE ISSUED ON BOTH SIDES WHICH COULD INFLAME PUBLIC OPINION AND FURTHER HARDEN ATTITUDES, ADVERSELY AFFECTING RELATIONS FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

8. COMMENT: THESE COMMENTS SHOULD BE PLACED IN CONTEXT OF CONTINUING FRIENDLY PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL US-NIGERIAN RELATIONS IN WESTERN NIGERIA. BOTH MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMMISSIONER FOR ECON PLANNING HAVE IN PAST FEW DAYS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US AID (IBADAN A-115). GOVERNOR GIVING FAREWELL LUNCH TO DEPARTING BPAO AND ATTENDED FAREWELL PARTY FOR HIM BY LTCOL MAKANJUOLA. PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO REPORT BREAKDOWN IN FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN THIS AREA BUT TO PUT UP WARNING SIGNAL THAT PRESENT RELIEF CONTROVERSY AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS IT MAY PROVOKE ON BOTH SIDES COULD CAUSE FURTHER SET-BACKS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

EXEMPT. STRONG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0175

